fore, by the law of self-preservation. No nation animated by loyal sentiments and inspired by a generous ambition can even suffer itself to debate with parties within or without a policy of self-preservation. In assuming this position and the policy resulting from it, we have done, as I think, just what Great Britain herself must, and therefore would do if a domestic insurrection should attempt to detach Ireland, or Scotland, or England from the United Kingdom, while she would hear no argument nor enter into any debate upon the subject. Neither adverse opinions of theoretical writers, nor precedents drawn from the practice of other nations, or, even if they could be, from her own, would modify her course, which would be all the more vigorously followed if internal resistance should fortify itself with alliances throughout the world. This is exactly the case now with the United States. So, for obvious reasons, I refrain from argument to prove to the government of Great Britain the assumed error of the position it has avowed. First. Argument from a party that maintains itself to be absolutely right, and resolved in no case to change its convictions, becomes merely controversial. Secondly. Such argument would be only an indirect way of defending our own position, which is unchangeable. Thirdly. The position of Great Britain has been taken upon the assumption of a certain degree of probability of success by the insurgents in arms; and it must be sooner or later abandoned, as that probability shall diminish and ultimately cease, while in any case that circumstance does not affect our position or the policy which we have adopted. It must, therefore, be left to Great Britain to do what we have done, namely, survey the entire field, with the consequences of her course deemed by us to be erroneous, and determine as those consequences develope themselves how long that course shall be pursued. While, however, thus waiving controversy on the main point, I am tempted by a sincere conviction that Great Britain really must desire, as we do, that the peace of the world may not be unnecessarily broken, to consider the attitude of the two powers, with a view to mutual forbearance, until reconciliation of conflicting systems shall have become in every event impossible. The British government will, I think, admit that so soon as its unexpected, and, as we regard it, injurious position assumed in the Queen's proclamation became known to us, we took some pains to avert premature or unnecessary collision, if it could be done without sacrificing any part of the sovereignty which we had determined in every event to defend. We promptly renewed the proposition which, fortunately for both parties, we had tendered before that proclamation was issued, to concede as one whole undivided sovereignty to Great Britain, as a friend, all the guarantees for her commerce that she might claim as a neutral from this government as one of her two imagined belligerents. It seemed to us that these two great and kindred nations might decline to be dogmatic, and act practically with a view to immediate peace and ultimate good understanding. So, on the other hand, it is my duty to admit, as I most frankly do, that the directions given by the British government that our blockade shall be respected, and that favor or shelter shall be denied to insurgent privateers, together with the disallowance of the application of the insurgent commissioners, have given us good reason to expect that our complete sovereignty, though theoretically questioned in the Queen's proclamation, would be practically respected. Lord Lyons, as you are aware, proposed to read to me a despatch which he had received from his government, affirming the position assumed in the Queen's proclamation, and deducing from that position claims as a neutral to guarantees of safety to British commerce less than those we had, as I have already stated, offered to her as a friend. I de clined, as you have been advised, to hear the communication, but nevertheless renewed through you, as I consistently could, the offer of the greater guarantees before tendered. The case then seemed to me to stand thus: The two nations had, indeed, failed to find a common ground or principle on which they could stand together; but they had succeeded in reaching a perfect understanding of the nature and extent of their disagreement, and in finding a line of mutual, practical forbearance. It was under this aspect of the positions of the two governments that the President thought himself authorized to inform Congress on its coming together on the 4th of July instant, in extra session. that the sovereignty of the United States was practically respected by all nations. Nothing has occurred to change this condition of affairs, unless it be the attitude which Lord John Russell has indicated for the British government in regard to an apprehended closing of the insurrectionary ports, and the passage of the law of Congress which authorizes that measure in the discretion of the President. It is my purpose not to anticipate or even indicate the decision which will be made, but simply to suggest to you what you may properly and advantageously say while the subject is under consideration. First. You will, of course, prevent misconception of the measure by stating that the law only authorizes the President to close the ports in his discretion, according as he shall regard exigencies now existing or hereafter to arise. Secondly. The passage of the law, taken in connexion with attendant circumstances, does not necessarily indicate a legislative conviction that the ports ought to be closed, but only shows the purpose of Congress that the closing of the ports, if it is now or shall become necessary, shall not fail for want of power explicitly conferred