Aug. C. Baldwin and Edward J. Bissell, for the appellants.

John H. Patterson, Charles F. Collier, and Clarence Tinker, for the appellees.

12 HOOKER, J. The defendants were stockholders in a corporation known as the Holly Vinegar & Preserving 13 Company, defendant Pomeroy being president, and defendant Wilson being secretary, of the concern. In June, 1884, this corporation needed some money, and conference was had by these defendants with one Seeley, who refused to loan it upon the credit of the company, but consented to furnish it upon the paper of the stockholders; and on June 21st these defendants made their joint note, payable to Daniel Seeley or bearer, for one thousand dollars, payable in one year, with interest at eight per cent, and obtained one thousand dollars, which was paid over to the vinegar works. Two or three payments were made upon this note by the Holly Vinegar & Preserving Company, one of them being made by or through defendant Pomeroy, against whom the plaintiffs were allowed to recover. It is, perhaps, inferable that these payments were made with the knowledge of the defendants, and that it was the arrangement, made when the money was borrowed, that the company should pay the note. The defense interposed is the statute of limitations, and the only question is, whether the case is taken out of the statute by these payments.

Counsel for plaintiffs contend that the Holly Vinegar & Preserving Company was made the agent of the defendants to pay this note, and, therefore, that the payments were made on their behalf and by their consent. On the other hand, the defendants insist that the payments were not made for them, or upon their behalf, or by the use of their funds. It is manifest that all parties knew that this was accommodation paper, and that payments made by the vinegar company were made on its own behalf, upon an obligation that it was morally bound to pay, and that the defendants wished and expected it to pay. There is nothing in this that ought to be construed into authority to pledge the defendants' credit. If the case is taken out of the statute by such payment, it is by reason of a technical application of the doctrine of agency. Had the vinegar company signed the note with the defendants, such payment would not have had. such effect, under our statute and the decisions 14 of this court: 2 Howell's Statutes, sec. 8730. The actual relation of the parties was substantially the same as though the Vinegar Company

had joined in the note. There is nothing in the case that shows that the defendants intended to give the company authority to extend this note beyond the statutory period, and we think the case is within the rule of the case of Home Life Ins. Co. v. Elwell, 111 Mich. 689, and cases there cited.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Long, C. J., and Grant and Montgomery, JJ., concurred.

Moore, J., did not sit.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-A PAYMENT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON does not affect the rights of a debtor under the statute of limitations: See monographic note to Maddox v. Duncan, 65 Am. St. Rep. 684, on the relation of agency existing between persons jointly liable, showing, at page 688, according to some of the authorities, that one joint debtor has no authority to deprive his codebtors of the benefit of the statute of limitations by his own promise or admission made without their consent.

CLARK V. MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY.

[113 MICHIGAN, 24.]

RAILWAYS-LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO TRESPASSERS OR LICENSEES.-One who goes upon the private grounds of another under a mere license from the latter does so subject to the attendant risks. Hence, if a trespasser, or even licensee, in passing over a railroad track, on the unfenced grounds of the company, is tripped by a semaphore wire and hurt, the company is not answerable for the injury.

Case by Clark against the defendant company for personal injuries. The court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed from the judgment rendered thereon.

Lehman Brothers, for the appellant.

John F. Lawrence, for the appellee.

24 HOOKER, J. Main street, in the village of Chelsea, runs north and south, and crosses the defendant's six tracks at an angle of about twenty-five degrees. The freight and passenger houses are south of the tracks, the former being a few rods west, and the latter about the same distance east, of Main street. On the north side of the railroad tracks is a driveway extending from Main street westerly, parallel with the tracks, between which and the tracks are three buildings. The first is Wood's warehouse, 25 and is situated but a few feet from Main street; next is Kempf's warehouse, which stands farther west, but in close proximity to Wood's warehouse; and a little farther west is a building called an "oil-house." The driveway gives access to all of those buildings upon the north, and the track is close to

them upon the south. There is a sidewalk on the west side of Main street. The first street to the north of the tracks is North street, which is parallel with the track, and it is apparent that persons living upon that street west of Main street find the distance to the business portion of the town shorter by going in a direct line across the tracks than by taking the highway running northeast to Main street, and then south; and, the station grounds being unfenced, people are in the habit of walking upon and across them at will. There is no evidence indicating an in

vitation or license unless it be found in the fact that the defendant has taken no steps to prevent it. The accompanying diagram will aid in understanding the situation. The line A-B C-D, between the second and third tracks (counting from the north), represents a wire which is used to operate, from the station, a semaphore, some distance off. This wire is raised some eight or ten inches from the ground, being supported at short intervals upon rollers or pulleys, and is drawn taut. Witnesses differ about the size of the wire, stating it to be from one-eighth

inch to the size of the finger. One says it is a twisted wire; othcrs that there were two wires. On the occasion of the injury, the plaintiff started from Kempf's warehouse, where he had delivered some poultry, to go to Kempf's bank to get a check for the chickens. Instead of going by the highway with his son, who drove the team, he took a more direct route across the tracks, thinking to save a little time, and was tripped by the wire, and hurt his elbow. The circuit court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.

