379 Opinion of the Court. amounts obtained are small. Notoriously the crime done once becomes habitual. And forgers are notoriously itinerant. Drawing the check upon an out-of-state bank, knowing it must be sent there for presentation, is an obviously facile way to delay and often to defeat apprehension, conviction and restoration of the ill-gotten gain. There are sound reasons therefore why Congress would wish not to exclude such persons, among them the very ease with which they may escape the state's grasp. A word will dispose of the idea that Sheridan did not "cause" the transportation. Certainly he knew the checks would have to be sent to the Missouri bank for collection. Given the proven forgery and uttering, no other conclusion would be possible. Necessarily, too, it would follow he intended the paying bank to send the checks there for that purpose. He knew they must cross state lines to be presented. One who induces another to do exactly what he intends, and does so by defrauding him, hardly can be held not to "cause" what is so done. The Kann case itself is authority for the Government on this point, in fact goes farther than is necessary here. For, as respected the same contention there advanced, the opinion said: ". . . we think it a fair inference that those defendants who drew, or those who cashed, the checks believed that the banks which took them would mail them to the banks on which they were drawn, and, assuming the petitioner participated in the scheme, their knowledge was his knowledge." 323 U. S. at 93. The statement was in answer to argument that Kann had not "caused" the mailing. III. Since the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on all counts on its view that the Kann case was controlling, it did not discuss respondent's other contentions. These are renewed here. They are, first, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and, second, that Opinion of the Court. 329 U.S. certain testimony was inadmissible, including that of the federal agent to the effect that the Department of Commerce had no agency "U. S. E. F. C. 14A" nor one "A. J. Davis, Commissioner." On the facts the two contentions are closely related.20 We express no opinion as to the admissibility of the evidence. It is desirable that the litigants and this Court, if the case is again before us, have the benefit of the views of the Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 88. However, with respect to the first contention, upon the assumption that the record, as stipulated, correctly sets forth the evidence introduced by the Government and also that all the evidence was admissible, it follows from our discussion of the statute that the evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury. The jury properly could have inferred that respondent had forged the checks in question; " that he therefore had knowledge of their spurious character; and, furthermore, that the checks were negotiated and caused to be transported with unlawful or fraudulent intent. However, counsel assigned here for respondent calls our attention to the fact that the instructions given and the rulings on instructions requested do not appear in the record. He suggests that, if the cause should be remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings, it would be appropriate for us to suggest to that court in the remand that it exercise its powers to secure a complete bill of exceptions, including the instructions given and all pertinent rulings in connection therewith. That course has been followed in unusual circumstances. See Miller v. United States, 317 U. S. 192, 199-200; Hel 20 It is argued that excluding the evidence regarded as inadmissible would render the remaining evidence insufficient. 21 That is, the checks which form the basis of counts 1 and 2. We express no opinion concerning the check on which count 3 was based. See note 4. 379 Opinion of the Court. wig v. United States, 328 U. S. 820. Such circumstances are presented on this record. Respondent defended himself at the trial. He did not have counsel on the appeal. The case is here in forma pauperis, and it is stated in his brief that "respondent is now confined in a Michigan state prison, is without funds and is unable to employ counsel of his own choice." Since the decision in Miller v. United States, supra, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have taken effect 22 and expressly provide that they shall govern all proceedings pending at the effective date "so far as just and practicable." Rule 59. Bills of exception are abolished.24 Since the record contains a statement of the evidence, apparently the only serious deficiency is in the matters relating to the instructions, noted above. In these circumstances we think taking any corrective action, in this respect or otherwise, in the interest of seeing that substantial justice is done, well may be left to the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 23 The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissent. 22 18 U. S. C. following § 687, effective March 21, 1946. 23 In this case the indictment was filed on October 27, 1944; the jury verdict and judgment were filed on November 30, 1944; the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on November 19, 1945; and a Government petition for rehearing was denied on January 28, 1946. Certiorari was granted on May 13, 1946. 24 See Rule 39 (c) and the note prepared under the direction of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Criminal Procedure. "The new rule supersedes Rules VII, VIII, and IX of the Criminal Appeals Rules of 1933, 292 U. S. 661. One of the results of the change is the abolition of bills of exceptions." S. Doc. 175, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 62-63. Statement of the Case. 329 U.S. EDWARD KATZINGER CO. v. CHICAGO METALLIC MANUFACTURING CO. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. Nos. 70 and 71. Argued November 14, 15, 1946. Decided January 6, 1947. A patent-licensing agreement provided that the licensee should sell the licensed products at prices fixed by the licensor and should be estopped from denying the validity of the patent. The products were sold widely in interstate commerce. A controversy having arisen as to the coverage of certain products by the patent, the licensing agreement was terminated, the licensee sued for a declaratory judgment declaring the patent invalid, and the licensor counterclaimed for unpaid royalties or damages for infringement. The patent was held invalid. Held: 1. In these circumstances, the licensee is not estopped to challenge the validity of the patent. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U. S. 249. Pp. 398–401. 2. The licensee's obligations to pay royalties and to sell at prices fixed by the licensor are not severable. P. 401. 3. Since the royalties here claimed accrued, if they accrued at all, prior to the time the licensing agreement terminated, the fact of subsequent termination does not free the promise to pay royalties from the taint of the price-fixing provision. P. 401. 4. The alleged fact that the licensee suggested the price-fixing provision in the licensing agreement does not estop him from challenging its validity as being in violation of the anti-trust laws. P. 401. 5. The specific contract not to challenge the validity of the patent cannot override congressional policy against contracts in restraint of interstate trade any more than can an implied estoppel. P. 402. 153 F.2d 149, affirmed. In a suit by a licensee for a declaratory judgment declaring a patent invalid, the licensor counterclaimed for unpaid royalties or damages for infringement. The District 394 Opinion of the Court. Court held that the licensee was estopped to challenge the validity of the patent. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the District Court to pass on the validity of the patent. 139 F. 2d 291. The District Court held the patent invalid. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 153 F. 2d 149. This Court granted certiorari. 328 U. S. 826. Affirmed, p. 402. Charles J. Merriam argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Stanley Hoods. Max W. Zabel argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Ephraim Banning. Acting Solicitor General Washington, Assistant Attorney General Berge, Charles H. Weston and Philip Marcus filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether the defendant, in a suit to recover royalties only under a terminated patent license agreement containing price-fixing provisions, can challenge the validity of the patent despite a covenant in the license contract that he would not do so. The petitioner, Edward Katzinger Company, and the respondent, Chicago Metallic Mfg. Company, make and sell tin baking pans. The undenied testimony was that Metallic sold its pans over a large part of the United States, probably in every state in the country. Katzinger became owner of Jackson patent No. 2,077,757 on a certain type of pan.1 Metallic, accused of infringing, entered into a licensing contract under which, upon payment of stipulated royalties, it was authorized to manufacture and sell pans made in accordance with the claimed invention. 1 Other patents, originally in suit, are not involved in this case. 727731 0-47-31 |