129 Opinion of the Court. that such defenses would include questions of coverage as well as validity of a patent. But we do not think that § 2 reflects a decision by Congress that all suits involving licenses under the Act and presenting questions of coverage or validity should be tried in the Court of Claims. As respects the problem with which we are now concerned, § 2 does no more than to make available such defenses in the Court of Claims whenever the suits authorized by the Act are brought there. Both Alma and Timken maintain that the constitutional question could not be avoided by the Circuit Court of Appeals, because the T-32 and T-43 transfer cases were covered, if the T-79s were not, and were therefore necessarily subject to the Order. Indeed, the District Court decided that they were covered, and Timken did not appeal. This point carries its own refutation. Neither party appealed from the adjudication as to the T-32 and T-43 transfer cases. No claim as to them was before the Circuit Court of Appeals. There is no claim now that a litigant may not appeal from part of a judgment, or that an appeal from part brings up the whole." The Circuit Court of Appeals was not properly concerned with their coverage, or with the applicability to them of the Act or Order. Therefore, the part of its order affecting T-32s and T-43s was unwarranted, and should not now be made the basis for approving a constitutional decision which was otherwise unnecessary. general or special, that might be pleaded by a defendant in an action for infringement as set forth in title sixty of the Revised Statutes, or otherwise." 14 Rule 73 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "notice of appeal... shall designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from . . . Opinion of the Court. 329 U.S. Alma objects strenuously to the Government "mending its hold" between the time it urged dismissal in an amicus brief in the Circuit Court of Appeals and argued constitutionality there and here, and the time it filed here its motion to vacate and remand. The Government certainly aided and abetted the Circuit Court of Appeals in its error. But Alma is not without fault in creating the confusion. In its "Petition to Review" the Order, Alma asked the Circuit Court of Appeals to hold the Order unconstitutional. In its petition to the Circuit Court of Appeals for rehearing, it argued that the court should not have passed on constitutionality because Timken had not charged any royalties to the United States on T-79s, and the Act and Order were allegedly inapplicable. Before this Court it has returned to its original position. We agree that much time has been wasted by the earlier failure of the parties to indicate, or the Circuit Court of Appeals or this Court to see, the course which should have been followed. This, however, is no reason to continue now on the wrong course. The principle of avoiding constitutional questions is one which was conceived out of considerations of sound judicial administration. It is a traditional policy of our courts.15 The judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. 15 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 553 (1837). UNEMPLOYMENT Syllabus. COMPENSATION COMMIS SION OF ALASKA ET AL. v. ARAGON ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 25. Argued February 27, 1946. Reargued November 13, 1946.Decided December 9, 1946. Companies engaged in catching and canning salmon in Alaska terminated their agreement with the union representing their employees at the end of the 1939 season. Prior to the beginning of the 1940 season, they opened negotiations in San Francisco with the same union for a new agreement. There ensued a controversy over wages which resulted in a failure to reach an agreement and a decision to conduct no operations during the 1940 season. Individuals who had worked for the companies during the 1939 season filed claims for unemployment benefits with the Alaska Unemployment Compensation Commission. The Commission held that they were disqualified from receiving payments for eight weeks under § 5 (d) of Alaska Extra. Sess. L., 1937, c. 4, as amended by Alaska Sess. L., 1939, cc. 1, 51, which disqualifies an individual for eight weeks if "the Commission finds that his . . . unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is in active progress at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he . . . was last employed." Held: 1. The Commission could properly find that a "labor dispute" existed within the meaning of § 5 (d) of the Alaska Act. Pp. 149-151. 2. The term "labor dispute," as used in § 5 (d) of the Alaska Act, need not be narrowly construed to require a strike or leaving of employment but may be construed as covering a situation where the controversy precedes the employment. Pp. 149–151. 3. Evidence that two of the companies had made extensive preparations for the 1940 operations, purchasing equipment and supplies, preparing ships and holding them in readiness for the expedition, and that they negotiated in good faith and failed to operate only because of their inability to negotiate satisfactory labor agreements before the beginning of the season, was sufficient to support the Commission's finding that their unemployment was "due" to a labor dispute. Pp. 149-151. 4. Evidence showing, inter alia, that the withdrawal of another company from negotiations with the union and its determination Statement of the Case. 329 U.S. not to operate during the 1940 season occurred prior to the deadline for its operations and was caused primarily by factors other than its inability to negotiate a satisfactory labor contract did not support a finding by the Commission that its employees were unemployed "due" to a labor dispute at the establishment at which they were last employed. Pp. 152, 153. 5. Where the negotiations continued beyond the deadline dates set by the companies for the consummation of an agreement and beyond the dates of the applications for unemployment benefits, the Commission could properly find that a labor dispute was in "active progress" within the meaning of § 5 (d) of the Alaska Act, even if it be assumed that at some time within the eight-week period of disqualification the point was reached when all possibility of settlement disappeared. P. 153. (a) The question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially. P. 153. (b) The reviewing court's function is limited; and all that is needed to support the Commission's interpretation is that it has "warrant in the record" and a "reasonable basis in law." Pp. 153, 154. 6. This Court is unable to say that the Commission's construction was irrational or without support in the record, since the Commission might reasonably conclude that the unemployment was not of the "involuntary" nature which the statute was designed to alleviate. P. 154. 7. The fact that, in accordance with the usual procedure, the wage negotiations were conducted in San Francisco and Seattle, instead of at the place of work in Alaska, did not prevent the dispute from being "at the factory, establishment, or other premises" within the meaning of § 5 (d) of the Alaska Act. Pp. 154-156. 8. A reviewing court usurps the administrative agency's function when it sets aside an administrative determination on a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the agency of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action-where the statute provides that judicial review is permitted only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. P. 155. 149 F.2d 447, affirmed in part, reversed in part. The Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska held certain employees of salmon canneries disqualified for eight weeks from receiving unemployment 143 Opinion of the Court. compensation benefits, on the ground that their unemployment was due to a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Alaska Unemployment Compensation Law, Alaska Extra. Sess. L., 1937, c. 4, as amended by Alaska Sess. L., 1939, cc. 1, 51. The District Court affirmed the Commission's holding. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 149 F.2d 447. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U. S. 700. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. P. 156. Marshall P. Madison argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were E. Coke Hill and Francis R. Kirkham. Herbert Resner argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In May, 1940, the individual respondents filed claims for unemployment benefits with the Unemployment Compensation Commission of the Territory of Alaska. After an initial determination by an examiner and after decision by a referee, the Commission held that the claimants were disqualified from receiving benefits for a period of eight weeks, since their unemployment was due to a labor dispute in active progress within the meaning of the Alaska Unemployment Compensation Law.' The United States District Court affirmed the Commission's holding in all particulars. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting. We granted certiorari because of the public importance of the questions involved.2 1 Extraordinary Session Laws of Alaska, 1937, Chapter 4 as amended by Chapters 1 and 51, Session Laws of Alaska, 1939. 2 The Alaska statute is part of the legislative scheme for unemployment compensation induced by the provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935. 49 Stat. 620, 626-627, 640. It is said that forty-three |