by law. When, on the 13th of April last, disloyal citizens defiantly inaugurated an armed insurrection by the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the President's constitutional obligation to suppress the insurrection became imperative. But the case was new, and had not been adequately provided for by express law. The President called military and naval forces into activity, instituted a blockade, and incurred great expense, for all which no direct legal provisions existed. He convened Congress at the earliest possible day to confirm these measures, if they should see fit. Congress, when it came together, confronted these facts. It has employed itself less in directing how and in what way the Union shall be maintained, than in confirming what the President had already done, and in putting into his hands more ample means and greater power than he has exercised or asked. The law in question was passed in this generous and patriotic spirit. Whether it shall be put into execution to-day or to-morrow, or at what time, will depend on the condition of things at home and abroad, and a careful weighing of the advantages of so stringent a measure against those which are derived from the existing blockade. Thirdly. You may assure the British government that no change of policy now pursued, injuriously affecting foreign commerce, will be made from motives of aggression against nations which practically respect the sovereignty of the United States, or without due consideration of all the circumstances, foreign as well as domestic, bearing upon the question. The same spirit of forbearance towards foreign nations, arising from a desire to confine the calamities of the unhappy contest as much as possible, and to bring it to a close by the complete restoration of the authority of the gov ernment as speedily as possible, that have hitherto regulated the action of the government will continue to control its counsels. On the other hand, you will not leave it at all doubtful that the President fully adheres to the position that this government so early adopted, and which I have so continually throughout this controversy maintained; consequently he fully agrees with Congress in the principle of the law which authorizes him to close the ports which have been seized by the insurgents, and he will put into execution and maintain it with all the means at his command, at the hazard of whatever consequences, whenever it shall appear that the safety of the nation requires it. I cannot leave the subject without endeavoring once more, as I have so often done before, to induce the British government to realize the conviction which I have more than once expressed in this correspondence, that the policy of the government is one that is based on interests of the greatest importance, and sentiments of the highest virtue, and therefore is in no case likely to be changed, whatever may be the varying fortunes of the war at home or the action of foreign nations on this subject, while the policy of foreign States rests on ephemeral interests of commerce or of ambition merely. The policy of these United States is not a creature of the government but an inspiration of the people, while the policies of foreign States are at the choice mainly of the governments presiding over them. If, through error, on whatever side this civil contention shall transcend the national bounds and involve foreign States, the energies of all commercial nations, including our own, will necessarily be turned to war, and a general carnival of the adventurous and the reckless of all countries, at the cost of the existing commerce of the world, must ensue. Beyond that painful scene upon the seas there lie, but dimly concealed from our vision, scenes of devastation and desolation which will leave no roots remaining out of which trade between the United States and Great Britain, as it has hitherto flourished, can ever again spring up. I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward. [Extracts.] No. 20.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: At the close of my despatch, No. 17, on the subject of my last conference with Lord John Russell, I mentioned my intention to write to Mr. Dayton, at Paris, to know whether he felt authorized to proceed in a simultaneous negotiation on the subject of the declaration of the congress at Paris. I have now to report that I executed my purpose on the 19th instant. On the evening of the 24th I received a note from Mr. Dayton announcing his arrival in town and his wish to confer with me upon this matter. Yesterday morning I had the pleasure of a full and free conversation with him, in the course of which we carefully compared our respective instructions and the action taken under them. I am very glad he has taken the trouble to come over to see me, for I confess that I was a little embarrassed by not knowing the precise nature of his proposal to the French government at the time when I heard of it from Lord John Russell. Had I been informed of it I should perhaps have shaped my own course a little differently. So I doubt not that he would have been pleased to know more exactly my own proceedings as well as the more specific character of my instructions. An hour's interview has had the effect to correct our impressions better than could have been accomplished by an elaborate correspondence. I can now perfectly understand as well as enter into the reasons which prompted his proposal of the declaration of Paris, connected as it was with the modification first suggested by Mr. Marcy. There can be no doubt that the attempt to secure such an extension of the application of the principle contained in the first point of that declaration was worth making, on the part of the new administration, particularly at a place where there