6. When the comptroller has refunded all the purchase money to the purchaser he is relieved from further duty in the trans- action.-Id.
7. By § 2481, subd. 6, the surrogate has power to open, vacate, modify or set aside a decree or to grant new trial, and his order in such a case is appealable and mandamus is not a remedy by means of which such an order can be disregarded. -The People ex rel. Stephens v. Lott, 396. 8. Where the relator, janitor of an armory, was entitled to monthly payment under Laws of 1883, Chap. 299, § 64, for his ser- vices, which were made a county charge, but the supervisors had made no provis- ion for such payment and the relator pro- cured his bills to be discounted, Held, That his claim for such discounts was not a county charge; that his claim for repayment was at least doubtful and a peremptory mandamus would not lie.- The People ex rel. Johnston v. Suprs. of Ulster Co., 559.
See CONTRACT, 14; RAILROADS, 12.
MARINE COLLISION.
1. Where both vessels are beating up a river and on the same tack, the one down the river is to be considered an overtak- ing vessel within the rules of navigation, regardless of the difference of their courses, and is bound to avoid the other. —Aldridge et al. v. Clausen, 273.
2. Defendant was the owner of a steam yacht licensed to proceed from port to port in the U. S. and by sea to any for- eign ports. The accident took place in the Hudson River and the yacht at the time showed the lights prescribed for ocean going steamers and those carrying sail, but not the lights prescribed for coasting vessels navigating inland waters. Held, That the yacht at the time of the accident was a coasting ves- sel and bound to carry the central range of lights prescribed by rule 7 of § 4233, U. S. R. S.-Chase et al. v. Belden, 392.
MARINE COURT. See JUDGMENT, 6.
MARINE INSURANCE.
1. The validity of a marine insurance ef- fected after the loss of the subject of in- surance depends upon the good faith of the assured, but no agency, however gen- eral in terms will be deemed to embrace
the power to insure property after knowl- edge of its loss.-The People v. Dimick, 236.
1. On an application to revoke letters issued to the widow of deceased the surrogate has power to pass upon the validity of a former marriage of such widow where the question affects the vitality of her marriage with the deceased.-In re estate of Hetherington, 4.
2. Decedent's widow was formerly married to one G. from whom she separated. At the time of said marriage G. had another wife living. In neither case has the mar- riage been annulled. Held, That the marriage to G. was absolutely void; that a decree dissolving it was not necessary to the legality of her marriage to dece- dent and that she was the legal wife of decedent.-Id.
1. A married woman domiciled in New York made a note, by her husband, who was then doing business in Connecticut, to the order of a firm there of which he was a member. The note was payable in Connecticut. It was first negotiated in New York. The law as to married women in Connecticut is, in general, the common law, and its statutes would not permit the making of such a note. Held, That the note was valid and she was bound.-Voight et al. v. Brown, 539.
See ASSAULT, 4; LIFE INSURANCE, 4, 5; MECHANIC'S LIEN, 2.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. One who has authority from the master to employ men, act as foreman and order repairs, stands in the position of the mas- ter, and the latter is liable for his neglect to adopt reasonable precautions for the safety of the employees.-Healy v. Ryan et al., 23.
2. Plaintiff was injured while in defendants' employ in a collision caused by a defec- tive brake. He had notified one P., who had authority to order repairs, and had been promised that it would be repaired. Held, That the question of contributory negligence was for the jury, and that the question whether such notice was given was properly submitted to them.-Id.
3. Plaintiff's intestate was killed while at work in the cellar of a building which defendant was constructing as contractor. He was engaged in preparing mortar, and for that purpose was obliged to get water from a tub standing under the opening
in the floors left for the stairs. Above this opening a number of brick-layers were at work laying brick on the fourth floor. The only evidence of the accident was given by a fellow workman, who was in the cellar, and who testified that he heard a thud, and, on looking round, saw deceased stagger toward the wall, and caught him as he was falling into the tub. It was found that deceased's skull was fractured. Held, That it could be inferred that deceased was killed by some hard substance falling upon his head from above; that defendant was under a duty to properly cover the said opening so as to protect the workmen in the cellar from such accidents and could not escape the liability for his neglect to do so by having delegated such duty to his foreman; and that, in the absence of proof that deceased knew that the cover- ing over said opening was insufficient, it could not be concluded that he took this risk as a necessary incident of his em- ployment.-Ford v. Lyons, 39.
4. Disobedience of a rule made by an em- ployer and posted conspicuously in his factory for the protection of his employ- ees in the use of the machinery would ordinarily be negligence on the part of the employee; but, if the employer prose- cutes his work in a manner that renders a violation of the rule necessary or prob- able, or if he suffers and approves its habitual disregard, its disobedience is not conclusive on the question of the em- ployee's negligence, and that matter must be left to the jury to determine.- Hayes v. The Bush & D. Mfg. Co., 42.
