U. S. SLOOP DALE, SIR: By your special order No. 2, I find myself, in common with other "watch-officers" of this ship, forbidden to visit the shore: as the order is a most unusual one, and bears exceedingly hard upon those who are subjected by the necessities of their profession to so many privations, 1 beg, most respectfully, to call your attention to the matter, that it may reconsidered by you; for I am not aware of having committed any of fence which should occasion such restraint If the discipline of the squadron or general good of the service require a non-intercourse with the shore to be observed rigidly by officers of every grade, I submit cheerfully; but where I find myself among a proscribed set, it becomes a duty to myself and station to make this ap peal to your sense of justice. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, T. AUG. M. CRAVEN, Lieutenant. Commodore THO. AP C. JONES, Communding U. S. Naval Forces, Pacific Ocean. UNITED STATES SLOOP DALE, October 21, 1848. SIR: In compliance with your advice, sent through Lieutenant Yard, I have withheld the accompanying communication one day longer. If the distinction has been entirely removed, or is made general in its opera tion, I am satisfied, and withdraw; but otherwise, I desire that my letter to Commodore Jones be handed him at the earliest hour. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, T. AUG. M. CRAVEN, Lieutenant. Captain STRIBLING, Flag-ship Ohio. And the witness proceeds "I discover no difference between the letter returned to Mr. Craven and this delivered by me to Commodore Jones." Question 6.Did you send any message, and by whom, to Lieutenant Craven, with the letter you returned to him? Answer. I recollect to have had a conversation with Lieutenant Yard; but whether I sent a message, or the note I have referred to, I am uncer tain. It is probable that I sent a message and note both by Mr. Yard; but of neither can I be positive. I cannot be positive whether I returned the letter by Mr. Yard, or by whom. In the multiplicity of duties of conflicting character, which I had to perform, there was nothing to fix the fact on my memory. I would not have a copy of such a note if I wrote one, as it would not have been of the character of which I was ac customed to keep copies. Question 7.-Are you able to say with positiveness whether Lieutenant Green's complaint to you was, or was not, expressed by him to be based upon a supposed invidious distinction between watch-officers and all other officers? Answer. It was certainly. The accused tenders the following paper to the court, and it is read by his counsel: "The accused is advised that this question is exceptionable, and he excepts to it as being in the nature of a leading question, and of a crossexamination by the prosecution of a witness produced by the prosecution. The witness had already testified, in answer to the second interrogatory of the judge advocate, that Lieutenant Green stated that he considered the order as invidious-making a distinction between the sea officers and the non combatants.' The present question puts it to the witness to say, whether he is able to say with positiveness,' that Lieutenant Green's complaint was not expressed in terms entirely different from those in which the witness had before stated it-namely, whether it was, or was not, expressed by him to be based upon a supposed invidious distinction between watch-officers and all other officers.' This is of the very essence of a cross examination-to draw from the witness a statement of the same transaction, materially differing in terms from the statement before given of it by the witness on his direct examination in chief. "THOS. AP C. JONES, "Late Commanding Pacific Squadron." The court is cleared for deliberation; and, after duly considering the objection, comes to the following decision: "Without deciding whether the question was liable to technical objection or not, the court thinks that it is not competent for the accused to suffer the question to be answered without objection, and then to object or not, according as the answer may be such as he expected or otherwise. The time for objection to the frame of the question is before it is answered. "If there be any real discrepancy in the evidence of the witness, the accused will equally have the benefit of it, whether that discrepancy be made to appear by the direct examination or by the cross examination. "The objection is overruled." The court is opened; the accused is in attendance; and the decision is read by the judge advocate. The following paper is tendered by the accused and read by his counsel : "The accused desires to explain, that his exception to the seventh question, put by the judge advocate to Captain Stribling, was not at all dictated or induced by the answer of the witness to the question; that neither the accused nor his counsel waited to take the chance of a favorable answer to the question, and, upon finding it unfavorable, then started the objection. His counsel, who started the objection, desires it to be understood that nothing is further