was no reason to presume any disinclination to adopt it. Neither did the reply of Mr. Thouvenel entirely preclude the hope of ultimate success, so far as the disposition of France may be presumed. The obstacles, if any there are, must be inferred to have been thought to exist elsewhere. And an advance could be expected only when the efforts to remove them had been applied with effect in the proper quarter. It was, therefore, both natural and proper for Mr. Dayton, after having made his offer, and received such an answer, to wait patiently until it should become apparent that such efforts had been made, and made without success. There can be no doubt that the opposition to this modification centres here. Independently of the formal announcement of Lord John Russell to me that the proposition was declined, I have, from other sources of informa tion, some reason to believe that it springs from the tenacity of a class of influential persons, by their age and general affinities, averse to all sudden variations from established ideas. Such people are not to be carried away by novel reasoning, however forcible. We have cause to feel the presence of a similar power at home, though in a vastly reduced degree. All modifications of the public law, however beneficent, naturally meet with honest resistance in these quarters for a time. It is to be feared that this may have the effect of defeating, at this moment, the application of the noble doctrines of the declaration of Paris, in the full expansion of which they are susceptible. But to my mind the failure to reach that extreme point will not justify the United States in declining to accept the good which is actually within their grasp. The declaration of the leading powers of civilized Europe, made at Paris in 1856, engrafted upon the law of nations for the first time great principles for which the government of the United States had always contended against some of those powers, and down to that time had contended in vain. That great act was the virtual triumph of their policy all over the globe. It was the sacrifice, on the part of Great Britain, of notions she had ever before held to with the most unrelenting rigidity. It would therefore seem as if any reluctance to acknowledge this practical amount of benefit, obtained on the mere ground that something remained to require, was calculated only to wither the laurels gained by our victory. It would almost seem like a retrograde tendency to the barbarism of former ages. Surely it is not in the spirit of the reformed government in America to give countenance to any such impression. Whatever may have been the character of the policy in later years, the advent of another and a better power should be marked by a recurrence to the best doctrines ever proclaimed in the national history. And if it so happen that they are not now adopted by others to the exact extent that we would prefer, the obvious course of wisdom would seem to be to accept the good which can be obtained, and patiently to await another opportunity when a continuance of exertions in the same direction may enable us to secure everything that is left to be desired. I think that Mr. Dayton has waited only to be convinced that his proposed modification cannot be secured before he acts upon the authority given him to accede to the declaration of Paris, pure and simple. On my part, I have apprised him of the answer made to me by Lord John Russell at our last conference. But he wishes some evidence upon which he can rely a little more securely than a report of conversation. And considering the remarkable discrepancy in the recollection of the conferences with his lordship which has thus far taken place, I am not surprised. In order to meet this difficulty he has addressed to me a letter of inquiry, which I propose to answer. At the same time I design to address a letter to his lordship recapitulating the portion of his conversation that is in question, and informing him that, on the assumption that I understood him right, Mr. Dayton consents to proceed. This will, of course, render it necessary for him to explain himself, if the fact should be otherwise. Mr. Dayton will, of course, communicate directly with the department as to the later measures which he may think proper to take. You will have been already informed by the newspapers of the changes which the ministry has undergone in consequence of the necessity imposed upon Lord Herbert by his failing health to retire from his post. As a consequence, Lord John Russell has been called to the House of Lords, though retaining his official station, and some shifting of other places has occurred. The only new appointment is that of Sir Robert Peel. * * * * * * * * * But I have not time at the close of this communication to enter into any speculations so intimately connected with a general view of the state of affairs in the other countries of Europe as well as in the United States. I shall therefore reserve what views I may have to submit on this subject to a future opportunity. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. SIR: My despatch, No. 42, dated July 21, was delayed beyond the proper mail day by circumstances entirely beyond my control. I trust, however, that it will still be in time. Our army of the Potomac on Sunday last met a reverse equally severe and unexpected. For a day or two the panic which had produced the result was followed by a panic that seemed to threaten to demoralize the country. But that evil has ceased already. The result is already seen in a vigorous reconstruction upon a scale of greater magnitude and increased enthusiasm. It is not likely that anything will now be done here, hastily or inconsiderately, affecting our foreign relations. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c. |