springing use took effect by the death of C. A good springing use must be limited at once, independently of any preceding estate, and not by way of remainder, for it then becomes a contingent and not a springing use; and contingent uses, as we have already seen, are subject to the same rules precisely as contingent remainders. The other mode of conveyance by which uses may be raised, operates, not by transmutation of the estate of the grantor, but the use is severed out of the grantor's seisin, and executed by the statute. This is the case in covenants to stand seised, and in conveyances by bargain

and sale.

(4.) Future, or contingent uses, are limited to take effect as remainders. If lands be granted to A. in fee, to the. use of B., on his return from Rome, it is a future contingent use, because it is uncertain whether B. will ever return.b

*299 *(5.) If the use limited by deed expired, or could not vest, or was not to vest but upon a contingency, the use resulted back to the grantor who created it. The rule is the same when no uses are declared by the conveyance. So much of the use as the owner of the land does not dispose of, remains with him. If he conveys without any declaration of uses, or to such uses as he shall thereafter appoint, or to the use of a third person on the occurrence of a specified event, in all such cases there is a use resulting back to the grantor.c

* Gilbert on Uses, by Sugden, 163, 176.

Sir Edward Sugden, in a note to his edition of Gilbert on Uses, 152—178, has given a clear and methodical analysis, definition, and description of these various modifications of future uses. In Mr. Preston's Abstracts of Title, vol. i. 105, 106, 107, and vol. ii. 151, we have also illustrations of the various shades of distinction between them.

• Co. Litt. 23, a, 271, b. Sir E. Clere's case, 6 Co. 17, b. Armstrong v. Wholesey, 2 Wils. Rep. 19.

(6.) The English doctrine of uses and trusts, under the statute of 27 Henry VIII., and the conveyances founded thereon, have been very generally introduced into the jurisprudence of this country. But in the remarks which accompanied the bill for the revision of the New-York statutes, relative to uses and trusts, the following objections were made to uses as they now exist. (1.) They render conveyances more complex, verbose, and expensive than is requisite, and perpetuate in deeds the use of a technical language, unintelligible as a "mysterious jargon," to all but the members of one learned profession. (2.) Limitations intended to take effect at a future day, may be defeated by a disturbance of the seisin, arising from a forfeiture or change of the estate of the person seised to the use. (3.) The difficulty exists of determining whether a particular limitation is to take effect as an executed use, as an estate at common law, or as a trust. These objections were deemed so strong and unanswerable as to induce the revisers to recommend the entire abolition of uses. They considered, that by making a *grant, without the actual de- *300 livery of possession, or livery of seisin, effectual

to pass every estate and interest in land, the utility of conveyances deriving their effect from the statute of uses would be superseded; and that the new modifications

⚫ Chamberlain v. Crane, 1 N. H. Rep. 64. French v. French, 3 ibid. 239. Parsons, Ch. J., in Marshall v. Fish, 6 Mass. Rep. 31. Johns. Rep. passim. 3 Binney's Rep. 619. It is doubted whether the statute of uses was ever in force in the state of Ohio. Thompson v. Gibson, 2 Ohio Rep. 339. Helfeinstine v. Garrard, ibid. 270. The statute of Uses of Hen. VIII., was a part of the colonial law of Virginia, but the Revised Statutes of Virginia, since 1792, adopted as a substitute, the provision which only executes the seisin to the use in the cases of deeds of bargain and sale, of lease and release, and of covenants to stand seised to use. The statute only executes the seisin to the use in those specified cases, and does not, like the English statute, include every case where any person should stand seised to the use of any other person. Lomax's Digest of the Laws respecting Real Property, vol. i. 188.

of property which uses have sanctioned, would be preserved by repealing the rules of the common law, by which they were prohibited, and permitting every estate to be created by grant which can be created by devise. The New-York Revised Statutes have, accordingly, declared, that uses and trusts, except as authorized and modified in the article, were abolished; and every estate and interest in land is declared to be a legal right, or cognizable in the courts of law, except where it is otherwise provided in the chapter; and every estate held as an use executed under any former statute, confirmed as a legal estate. The conveyance by grant is a substitute for the conveyance to uses; and the future interests in land may be conveyed by grant as well as by devise. The statute gives the legal estate, by virtue of a grant, assignment, or devise; and the word assignment was introduced to make the assignment of terms, and other chattel interests, pass the legal interest in them, as well as in freehold estates; though, under the English law, the use in chattel interests was not executed by the statute of uses.