5. Plaintiff's intestate, a skilled workman, entered and remained in defendant's ser- vice with full knowledge and appreciation of the risk and danger of leaving the roller couplings uncovered. He died from in- juries received in the couplings. Held, that he took upon himself the risk of injury from plaintiff's omission.-Shaw v. Sheldon et al., 45.
6. Testimony was given that the superin- tendent asked deceased if he wanted the couplings covered and that he declined it. Held, That the jury should have been charged that, if true, that fact proved conclusively that deceased took the risk and freed defendants from responsibility. -Id.
7. Plaintiff while working in a laundry slipped upon the wet floor, when her left foot slipped into a hole which was used to sweep refuse into, and it was injured. Held, That she must be deemed to have taken the risk of slipping on the floor as incident to the employment and that the employer was not liable.-Burns v. Bost- wick, 217.
8. If, considering the age and experience of
the employee, the danger and risk of the work is obvious, no negligence can be imputed to the master for a failure to give notice.-Murphy v. Mairs, 309.
9. Plaintiff was injured by the fall of a scaffold on which he was at work for de- fendant as a helper. Defendant did not construct the scaffold, but it was done by his foreman. Held, That whether the scaffold was unsafe for the use to which it was put was a question of fact for the jury, and that defendant was liable for a failure to exercise proper care and prudence in regard to it before requiring plaintiff to use it.-Weiler v. Isley, 398.
10. Where the dangers of an employment are obvious, or are well known to the ser- vant, instruction and warning as to them is not required of the master.— Wendling v. Bainbridge et al., 481.
11. While plaintiff was welding two pieces of iron one of his employers, without warning, threw a compound on the pieces, which formed a sputtering flux and one of the particles injured plain- tiff's eye. Held, That as this act was unusual the injury was not an incident of the work which plaintiff assumed.- McCarragher v. Gaskell et al., 527.
12. The members of a firm are liable for a negligent act of one of the firm.- Id.
See CONTRACT, 18; NEGLIGENCE, 19; RAIL- ROADS, 1, 3, 4, 10, 11.
1. Where an action to establish and foreclose a lien is brought pursuant to Chap. 402, Laws of 1854, and amendments thereto, and judgment rendered therein which was set aside on appeal and a new trial granted, it is proper to deny a motion to dismiss the action, although more than a year had expired since the determination upon appeal and the case had not been retried. The case is still one where "pro- ceedings are commenced," and the lien continues" until judgment is rendered," that is, until a final judgment is rendered. -Haag et al. v. Hillemeyer, 34.
2. Where a man, with his wife's consent, erects improvements on her real estate, said estate becomes subject to the stat- utory mechanics' liens the same as if the wife had personally contracted for the erection of the building.-McDougall et al. v. Nast, 263.
3. The statutory lien is limited to the amount due to the contractor at the time of filing the notice, or to the sums he might re- ceive afterwards on account of his con- tract.-Id.
4. Section 2 of Chap. 342, Laws of 1885, ap- plies only to cases where the money is paid or the incumbrances put on by col- lusion with the owner for the purpose of defrauding the contractor.-Munger v. Curtis et al., 362.
5. A lien cannot cut off or affect a prior unrecorded mortgage made in good faith. -Id.
1. The report of a referee appointed to com- pute, etc., in a foreclosure suit is not the report meant by § 763 of the Code, which contemplates a decision of the referee determining the rights of the parties as they would be determined by a verdict, decision of a judge, or interlocutory judg- ment.-Smith v. Joyce 106.
2. A failure to revive a foreclosure suit in which there was no defense, plaintiff having died after the report of the referee to compute and before the entry of final judgement, does not affect the title of the purchaser at a sale under a decree in plaintiff's favor, such purchaser being the mortgagor and a defendant and hav- ing no notice of plaintiff's death.-Id.
3. Under what circumstances the non-pro- duction of a bond and mortgage furnishes conclusive evidence of their payment.- Lammer et al. v. Stoddard et al., 107.
4. A mortgage made upon real property be- fore the enactment of Chap. 275, Laws of 1882, by a trustee appointed by a marriage settlement to receive the rents and profits of said property during the life of the wife and apply the same to her benefit free from the debts, control or management of her husband, is absolutely void as being in contravention to the trust, not- withstanding that it was made with the sanction and under the direction of the Supreme Court and the proceeds were used in paying taxes levied upon the property.-The U. S. Trust Co. v. Roche et al., 111.
5. An action to foreclose such a mortgage cannot be sustained upon the ground that the mortgagee has become subrogated to the rights of the prior lienors whose liens upon such property were paid off by the money advanced upon the mortgage.-Id. 6. A purchaser of the equity of redemption who makes payments to the mortgagee after an assignment of the mortgage has been recorded is a purchaser subsequent to the assignee, and under the recording act he is chargeable with notice of such assignment, and it is not material whether he had notice otherwise sufficient to put him on inquiry.-Brewster v. Carnes, 129.