from his course, in any court, than any such catching and disingenuous practice; and he knows that nothing could be more vain in effect than the attempt to take advantage of it, for it is the rule of every court to hold a party concluded, as by a waiver of objection, if he intentionally permits the question to be put and answered without exception; but nothing is of more ordinary occurrence in every court than this: if an improper question is inadvertently suffered to be put and answered before the objection is raised, and the objection is raised in reasonable time thereafter, the court will entertain the objection; and, if it be well founded, will instruct the jury to disregard the evidence given in answer to the question. "In this case, the counsel was, when the witness answered the ques tion, in the act of examining what the witness had sworn to, as to the terms of Mr. Green's complaint, in order to be certain that the question went to draw out a statement of it materially different in terms. It was a mere inadvertency that he did not ask the witness to suspend his answer till the ground of the objection was looked into an inadvertency which the counsel is quite positive would not have stood in the way of his objection before any court in which he has chanced to practice. "THOS. AP C. JONES, "Late Commanding Pacific Squadron." To which the judge advocate responds as follows: "The judge advocate takes great pleasure in saying that, in putting into form the opinion of the court, it was his intention to express a general rule of evidence only, and not to make any reflections whatever upon the very eminent counsel of the accused. It must be evident that, if the objection be allowed to prevail, after the proper time for making it has passed, and after the answer has been received, the result would be as stated in the decision of the court, and that upon principle the objection ought not to prevail." The witness desires to explain what he means by the terms sea officers and watch officers, as used in his evidence; and, being desired to do so, proceeds as follows: "By sea-officers, I understand to be included captains, commanders, lieutenants, masters, and midshipmen. "By watch officers, lieutenants, masters, and midshipmen. In larger ships, masters would not be included; in smaller ones, they would." Question 8.-Will you state what further occurred in regard to said special order No. 2, so far as the conduct of the officers referred to was concerned? Answer. After the interview I had with Lieutenants Green and Marchand, whether before or after I delivered to the commodore the notes from Lieutenant Craven, I do not recollect; I had a conversation with Commodore Jones in relation to the special order No. 2, explaining the views and objections of these gentlemen, and the particular bearing they felt it had upon them. Some time after that, special order No. 2 was modified so as to permit the commanders of the different vessels to allow their officers to go ashore, when it could be done with propriety. Question 9.-Are you aware of any modification or explanation of that order No. 2 having been verbally made by the first lieutenant of the Ohio, previous to the modification just referred to? Answer. I do not recollect. Question 10.-Was there any further remonstrance, verbal or written, made by either of the three lieutenants you have spoken of, touching said special order No. 2, after the modification thereof? Answer. I believe not. I have no recollection of it. Question 11.-Was there any fact in the conduct of those officers, or either of them, at or about the time of the promulgation of said special order No. 2, and up to the 25th day of October, 1848, inclusive, which could justly subject them, or either of them, to the charge of being "tainted with the gold mania?" If yea, specify the fact or facts. Answer. I know of no fact, bearing upon the question, except their remonstrance against special order No. 2, as being particularly oppressive or invidious to them in their opinion. Question 12.-Do you mean to be understood as saying that their conduct in relation to said special order No. 2 did, in your opinion, justly subject them to the charge of being tainted with the gold mania? And the question being read, is objected to by the accused. The judge advocate withdraws the question for the present, and substitutes the following: Question 13.