Counsel for the plaintiff make the claim that the common practice of crossing the unfenced grounds of the defendant 20 at this point for over twenty years had established a public easement, but they cite no authority which sustains the contention. In our opinion, the evidence does not create a suspicion of the existence of an easement. There is nothing that indicates a license even, unless it is to be inferred from the fact that the defendant did not care to contest the right of every person whose convenience might lead him to cross the premises. Technically, such people were trespassers; but it is not to the discredit of the defendant that it did not resort to violence or litigation to stop a practice that did it no harm. Whether these persons were trespassers or naked and gratuitous licensees (which last we do not mean to intimate) is unimportant. 27 In neither case had they the right to expect the defendant to forego a reasonable use of its land, in which respect it stood on the same plane as a private person. Such persons may have rights of action where a wanton injury is done them, or where caused by unlawful acts, and, under some circumstances, in the running of trains, as in the following cases cited by counsel: Barry v. New York Cent. etc. R. R. Co., 92 N. Y. 289; 44 Am. Rep. 377; Byrne v. New York Cents etc. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 362; 58 Am. Rep. 512; Taylor v. Delaware etc. Canal Co., 113 Pa. St. 162; 57 Am. Rep. 446; Nichols v. Washington etc. R. R. Co., 83 Va. 99; 5 Am. St. Rep. 257; Swift v. Staten Island etc. R. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 645; Hooker v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 76 Wis. 542; Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525. See, also, Green v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 110 Mich. 648. It is the general rule that one who enters the private grounds of another at the mere license of the latter does so subject to the attendant risks: See Schmidt v. Bauer, 80 Cal. 565. With the latter report of this case will be found a note citing many cases in support of the doctrine: And see 1 Thompson on Negligence, 303, and Kinney v. Onsted, 113 Mich. 96; post, p. 455. In our own state are two cases which clearly forbid a recovery: Sturgis v. Detroit etc. Ry. Co., 72 Mich. 619;

O'Neil v. Duluth etc. Ry. Co., 101 Mich. 437. In the light of these cases, the defendant was entirely without fault.

The judgment is affirmed.

The other justices concurred.

RAILWAY-LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO TRESPASSERS OR LICENSEES.-The owner of private grounds is under no obligation to keep them in a safe condition for the benefit of trespassers, or those who go upon them, uninvited, for their own convenience: Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345; 56 Am. St. Rep. 106, and note. A railway company, which merely permits a person to come upon its premises for his own interest, convenience, or gratification, and not upon any business connected with the company, owes him no duty other than that of not willfully or wantonly injuring him, for he is a mere licensee, who accepts the license subject to its attendant risks and perils: Note to Pomponio v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 50 Am. St. Rep. 133.

EARLY V. STANDARD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY.

[113 MICHIGAN, 58.]

INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-DEATH BY POISON.-An insurance company, exempt, under an accident policy, from liability in case of death by poison, is not answerable for a death caused by poison accidentally administered. To defeat a claim under the policy it is not necessary that the poison should have been taken with intent to produce death.

DEFINITIONS-POISON.-Aqua ammonia is a poison.

Assumpsit by Welthy A. Early against the Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company on a policy of insurance. The . court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed from the judgment rendered thereon.

George H. Prentis, for the appellant.

Keena & Lightner, for the appellee.

58 LONG, C. J. This action is upon a policy of insurance upon the life of Michael Early, the husband of the plaintiff. The policy was made payable to the plaintiff in case of the death of the insured. It is undisputed that the policy was to be in force from October 18, 1892, to October 18, 1893. It appears that on August 29, 1893, Michael Early, feeling slightly unwell, went into a drugstore in Detroit, and asked the proprietor to give him something to relieve the pain, and the proprietor, by mistake, gave him some aqua ammonia. It burned his mouth very severely, but he lived from that time to September 13, 1893 (some fifteen days), when he died from the effects of the potion taken. Due proofs of death were made, and the defendant refused payment on the ground that the death was caused by