We started out with about 15 cars, and before we had gone ten miles the steam gauge registered just 50 pounds shy of 140. The engineer put on the blower and we looked at the fire-it was a sight-it looked like a birdseye view of the Alleghenies, one peak nearly touching the crown sheet. The engineer fired to the next station, but-instead of using the shovel-he used the hook. When night came we had thirty miles yet to go-and sixty pounds of steam.

We were making overtime, and while the engineer was making out his detention slip I thought he was writing a letter to the road forman of engines complaining about his fireman. The flues began to leak, and the fire clinkered so bad that we were compelled to set off all but three cars of the train.

We arrived at the terminal early the next morning, with not enough steam with which to call for a signal from the switch tender. The hostler who cleaned the fire said there was only one clinker in the firebox-but it had to be broken into several pieces before he could get it out of the door.

I had made up my mind to get a job at husking corn, but the engineer coaxed me to come back with him.

Columbus, Ohio.

A. L., No. 445.

Partially Closed Gurret Valve and Wet Steam.

I was interested in the article on "The Partially Closed Turret Valve and Wet Steam," by Hugh L. Edwards, on page 867 of the November MAGAZINE, but do not understand, if "steam at 180 pounds pressure has a higher temperature and contains more water according to volume than does steam at a lower pressure," how, when the pressure is reduced through the slightly opened turret valve, from 180 pounds to 150 pounds, with a corresponding reduction in temperature (the high pressure steam already containing more water than the low pressure steam) it reasonably causes condensation. These two statements apparently disagree.

A gauge pressure of 180 pounds equals 180 plus 14.7, or 194.7 pounds absolute pressure. A gauge pressure of 150 pounds equals 150 plus 14.7 pounds, or 164.7 pounds absolute pressure. The fall in pressure is the difference between 194.7 and 164.7 pounds, or 30 pounds.

The temperature of saturated steam at a pressure of 194.7 pounds absolute is 379.365°. The temperature of saturated steam at a pressure of 164.7 pounds absolute is 365.639°. The fall in temperature is the difference between 379.365° and 365.639°, or 13.726°.

From the following it will be seen that the volume of the steam increases as the pressure decreases:

The volume of a pound of steam at 194.7 pounds absolute pressure is 2.315 cubic feet. The volume of a pound of steam at 164.7 pounds absolute pressure is 2.713 cubic feet. The increase in volume of a pound of steam for a decrease in pressure from 194.7 pounds absolute pressure to 164.7 pounds absolute pressure is the difference between 2.713 and 2.315, or 398 cubic feet.

Thus it will be seen that at the higher pressure and temperature, the steam occupies less volume and, holding less water in suspension, is in a dryer state than it is at the lower pressure and temperature. I note what Mr. Edwards says about easing off on the throttle, when the water in the boiler is too high, which will cause the water to drop slightly and the engine cease to lift the water and, after the water has lowered some, the throttle can again be opened wide if necessary. In this I agree, but the very fact that the water is too high in the boiler is, in itself, explanatory of the necessity for easing off on the throttle, thereby reducing the opening for the escape of the water, and is by no means a justification for the belief that wiredrawing is preferable to high-pressure steam, or that high pressure steam contains more water according to volume than does steam at a lower pressure.

I believe that where a turret is used, it should be amply large to supply all demands made upon it, and that it should have a suitable dry-pipe leading to the dome, and that where the conditions are such, there is little trouble had with them. "MACK."

Smokeless Firing.

I think there is no other part of the service rendered by the enginemen in the employ of a railroad company, if they study and try to see how near they can come to firing their engines without smoke, and without being compelled to follow it up against their will, that will give such good results. If a man has the

will and determination he can succeed to a certain degree, no matter what the conditions are, and if each and every fireman will labor with this in mind it will be wonderful how the cost of fuel for locomotives will be reduced.

But in the first place the company should show a disposition to do its part; they should put their engines in such condition that if the engineer and fireman do their part it can be done. Then in the quality of coal; the company should furnish coal that is not full of rock and slate that will fill a firebox up before the engine has got fifty miles from the terminal.

One of the absolute necessities for smokeless firing is a light fire, and when the firebox fills up it is an impossibility. When I say the engine should be arranged to do it, I mean that any engine will perform its part if the draft appliances are properly arranged. The draft on the fire must be mild to allow as much time as possible for the heat to come in contact with the sheets. A low diaphragm is necessary, and then with a properly adjusted draft pipe, so the gases will burn to a white incandescent heat, it is very easy to fire an engine without black smoke.

Then, the engineer and fireman must work in harmony. The engineer must not be of the kind who pulls out of a station and never casts a thought ahead to the next station as to whether he will have any steam or water when he arrives there, by allowing the engine to work with a longer cut-off than is necessarry to perform the work. The quadrant with its notches were put there for a purpose, and the economical use of steam is one of them.