7. Accountings between a mortgagor and a former holder of the mortgage, in respect to payments claimed to have been made thereon, accompanied by an agreement to apply the balances settled upon the mort- gage, are admissible in evidence, as against a subsequent assignee, to prove payment of the mortgage to the mort- gagees.-Holcomb v. Campbell, 265.
8. Such an agreement to make an applica- tion is as effectual, by way of payment upon the morgage, as if receipted to that effect or endorsed thereon; and both par- ties are concluded by the transaction. — Id.
9. What was said by the parties, while the accounting and settlement was in pro- gress, is admissible as part of the res gestæ.-Id.
10. Testator, who was liable upon a mort- gage which he had assumed, conveyed the mortgaged premises to his daughter by a full convenant deed, in consideration of love and affection. Held, That the land was the primary fund for the payment of the mortgage, and that the daughter had no claim against the estate for pay- ments on the mortgage made by her.-In re claim of Wilbur v. Estate of Warren, 276.
11. In an action to restrain the foreclosure of a bond and mortgage, of which defendant was assignee, upon the ground of pay- ment, plaintiff, who was the widow and devisee of the mortgagor, was allowed to testify that in certain years there were settlements of mutual accounts between the mortgagees and the mortgagor; that certain amounts were then found due the latter and that these were agreed to be indorsed on the bond and mortgage. Held, No error. That these declarations of the mortgagees were competent as part of the res gesta.-Holcomb`v. Campbell,
12. Where a person who has purchased prem- ises at foreclosure sale and paid the ten per cent. and signed the usual terms of sale assigns his bid to another person who fails to complete the purchase the assignee takes the responsibility of the broken condition so far at least as to for- feit the ten per cent. in case of a deficiency on the re-sale.-Mead v. Brunnemer et al., 407.
13. Under the charter of the city of Buf- falo, where the city in the exercise of its right of eminent domain has instituted proper proceedings to condemn a portion of lands which are subject to a mortgage, and awards have been made to the mort- gagee for his damages in diminishing his security, although the awards had not in fact been paid by the city to the mort- gagee, the right of such mortgagee to payment of such awards is not affected by
the foreclosure and sale of the premises described in the mortgage. The rights acquired by the city by means of its right of eminent domain are paramount to the lien of the mortgage.-Fincke et al. v. The City of Buffalo, 445.
14. When a mortgage of a third person is assigned by the mortgagee as collateral for his own debt, the foreclosure by the assignee and his purchase at the sale as against the assignor, who has not been made a party, has only the effect to sub- stitute the land for the mortgage in the hands of the assignee, and leave it sub- ject to the right of the assignor, by pay- ment of his debt, to reclaim the property and hold it discharged of the assignee's lien. In re estate of Gilbert, 470.
15. The efficiency of a deed or mortgage de- pends upon its being executed according to the statutory formalities and being unconditionally delivered by the maker to the grantee or mortgagor or his agent. -Munoz v. Wilson, 477.
16. Under the circumstances of this case, Held, That the mortgage to plaintiff's in- testate, though subsequent in date to a deed to defendant, was delivered first and entitled to priority.-Id.
17. Action to foreclose a mortgage upon the property of a railroad company given to secure bonds issued by said company. The defense was that the bonds had been fraudulently issued and were invalid. The issues were tried at Special Term and a decision rendered to the effect that said bonds had been unlawfully issued and were voidable at the election of the railway company with the exception of those which had passed into the hands of holders for value without notice, and that as to such bonds the action could be maintained. Held, That it was not nec- essary upon such decision for the court to make findings and to enter an interlo- cutory judgment of foreclosure and sale with a reference to ascertain the amount due upon the bonds, but that a mere order of reference to inquire who were the holders of the bonds in controversy and for what they had been acquired and what consideration had been paid therefor by their present or preceding holders was proper and sufficient.-The Central Trust Co. v. The N. Y. C. & N. RR. Co., 520.
18. Such an order of reference affected a substantial right and was appealable.— Id.
19. Plaintiff, who held mortgages executed by F. and W., executed a release of W. from all liability thereon, which ex- pressed an intention not to discharge F.'s liability. Held, That the release cut off and destroyed the equitable right of sub-
rogation to the surety in case of payment, and the lien of the mortgage was de- stroyed.—Murray v. Fox et al., 535.
See ASSESSMENTS, 2; ASSIGNMENT, 2; BANKS, 13; CORPORATIONS, 7; DEEDS, 4; LEASE, 1; MECHANIC'S LIEN, 5; TRUSTEES, 1; VE- NUE, 2.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
1. The provisions of Chap. 719, Laws of 1870, in regard to the employment of counsel by defendant's common council were inconsistent with and repealed by Chap. 461, Laws of 1871, and a claim for services as counsel under such an employ- ment cannot be recovered against de- fendant. - Lyddy v. Long Island City, 284.