The operation of the statute of New-York, in respect to the doctrine of uses, will have some slight effect upon the forms of conveyance, and it may give them more brevity and simplicity. But it would be quite visionary to suppose that the science of law, even in the department of conveyancing, will not continue to have its technical language, and its various, subtle, and profound learning, in common with every other branch of human science. The transfer of property assumes so many modifications, to meet the varying exigencies of speculation, wealth, and refinement, and to supply family

■ Vol. i. 727, sec. 45, 46.

b New-York Revised Statutes, vol. i. 724, sec. 24. Ibid. 738, 739, sec. 137, 138. 142. 146. Ibid. 727, sec. 47.

wants and wishes, that the doctrine of conveyancing must continue essentially technical, under the incessant operation of skill and invention. The abolition of uses does not appear to be of much moment, but the changes which the law of trusts has been made to undergo, becomes extremely important."

II. Of trusts.

The object of the statute of uses, so far as it was intended to destroy uses, was, as we have already seen, subverted by the courts of law and equity.

(1.) Growth and doctrine of trusts.

It was soon held, that the statute executed only the first use, and that a use upon a use was void. In a feoffment to A., to the use of B., to the use of C., the statute was held to execute only the use to B., and there the estate rested, and the use to C. did not take effect." In a bargain and sale to A. in fee, to the use of B. in fee, the statute passes the estate to A., by executing the use raised by the bargain and sale; but the use to B., being a use in the second degree, is not executed by the

• Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said, in the course of his opinion, in Hopkins v. Hopkins, (1 Atk. Rep. 591,) that the statute of uses had no other effect than to add, at most, three words to a conveyance. This was rather too strongly expressed; but I presume the abolition of uses with us will not have much greater effect. It was the abolition of a phantom. The word grant is not more intelligible to the world at large, than the words bargain and sale; and the fiction indulged for 200 years, that the bargain raised a use, and the statute transferred the possession to the use, was as cheap and harmless as any thing could possibly be. It would, perhaps, have been as wise to have left the statute of uses where it stood, and to have permitted the theory engrafted upon it to remain untouched, considering that it had existed so long, and had insinuated itself so deeply and so thoroughly into every branch of the jurisprudence of real property.

Tyrrell's case, Dyer, 155. 1 And. 37. Meredith v. Jones, Cro. C. 244. Lady Whetstone v. Bury, 2 P. Wms. 146. Doe v. Passingham, 6 Barnw. & Cress. 305.

statute, and it becomes a mere trust, and one which a court of equity will recognise and enforce. Shifting, or

substituted uses, do not fall within this technical *302 rule at law, for they are merely alternate uses. Thus, a deed to A. in fee, to the use of B. in fee, and if C. should pay a given sum in a given time, then to C. in fee; the statute executes the use to B., subject to the shifting use declared in favor of C. Chattel interests were also held not to be within the statute, because it referred only to persons who were seised; and a termor was held not to be technically seised, and so the statute did not apply to a term for years. An assignment of a lease to A., to the use of B., was held to be void as to the use, and the estate was vested wholly in A. This strict construction at law, of the statute, gave a pretext to equity to interfere; and it was held in chancery, that the uses in those cases, though void at law, were good in equity; and thus uses were revived under the name of trusts. A regular and enlightened system of trusts was gradually formed and established. The ancient use was abolished, with its manifold inconveniences, and a secondary use or trust introduced. Trusts have been modelled and placed on true foundations, since Lord Nottingham succeeded to the great seal; and we have the authority of Lord Mansfield for the assertion, that a rational and uniform system has been raised, and one proper to answer the exigencies of families, and other civil purposes, without any of the mischiefs which the statute of uses meant to avoid.

a Lord Hardwicke, in Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 591. Jackson v. Cary, 16 Johns. Rep. 302.

b Preston on Abstracts, vol. i. 307-310.

• Anon., Dyer, 369, a.

d A conveyance in trust to receive the profits, and pay them over to a third person, was never a use within the statute, but an equitable trust at common law.

e Lord Mansfield, in Burgess v. Wheate, 1 W. Blacks. Rep. 160.