The engineer is the first party, and the fireman the second. Then the fireman being the second party, assuming that the engineer is doing his part, the fireman must have this one point in view, namely, to fire the engine and keep up steam at the required pressure with the least amount of fuel. To do this, he must fire regularly and frequently. When he puts in a fire he must not sit or stand and watch the hand of the gauge until it starts to drop back; if so, he waits a little too long. Remember that when a fire is put in the firebox, and after combustion has taken place, there is a certain time when the temperature is the highest, and if the next fire is put in before that temperature starts to drop there will be little change, unless a very heavy charge of coal is put in, and a heavy charge is wrong.

If your coal burner in your house was down low and the house cold, and you wanted to heat it up as quick as possible, would you put a whole scuttle of coal on at a time? No, you wouldn't. Do likewise in a locomotive firebox. "T. F." Marshalltown, Iowa.

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Wreck on the Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad.

The December MAGAZINE contained illustrations of a wreck which occurred on the Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad, also a statement as to the cause of the wreck. In justice to the engineer who was killed in the wreck, and all concerned, the statement should be corrected. The facts are, instead of the engineer having orders to meet the excursion train at the place named, he had no orders. The passenger train was a carded train and ran once week, Sunday only, and no men tion was made by anyone of the train. The statement of the dying engineer was that he forgot the passenger train, and that he was entirely to blame, making no effort to shift the blame to others. The statement that the crew made a wild rush over the train to call Engineer Zimmerman's attention to the passenger train was not proven, also the statement that Engineer B. J. Dart said to his fireman "We're going to hit her, and hit her hard-stick to your seat," is without foundation. Those unfortunate men had no time for conversation. We believe that a time card which schedules a train for one day a week is a dangerous one, and we most sincerely hope that a time card which schedules a train for one day a week will be discontinued.

Grand Rapids, Mich.

MEMBER 265.

The Pathos of Truth. "Truth is stranger than fiction"-and oh, how much sadder it can sometimes

be.

I am thinking of an experience of some weeks ago, strange and pathetic as anything I have met with in real life; stranger and away far more pathetic than most of the stories I have read, born of the imagination and telling of the rail and its dangers.

About 3 o'clock in the morning of November 15th last, a fast east bound freight train and a light engine west bound collided under full headway on the

as when it left the boiler maker. Thirteen heavy freight cars were totally wrecked. When the collision came both engineer and fireman were thrown through the cab windows of the light engine and escaped uninjured. This engine did not leave the rail. On the contrary it immediately started east and ran wild under steam for eight miles-yet the engineer says he did not touch the reverse lever and that neither he nor his fireman have any recollection of being thrown from the cab. This is truth but it sounds like fiction. There are several questions that nat

freight train had orders to meet the light engine at Orchard. It ran two miles beyond the meeting point, notwithstanding that five men on the engine and train had read the orders. Then it collided with the west bound engine, which was backing up. The track is straight for miles east and west of where the disaster occurred, yet the three men on the engine of the freight train did not see the tail lights of the light engine nor did the crew of the latter see the headlight of the freight engine.

When the engines came together the heavy consolidation engine of the freight train left the track and rolled fifty feet away. The boiler was stripped as clean

urally arise and there are many answers, none of which are satisfactory.

Did the engine of the freight have a headlight and if so why was it not seen on the straight track?

Did the light engine carry tail lights and if so why were they not observed in time to avert the collision?

Why did the entire crew of the freight train forget the order to meet at Orchard?

Why was the heavy freight engine demolished and the lighter engine left on the rail and in such condition that it could run until out of steam.

How did it come that the light engine, which was in the back motion when the

When the conductor of the freight train discovered what had happened he walked back two miles to Orchard, woke up the agent and wired for help. The brakeman was killed outright, but for nearly three hours the mangled and bleeding engineer and fireman lay out in the cold morning air suffering agony untold. Then a relief train came and took them to the Boise hospital.

The fireman submitted to an operation almost immediately, which deprived him of a leg. He had been in locomotive service but three months and was therefore not a member of the B. of L. F. That made no difference in his case, and, I say it to the everlasting glory of Lodge 113, B. of L. F., of Pocatello, a committee was sent to him to minister to his need and render that sympathy and encouragement which are the divine graces in that sweetest of human possessions, which is the spirit of brotherhood.

Engineer Martin Cosgrove was a brave man and in the manner of his death he left to his loved ones a hero's immortal legacy. Very tenderly they picked him up and carried him to the car. They knew that the dawning day was to be an endless one for Martin Cosgrove. He knew it also-and was willing.

"Keep up your courage, boy," said the conductor.

"I will," he answered, "but let me die. The brakeman and fireman are dead and it's my fault-I want to go with them." His fault? Possibly, and yet I am not sure that others should not have divided the responsibility with him. I am not sure his fellow employes are not surebut that the only judgment which is ultimate will censure some railway officials who imagine all men other than themselves should be infallible; who treat all other men as if they were equal to what theory requires of perpetual motion; who treat with disdain those who render a loyal service and affix a maximum penalty for a minimum offense. Not that I think the Oregon Short Line in anywise to blame for the wreck at Orchard. Oh no, most certainly not.