-Please to explain how that fact bears upon the question. The accused objects to this question also, and submits the following paper; which is read: The accused is advised that this question is liable to the double objection, first, of being in the nature of a cross examination of the witness by the party who produces him; and secondly, to explain, or give an opinion, on a matter which should be judged by the court itself. As to the first objection, the obvious tendency and purpose of the question is to draw from the witness an answer which may go to contradict or discredit the opinion implied from his answer to a previous question, that the remonstrance of the officers in question, against the special order No. 2, was a fact which had some bearing on the charge of their being tainted with the gold mania. The witness has cited that remonstrance as the only FACT within his knowledge that could justly subject them to the charge. The present question goes not to any question or illustration of that fact; the fact is unquestionable, and admitted that they did remonstrate. The reasoning or opinion of the witness that the fact had a bearing, and how it bore on the charge, is wholly inadmissible, except as a cross-examination to contradict and discredit the reasoning and inferences of the witness. As to the 2d objection: if the tendency and object of the question be not to contradict or discredit the previous statement of the witness, then it is a call on the witness to give an opinion how the naked fact he has stated goes to prove, by inference or otherwise, a taint with the gold mania. Surely, this is a question of reasoning and inference from a given fact; and, as surely, no such reasoning or inference can, in the nature of things, be any subject of the testimony of witnesses, but belongs exclusively to the judicial faculty of the court itself, who must decide from its own intuitions what bearing, if any, the fact has upon the charge. As to the question No. 12, which is held in reserve, and for which the question just objected to is for the present suostituted, it is conceived to be liable to substantially the same exceptions, and to additional ones peculiar to itself. The witness, in his answer to the 11th question, has already said that he knew of "no fact bearing upon the question except their remonstrance"-a clear and unequivocal declaration that he considered that remonstrance as a fact bearing on the question. Now, to ask him whether he meant to be understood as saying that their conduct in relation to special order No. 2 did, in his opinion, justly subject them to the charge, is exceptionable 1st. As a leading question; 2d. As in the nature of a cross examination; and 3d. As calling for HIS OPINION, and his opinion on a question exclu sively belonging to the judicial faculty of the court itself, namely: an opinion whether a given fact justly subjected the officers to the charge; or whether any just inference could be drawn from that fact of their being justly subject to the charge. THOS. AP C. JONES, And thereupon the court is cleared for deliberation. But the usual hour of adjournment having arrived, without coming to any decision upon the objection, the court is opened, and the accused is notified that the court will further deliberate on the matter of his objection. The testimony of the witness, Commander Stribling, is read over to him. as herein before recorded, and is acknowledged to be correctly re corded. And the court is adjourned until to-morrow morning at half-past 10 o'clock. JANUARY 9, 1851-Half past 10 o'clock a. m. The court met, pursuant to adjournment. Present: the president, all the members, and the judge advocate. The accused is in attendance. The record of the proceedings on yesterday is read and approved. The judge advocate reads the following paper to the court: "The judge advocate does not think it necessary to occupy further the attention of the court in the matter of the objection which was pending at the adjournment on yesterday; and he therefore forbears to enter into any discussion of the grounds taken in the paper prepared by the learned counsel for the accused. "The object of the judge advocate in putting the questions which have been objected to was not to draw from the witness any mere opinion, or to lead him in any degree to usurp the functions of the court to decide upon the bearing or weight of any fact in evidence before it. Nor did he contemplate any such thing as a cross examination of the witness. Al though regarding his position as quasi judicial, he is not prepared to admit that he is restrained by the rules of practice applicable to a private party, or mere prosecutor, from eliciting the whole truth from every wit ness who is placed upon the stand. His motive in the present instance was one of justice to the witness, in affording him the opportunity of explaining an answer which seemed to be equivocal in its terms, and which, for reasons apparent upon the record, and to which it is not necessary now further to allude, he supposed the witness did not design to convey the meaning which is broadly attributed to it in the paper presented yesterday by the accused-of which interpretation it is doubtless susceptible. The witness was in court during the reading of that paper, and heard the construction which the accused puts upon his testimony. His attention was in that manner distinctly called to the point on which the judge advocate supposed that he had not expressed his real meaning. If he is now content that his testimony shall stand as it is recorded, without explanation, so is the judge advocate. He has done all that his duty requires. "The object of the questions being accomplished, it would be idle to discuss the abstract right to put them. The judge advocate, therefore, |