2. If city authorities have no actual notice of an obstruction placed in a street by third persons, yet if their ignorance re- sults from omission of duty of inspection the city is equally chargeable as if express notice had been actually proved. The question of reasonable time on which notice is to be inferred must be deter- mined on all the circumstances of the case by the jury where the question of negligence depends on implied notice, and in such case it is error to non-suit.— Kunz v. The City of Troy, 425.
3. The chamberlain of the city of Troy having abandoned his office and left the city, the mayor appointed defendant "to discharge the duties * during his absence." The charter provided for an appointment for three years, and that in case of sickness or absence, if the cham- berlain neglected to appoint some suitable person to discharge the duties the mayor could appoint some suitable person to dis- charge the duties during such sickness or absence. Held, That the appointment was a temporary one and was not in- tended as an appointment for a full term; that if the power to make a temporary appointment did not, under the circum- stances, exist, the appointment of defend- ant was void -The People ex rel. Bridg- man v. Hall, 428.
4. The negligence of the water board of the city of Yonkers, created under Chap. 36, Laws of 1873, for the purpose of taking land by condemnation for the city, while acting in performance of the duty of the municipality, is the negligence of the city.-Pettengill v. The City of Yonkers,
5. By Chap. 298, Laws of 1886, a city was au- thorized to borrow not exceeding $25,000 to erect a school building and the board of education was to certify how much of this sum would be necessary. The board certified that the whole sum would be
2. In a prosecution for the crime of man- slaughter committed as above described, reports of the condition of the buildings which subsequently fell, made to the Bu- reau of Inspection of Buildings of the city of N. Y. by one of its examiners, were admitted in evidence against the objection and exception of defendant. Before said reports were received in evi- dence their entire substance and effect were stated by the superintendent of said bureau in the course of his examination as a witness without exception or objec- tion on the part of defendant. Held, That since the reading of the report added nothing to the evidence already before the jury no error was committed in re- ceiving them for which a conviction should be reversed.--Id.
3. In such a prosecution it is proper to sub- mit to the jury specimens of mortar taken from several different parts of the fallen buildings shortly after their fall, and also a specimen of mortar designated by ex- perts to be good.—Id.
MUTUAL INSURANCE.
1. Defendant was organized under Chap. 175. Laws of 1883. An assessment was laid and money collected to pay plaintiff's claim. Payment was deferred and finally suit brought. Held, That the collection of the assessment for the purpose of pay- ment was not a bar to defendant proving any valid defenses which it had to the payment and that it was its duty to make such defenses.--Mayer v. The Equitable Reserve Fund Life Assn., 322.
2. A beneficial certificate in the "Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Work- ingmen of the State of New York," and the rules of the order to which the in-
sured had agreed, required that any mem- ber desiring to make a direction as to payment different from that stated in the certificate might do so in a prescribed form and with certain formalities. The insured, believing himself dying and de- siring such change, told a friend that he wished this done and asked him to have the forms gone through with. Before anything was actually done he died. Held, That the designation in the certifi- cate must stand and that the person des- ignated was entitled to the money.-Ire- land v. Ireland, 335.
See EXECUTORS, 11; LIFE INSURANCE, 9
1. After defendant's train began moving plaintiff's intestate with others attempted to board it. The gate was closed on the foot of deceased and he was carried along clinging to the car until struck by a water pipe and injured so that he died. Held, That his attempt to enter the train under the circumstances was a negligent act contributing to his death and that plaintiff could not recover.-Solomon v. The Manhattan R. Co., 25.
2. After the gates on defendant's cars were closed plaintiffs' testator kept hold of the stanchions supporting the roof while the train was moving and the gateman push- ing him away until he disappeared under the car and was killed." Held, That plaintiffs could not maintain an action for damages for his death.-Card et al. v. The Manhattan R. Co., 43.
3. A person driving a vehicle through the streets of a city is bound to anticipate that pedestrians may be at the crossings and to take reasonable care not to injure them.- Birkett v. The Knickerbocker Ice Co., 46.
4. In order to impute the negligence of its parents to a child who is non sui juris the child itself must be guilty of what would be negligence in an older person. -Id.
5. It is not negligence, as a matter of law, for a mother to allow a child four and one-half years old to go out to play on the sidewalk in the city of Brooklyn on a summer afternoon in company with a brother six years of age. Whether or not such an act is negligence is a question for the jury.-Id.
6. The measure of the damages arising from the death of a child four and one- half years old caused by the negligence of defendant is not the loss of services of such child during its minority, but is the whole pecuniary loss occasioned by its death.-Id.
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