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Our lawsuit is based on the propositon that Burlington Northern's Holding Company strategy should be declared illegal because it constitutes a clear and present danger to the continued financial viability of essential rail services. the ICC has reported to Congress:

As

Were the railroads receiving these properties, or their
railroad successors in interest, to be deprived of the
fruits of these land grants, at a time, whether now or in
the future, when they are needed to support rail services
essential to the public interest, the intention of the
Congress in making these grants would be subverted and
today's citizens would lose the benefit of the contract
made by their forebears with the Land Grant

Railroads.--"Railroad Conglomerates and Other Corporate
Structures," Feb. 5, 1977, p.74.

Our brief points out over a dozen ways in which the Holding
Company strategy threatens the future of the railroad.

The response of the lawyers for the Holding Company to our claims was that they have no obligations to the public, and that even if everything we say is true, we have no right to complain about it. The Holding Company's position is that Northern Pacific did everything it was obligated to do to earn its over 40,000,000 acres of public land when the railroad construction was completed. They feel that if they can earn more profits for their stockholders (largely banks and other large corporations) by non-transportation activities, it is their right to divert the proceeds from the land grants to such activities regardless of the adverse impact on the railroad.

The decision of the Federal District Court Judge was that, even if the Holding Company strategy is violating the intent of Congress, private parties like the plaintiffs in our case shall not be allowed to challenge it in federal court, and that further Congressional action would be required to provide a remedy for such violations as may be occurring.

This presents an urgent necessity for Congressional investigation and action. ICC oversight should not depend on the technical question of whether a few independent switchyards and terminals are actually controlled by the BN system. The disintegration of our national rail transportation system may well become irreversible if rate structures and investment decisions are left in the unreviewable discretion of directors tempted by higher returns in energy or entertainment speculation.

We applaud your initiative in reopening the congressional scrutiny of these thorny problems. Only on the basis of full disclosure by the holding companies, and independent economic analysis by representatives of the public interest, can the Congress structure intelligent and appropriate legislative action.

Sincerely yours,

Cecil it Ann

Daniel Hoyt Smith

Attorney for CSLGR

16. Increased utilization of locomotives and cabooses;

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

Better car tracing systems;

More extensive and more efficient communication
systems;

Expanded use of centralized traffic control;

Elimination of combination rates on certain commodities;

Extension of transit and stop-off privileges;

Reduced damage to cargo because of fewer interchanges;

23. Reduction in total number of officers;

24.

Elimination of 8,072 jobs;

25. Lower per diem costs because of faster schedules;

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

Less cars needed because of car-days saved from faster service;

Reduction in clerical time (because tracing claims, car
ordering, diversion and car accounting would be
simpler);

Enhancement of intra- and intermodal competition;

Opening of new markets and sources of supply to industries because of Milwaukee and C&NW conditions;

Increased capacity to handle national defense needs.

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Mr. Quentin Crommelin, Jr.
April 7, 1982
Page Two

Northern Pacific was 76 1/2 hours, and that the merger
would reduce the time to 70 1/2 hours. By the time of
the filing of the exceptions, the Northern Pacific had
already pared its time to 58 1/2 hours, and the Great
Northern to 59 1/2 hours. Obviously, this is another
area where the ICC should look at railroad prognostications
with great care, because predicted results are not proven
results, and may be accomplished in any case without a
merger.

It would appear, therefore, that the Ralph Nader group had concluded that the minimum time for an eastbound train was substantially less than what is now claimed as the direct result of the Northern Lines merger. The converse approach may be that after the reduction, which had already been accomplished by the time of the Burlington Northern merger on March 3, 1970, the carrier increased its running time between Seattle and Chicago. I thought it appropriate to point out to the Commission this claimed benefit from a marger when in fact it appears that the actual accomplishment of a merger resulted in an increased time on the eastbound train.

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Includes operating income from oil and gas, coal and minerals, forest management and land.

** Includes operating income for Burlington Northern Inc. and its successor, Burlington Northern Railroad Company.

May 12, 1982

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Details for years 1972 and 1973 are not available.

** Includes income from oil and gas, coal and minerals, forest management and land. See Page 2 of this Appendix.

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