The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, Peter Ruggenthaler Rowman & Littlefield, 29. des. 2009 - 530 sider On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the 'Prague Spring' reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decide that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for 'socialism with a human face.' Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that 'the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries' and that the Soviet Union had both a 'right' and a 'sacred duty' to 'defend socialism' in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia. The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a 'green light,' if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion. |
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PART II CZECHOSLOVAKIA THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PRAGUE SPRING | 59 |
The Prague Spring and Apprehension about a Soviet Invasion | 61 |
Chapter 4 Soviet Society in the 1960s | 75 |
Chapter 5 Politburo DecisionMaking on the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968 | 103 |
Preconditions for the Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia | 145 |
Normalizing Relations between the Soviet Leadership and the Czechoslovak Delegation after the Invasion | 165 |
Chapter 15 Ulbricht East Germany and the Prague Spring | 341 |
Chapter 16 Hungary and the Prague Spring | 371 |
Chapter 17 Tito the BlocFree Movement and the Prague Spring | 397 |
Neutrality in the Crucible? | 419 |
in Prague | 441 |
Appendix 2 We Are Ready at Any Time to Assist the Czechoslovak People Together with the Armies of the Warsaw Pact | 443 |
Eugene V Rostow to Dean Rusk 10 May 1968 | 447 |
Appendix 4 On the Results of the Warsaw Meeting of the Delegations of Communist Parties and Workers Parties from Socialist Countries | 449 |
PART III THE GREAT POWERS AND THE YEAR OF CRISIS IN 1968 | 191 |
Chapter 8 The Johnson Administration the Vietnam War and the American Souths Response to the Vietnam War | 193 |
The Johnson Administration and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 | 215 |
Photospread | 236 |
The CIA and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia | 237 |
Britain the Soviet Union and the 1968 Czech Crisis | 249 |
Chapter 12 Paris and the Prague Spring | 271 |
Chapter 13 France Italy the Western Communists and the Prague Spring | 283 |
PART IV EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS DURING THE PRAGUE SPRING | 317 |
Chapter 14 The USSR the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 | 319 |
Appendix 5 CC Urging the United States to Halt Hostile US Media Campaign against the Soviet Union | 453 |
Appendix 6 Secret Memorandum by Nathaniel Davis Czechoslovak Contingencies | 455 |
Appendix 7 Memorandum from Ambassador McGhee to the Secretary of State 21 August 1968 | 457 |
If He Were to Resign from His Post It Would Be Better for All of Us | 461 |
Appendix 9 Secret and Top Secret Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings 1968 | 465 |
Appendix 10 US Propaganda Strengthening NATO | 481 |
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About the Contributors | 505 |
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The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 Günter Bischof,Stefan Karner,Peter Ruggenthaler Ingen forhåndsvisning tilgjengelig - 2010 |
Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
21 August Andropov Austria AVP RF Bil’ak Bloc Bratislava Brezhnev Brezhnev Doctrine Budapest CC CPSU CC KSC Central Committee Cernik Cierna nad Tisou Cold Cold War Communist Party Comrade counterrevolution CSSR cultural Czech Czechoslovak crisis Czechoslovakia defense democratic détente developments difficult diplomatic Dokumente Dubéek East Eastern Europe embassy European first fraternal parties Fulbright Gomulka healthy forces Hungarian Hungary influence intellectuals internal invasion of Czechoslovakia Johnson July Kremlin KSC leadership Mark Kramer meeting memorandum military intervention minister Moscow NATO negotiations Office official ofthe ovotny Pauer plenum Politburo resolution political Prager Prague Spring president Presidium reform reprinted in Karner Republic RGANI Rusk Russian secretary Senator September 1968 Slovak socialism Socialist countries Soviet ambassador Soviet leaders Soviet leadership Soviet Union Stalin Svoboda talks tion Tito troops Ulbricht United University Press USSR Vietnam Warsaw Pact West German Western Yugoslav Yugoslavia