If the engine and train crews involved in this disaster had been worked to a point where nature says "rest," and then beyond it; if the physical strain had been prolonged to where eyes closed unbidden and the will could no longer control the body, the fault lay between the company's

An engineer, whom I believe to be a martyr, said. "It is my fault"-nothing about the four other men who had seen the orders and then he felt the greeting of God's eternal morning.

I went to the hospital and saw him for a few moments before he died. Not a word of complaint did he utter. Not a groan escaped his lips. He had intended to lay off when he reached the division terminal, then go to Pocatello and marry the idol of his heart. After that, a season of merited happiness in the East. Now it could not be. He talked of the girl who was his sweetheart, and of his mother in Maryland; of how he loved them and how their hearts would be broken when they knew he was gone. Then he went home.

There are mistakes of the mind and mistakes of the heart. If Martin Cosgrove erred the mistake was of the mind for his heart was as true as human heart can be. Then who shall pass judgment?

I heard a man say, when told that the engineer and brakeman were dead, "I hope they were prepared for eternity." Oh, why will men try to bound the mercy of God?

Not long ago I was in Huntington, Oregon, detailing the incidents to a brother fireman. When I looked up I saw that there were tears in his eyes. They say that is an indication of weakness but it isn't. It is a demonstration of the supreme attribute of manhood.

AVERY C. MOORE.

Shall the Engineer and Fireman be Held Equally Responsible? In the Railroad Gazette of December 6, 1901, Mr. J. J. Fleming, of Ogden, Utah, contributes the following letter on "Overlooking Train Orders:"

"How best to guard against the error of overlooking train orders is a subject worth serious consideration. Being employed as a leomotive engineer I speak from practical experience, and my observations have led me to conclusions that I hope will throw some light on the subject.

"It has been my experience that many firemen do not realize how important it is that they should know the contents of every order. The impression of many firemen, that they are not responsible for the fulfillment of train orders, should be

corrected, and it is essential that every fireman should have as thorough knowledge of train orders, and the rules goyerning the movement of trains as the engineer.

"I have seen many engineers, after reading their orders, put them on a spindle or in their pocket, and utterly disregard the fireman. This is a habit which often leads to error; the results of which are frequently published in our daily papers. The practice is due to overconfidence on the part of the engineer in himself, and indifference on the part of the fireman.

"As a precautionary measure I would suggest that the fireman receive a copy of each order as well as the engineer. It is true that his burdens are already great, but he is never so busy that he would not devote a few minutes to the reading of his orders if he had them convenient, and knew that he was held equally responsible with the engineer.

"As long as the present system prevails and the rules of railroads are not rigidly enforced in regard to this matter, so long may we expect disasters due to the overlooking of orders."

It may be true that "some" firemen do not realize the importance of knowing the contents of every order received by the engineer, but I do not believe it is the experience of many engineers that "many firemen do not realize how important it is that they should know the contents of every order."

"The impression of many firemen, that they are not responsible for the fulfillment of train orders," may be true, but are the firemen paid for this responsibility? Continuing, he says of this impression that it "should be corrected, and it is essential that every fireman should have as thorough knowledge of train orders, and the rules governing the movement of trains, as the engineer."

I agree that it is essential that the fireman should have a full knowledge of all train orders, rules governing the movement of trains, etc., and if he is anyways bright, he is going to have that knowledge if there is any way of obtaining it. He proposes to have that knowledge for his own safety, and he will not fail to make it known to the engineer if he observes any error of judgment or lapse of memory on his part.

I too, have seen engineers stuff their orders into their pockets without any more consideration of the fireman than if he didn't exist, and a question from the fireman as to where they were going for

"Number So-and-so" would be answered with a grunt, and a command to get in a I have fired for such men. good fire.

On the other hand, I have fired for men who were just the reverse of this type, and who would immediately upon reading their orders hand them to the fireman and insist upon his reading them aloud to them, and would ask the fireman how he understood the orders.

The precautionary measure suggested, that the fireman receive a copy of each order as well as the engineer, is very good and would be a sure means of imparting the knowledge to the fireman, even though the engineer was not disposed to acquaint him with that information. I believe also that it would be beneficial in more ways than one, the best of which is, that it would be another safeguard against accidents, and in case of the engineer becoming disabled on the road and it was impossible or inconvenient to get another engineer for the train without considerable delay, the fireman could, with an assistant, take the train through.

But, speaking of the fireman, Mr. Fleming says: "It is true that his burdens are already great, but he is never so busy that he would not devote a few minutes to the reading of his orders if he had them convenient, and knew that he was held equally responsible with the engineer."

Isn't this a little too strong? The reason that has always been assigned for the fireman receiving only about 55 per cent of the wages of the engineer, and the strongest argument set forth in its favor is the "increased responsibility" resting upon the engineer Should the firemen be held equally responsible with the engineers for the movement and safety of trains, how can the management longer make that claim, and upon what grounds can there be such a disparity in wages?

Never before, in so short a time, has there been so many disastrous wrecks, caused through misreading of train orders, lapse of memory, and errors of judg ment, as in the past few weeks, and it would seem that the railroad companies would adopt some such precautionary measures to guard against them.

But, perhaps, the railroad companies realize that with increased responsibility comes increased remuneration.

"МАСК."