The mortgagee of the improvements on leased Indian Reservation lands and of the leasehold thereof has the right of renewal of the lease under the act of Con

gress of Feb. 19, 1875. It not appearing

that such renewal was not made, it is presumed, under the circumstances of the case, that it was made.

Appeal from judgment on decision at Special Term and from order denying motion to modify the judgment.

In June, 1872, Redeye, a Seneca Indian, residing on the Allegany Indian Reservation in Cattaraugus County, executed to plaintiff a lease of a piece of land on said reservation for the term of 13 years from Nov. 1, 1872. Said land was in Great Valley, one of the villages mentioned in the act of Congress approved Feb. 19, 1875, entitled

"An act authorizing the Seneca Nation of New York Indians to lease lands within the Cattaraugus and Allegany reservations, and to confirm existing leases." U. S. Sess. Laws, 1874–5, 330. On Nov. 30, 1875, plaintiff assigned said lease and transferred possession of the land on which werethen a house and barn to defendant, in consideration of $1,100, to secure payment of which defendant, on the same day, executed to plaintiff a mortgage upon the house and barn and also upon his interest in said lease and all buildings then on said land or thereafter to be erected thereon. Defendant continued in possession, and in April, 1878, default having been made, plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose said mortgage. The action was tried in May 1881, and in March, 1884, judgment was entered directing that the premises be sold; that the purchaser be let into possession; that the proCeeds, or so much thereof as may be necessary, be applied to the payment of the amount unpaid upon the mortgage; and that thedeficiency, if any, be paid by defendant. Subsequently, defendant. moved at Special Term to modify the judgment, and particularly to strike out the provision that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale be let into possession.

Henderson & Wentworth, for applt.

Ansley & Vreeland, for respt.

Held, As we apprehend it, appellant's argument is that the lease was void at its execution, and at most was made valid by the act of

Feb., 1875, for five years only from the passage of said act, and that as the five years had elapsed before the trial, the court erred in holding that the mortgage was then a subsisting lien upon the preniises.

The act made valid all then existing leases of lands within the boundaries of the villages therein named, in which Seneca Indians or persons claiming under them were lessors, for a period of five years after the passage of the act, except such as by their terms expired at an earlier date. The act also provided that at the expiration of a lease the Nation should be entitled to the possession of the lands and have power to lease them. It also made such leases renewable, at their termination, for periods not exceeding twelve years, and provided that the persons who might be at such time the owners of improvements erected upon such lands should be entitled to such renewed leases, and to continue in possession of such lands on such conditions as might be agreed upon by such owners and the councilors of the Seneca Nation, or, in case of their disagreement, by referees to be chosen as provided in the act.

The lease in question, if invalid before, was made valid by the act. Defendant is not in a position to raise the question whether the lease had expired. Clearly, it had not expired when this suit was begun, as that was within five years after the passage of the act. Whether plaintiff had availed himself of the right of renewal under the act

does not concern defendant. He had not been disturbed in his possession when judgment was entered. His only right to posses

sion was under the lease assigned to him by plaintiff. The right of the Indian Nation to possession at the expiration of the five years was subordinate to the right of the owner of the improvements to a renewal of the lease for twelve years thereafter. years thereafter. Plaintiff's interest, as mortgagee of the improvements and of the leasehold, gave him the right of renewal under the act, and from the fact that his assignee continued in possession under the lease it may be presumed, if necessary to support the judgment, that the lease had been renewed.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.

Opinion by Smith, P.J.; Bradley, J., concurs; Barker and Haight, JJ., not sitting.

March 13, 1886, relator relator was arrested on a warrant issued by the recorder of the city of Elmira, charging her with keeping a disorderly house, and taken before the recorder, whereupon she pleaded not guilty, waived an examination and demanded a trial by jury after indictment, and offered bail, which was refused on the ground that the recorder had exclusive jurisdiction to try her. The trial was adjourned to March 19, and in default of bail to appear for trial she was committed to jail.

Relator obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the county judge and sought to be discharged on the ground that she had a right to give bail for her appearance to answer to an indictment and therefore was illegally imprisoned. The county judge held that the recorder had exclusive jurisdiction to try relator for the offense charged, and remanded her to the custody of the sheriff. The offense charged is a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary or county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than $500, or by both. Penal Code, § 15.

Charles A. Collin, for applt. Edgar Denton, Dist. Atty., for respt.

Held, That the order is correct. That the recorder had exclusive jurisdiction to try the relator for the offense charged, subject to her right to apply for a certificate directing that she be prosecuted by indictment, pursuant to $857 and 58, Code Crim. Pro. The recorder of the city of Elmira is

authorized to hold Courts of Special Sessions and exercise the powers and jurisdiction of such courts, as regulated by the statute. Elmira charter, Chap. 370, Laws of 1875, $104; Code Crim. Pro., § 63. Section 44 of the charter of the city provides: "The justices of the peace within the city shall have and exercise all the powers, authority and jurisdiction, and discharge all the duties, and be entitled to the fees and compensation of justices of the peace of the several towns in this State, except as modified by this act."

Section 104 provides: "The recorder of the city shall, except in case of his absence therefrom, or inability, from sickness or other cause, to act, have jurisdiction exclusive of any justice of the peace or other officer therein, except judges of courts of record, to issue all criminal process, and to institute all criminal proceedings,. which a single justice or two justices of the peace in towns are empowered or directed by law to issue and institute; to hear and entertain all complaints and conduct all' examinations in criminal cases and proceedings; to hold Courts of Special Sessions, with all the powers and jurisdictions of such courts. as regulated by statute; to try, convict and sentence all persons who may be guilty of any offenses which are or may be triable by Courts of Special Sessions, and to commit for trial all persons who shall be charged or be guilty of any offense not triable in said court. The Court of Special Sessions, held by said recorder, shall

have jurisdiction of and power to hear and determine all charges for every misdemeanor committed or charged to have been committed within said city. * * * Said recorder shall have the power to let to bail persons charged with crime before him in all cases of felony where the imprisonment in the State prison, on conviction, cannot exceed five years. * * * The said recorder shall have and possess the exclusive jurisdiction of all the offenses within said city specified in this section, except as hereinbefore stated." The sentence last quoted is very broad. No specific offenses are mentioned in the section, but offenses are classified as felonies and misdemeanors. In felonies the recorder is given power to take examinations and let to bail when the punishment, on conviction, cannot exceed imprisonment for five years in a State prison, which are the only offenses excepted from the exclusive jurisdiction of the recorder.

Section 106 of the charter pro

meanants had been established. Chapter 769, Laws of 1857; Chap. 467, Laws of 1866; Chap. 530, Laws of 1872. Laws of 1872. The sentence in the section last quoted, "except that such justices shall not have jurisdiction to try any person for any offense not heretofore triable by Courts of Special Sessions, conveys the idea of a broader jurisdiction in the Courts of Special Sessions when presided over by the recorder than when presided over by a justice of the peace, and if such was not the legislative intent it is difficult to see why these words of limitation were inserted.

The language of the charter of the city of Elmira is much broader than the language in the charter of the village of Hornellsville, and the case of People v. McDonald, 26 Hun, 156, does not support the contention of relator. Order affirmed.

Opinion by Follett, J.; Hardin, P.J., and Boardman, J., concur.

TION.

N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL

TERM. FIRST DEPT.

When this charter was passed the policy of conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon Courts of Special Sessions to try specified misde

The People ex rel. William J. Haddock et al., v. Artemas S. Cady, Clerk of Arrears.

Decided Oct. 15, 1886.

An owner of land in the city of N. Y. sold for the non-payment of taxes has two years from the date of the certificate given to the purchaser in which to redeem said land, and such certificate should bear the date of the time when such purchaser paid the purchase price

Taxes upon real property in the city of N. Y. which are not paid within 60 days after the entry thereof in the records bear interest at the rate of seven per cent. from the date of such entry up to the date of the certificate of sale given to the purchaser thereof. After the date of such

certificate of sale and up to the time of the delivery of a lease to the purchaser the owner of such lands, in order to redeem them, must pay to the clerk of arrears the purchase price together with interest thereon at the rate of fourteen per cent.

Certain real property in the city of N. Y. owned by relators was sold for the non-payment of taxes on May 7, 1883. The purchase price thereof was received by the clerk of arrears from the purchaser on May 29, 1883. The clerk of arrears subsequently advertised that the property had been so sold and that, unless the same was redeemed within two years from May 7, 1883, the date of the sale, a lease thereof would be delivered to the purchaser. On May 8, 1885, no redemption having been made, a lease was executed to said purchaser. On December 24, 1885, relators tendered to the clerk of arrears the amount of the taxes with interest at seven per cent. to the date of the tender, which was refused by the clerk. Relators then made an application for a mandamus, which resulted in the granting of a peremptory mandamus commanding the clerk of arrears to receive the amount of the purchase money with interest at fourteen per cent. from May 29, 1883, and give a certificate of redemption. From the order granting such mandamus both parties

under 918 of the Consolidation Act they were entitled to redeem upon payment of the tax with seven per cent. interest, and the clerk of arrears claiming that, since more than two years had elapsed since the date of the sale and a lease had been executed, relators were not entitled to redeem, even upon the payment of fourteen per cent. interest.

John C. Shaw, for relators. John Townshend and E. Henry Lacombe, for clerk of arrears.

Held, That the statute gave the owner two years from the date of the certificate of sale in which to redeem the lands, § 941, Consolidation Act, and that it seemed to be recognized that the date of sale and the date of the certificate might not coincide, and that it was implied that the certificate should bear date as of the time when the purchaser paid his money, for if the certificate bore the same date as the sale although the money was not paid until afterward, then the purchaser in case of redemption would receive fourteen per cent. for money which he still had in his pocket and was using for his own purposes until he paid it over to the city. That it must be assumed, therefore, that the certificate must be dated as of the day when the purchaser pays his money. That the notice in the case at bar required the owner to redeem 22 days before the time allowed by law, and that it was therefore void, and the provisions of the statute requiring 42 per cent. to be paid upon redemption