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Is it a part of the treaty, or is it not? If it be, then is the undersigned exceeding his instructions in signing it, for the paper made no part of the project which he was directed to propose; and in case he should sign, the addition must be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, together with the paper itself. If it be not, what advantage can the party making the declaration expect from it in modifying the construction of the project, when the Senate have never had it before them for their approval? It either changes the treaty or it does not. If it does, then the question arises, why did not the undersigned procure it to be incorporated into it? On the other hand, if it do not, why did he connive at the appearance of a desire to do it without effecting the object?

The undersigned has ever been desirous of maintaining and perpetuating the most friendly relations between her Majesty's kingdom and the United States, and he continues to act in the same spirit when he deprecates the submission of any project clogged with a similar exception to the consideration of the Senate of the United States. He has reason to believe that already a strong disinclination exists in that body to the acceptance of the first of the four propositions embraced in the declaration itself, and that mainly because it is esteemed to be too much of a concession to the great maritime powers. Were he now to consent, without further instructions, to accept a qualification which would scarcely fail to be regarded by many unfavorably disposed persons as more or less directly an insult to the nation in its present distress, he should deem himself as incurring the hazard of bringing on difficulties which he professes an earnest wish to avoid.

For the reasons thus given the undersigned has reluctantly come to the conclusion to decline to fix a day for proceeding in the negotiation under its present aspect, at least until he shall have been able to submit the whole question once more to the judgment of the authorities under which he has the honor to act.

tion.

А сору The undersigned prays Lord Russell to receive the assurances of the most distinguished consideration with which he is his obedient servant.

of this letter will also be forwarded to Mr. Dayton for his informa

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Right Hon. EARL RUSSELL, &c., &c., &c.

Lord Russell to Mr. Edwards.

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 14, 1861.

It is for the Spanish government to weigh in the balance of their judgment the advantages and inconveniences which may arise from the annexation of the territory of the Dominican state to the dominions of Spain; and any opinion which her Majesty's government may form on the subject can be founded on no other consideration than a regard for what they may look upon as the real and permanent interests of Spain.

Her Majesty's government would, no doubt, have felt a strong and decided dissatisfaction at the proposed annexation if it had been likely to lead to the introduction of slavery into a community which is free from the taint of that pernicious institution; but the formal and repeated declarations of Marshal O'Donnell, that under no circumstances will slavery be introduced into the Dominican territory, have removed the main cause which would have led her

Majesty's government to view the proposed annexation with dislike and re

pugnance.

Her Majesty's government certainly apprehended, when first this projected annexation was talked of, that it might, if carried into execution, involve Spain in unfriendly discussions, if not in conflict, either with France or with the United States, or with both. With regard to France, her Majesty's government have not learned that the French government has expressed any positive objection to the proposed arrangement, although she may not think it advantageous to Spain. It appears, also, from what has been stated to you, that there is no probability at present of any positive resistance to the measure, either by the northern or the southern confederation of North America. But the Spanish government should not too confidently rely on the permanent continuance of this indifference or acquiescence on the part of the North Americans; and it is not impossible that when the civil war which is now breaking out shall have been brought to an end, an event which may happen sooner than at present appears likely, both the north and the south might combine to make the occupation of the Dominican territory by Spain the cause of serious difference between the North American governments and that of Spain.

But

Her Majesty's government do not deny that Great Britain, as a power naturally inclined to peace, and systematically addicted to commerce, must always view a war between any two powers as an event not only at variance with her principles, but to a certain degree injurious to her interests. with respect to Spain, the motives of the British government spring from far higher sources. Great Britain and Spain have for long periods of time, and in circumstances of high moment to each, been faithful and active allies; their alliance has been greatly useful and eminently honorable to both. It is a fundamental maxim of British policy to wish well to Spain, and earnestly to desire her welfare and prosperity; and therefore any combination of events which might at any time involve the possibility of Spain being engaged in a conflict which, from local circumstances and disadvantages, might be in the end seriously injurious to her rule over her ancient possessions, would be viewed by her Majesty's government with lively apprehension and sincere regret.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

[Extracts.]

No. 78.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, September 2, 1861.

SIR: Your despatch of the 16th of August, number 29, has been received.

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Steadily for the period of four months our forces have been coming into the field at the rate of two thousand a day, and the same augmentation will go on nearly at the same rate until 500,000 men will be found in the service. Our supplies of arms are running low.

My despatch, No. 42, acknowledged by you in the paper before me, was written, as you will see by its date, July 21, during the progress of the battle at Bull Run, though sent a few days afterwards. From this fact you will see that our policy and our claims upon the government of Great Britain are not affected by the caprices of military fortune..

We have now reached a new and important stage in the war. The enemy

is directly before us, invigorated and inspirited by a victory, which it is not the part of wisdom for us to undervalue. But that victory has brought with it the necessity for renewed and decisive action with proportionate results. The demoralization of our forces has passed away. I have already stated that they are increasing in numbers. You will learn through other channels that they are equally perfecting themselves in discipline. Commander Stringham and General Butler's success at Hatteras was not merely a brilliant affair. It brings nearly the whole coast of North Carolina under the surveillance of our blockade. *

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I shall be entirely satisfied with the exercise of your own discretion as to the time and form you may choose for making the explanations to the British government on those subjects with which you are charged, and I regard the condition of things in that respect, as you have reported it to me, as, under the circumstances, quite satisfactory. No change of policy in regard to the blockade has been adopted since my former despatches.

I can well enough imagine that your position has been made a trying one by the exultations of enemies of our country and its institutions over the disaster of the 21st of July. But you will be able to comprehend what they cannot, that faction ripens fast, whence its necessities impel to action which exhausts its energies. Loyalty in any free country organizes less rapidly and gains strength from time and even from reverses. The previous success of this government is a sufficient guaranty of the safety of our cause, and is a fact too important to be misunderstood in the political circle in which you are moving.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

No. 83.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, September 7, 1861.

SIR: I have received your despatch of August 23, number 32. It is accompanied by a note which was addressed to you by Lord Russell on the 19th of the same month, and a paper containing the form of an official declaration which he proposes to make on the part of her Majesty on the occasion of affixing his signature to the projected convention between the United States and Great Britain for the accession of the former power to the articles of the declaration of the congress of Paris for the melioration of the rigor of international law in regard to neutrals in maritime war. The instrument thus submitted to us by Lord Russell is in the following words: "Draft of declaration. In affixing his signature to the convention of this day, between her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, by order of her Majesty, that her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States."

Lord Russell, in his note to you, explains the object of the instrument by saying that it is intended to prevent any misconception as to the nature of the engagement to be taken by her Majesty.

You have judged very rightly in considering this proceeding, on the part of the British government, as one so grave and so novel in its character as to render further action on your part in regard to the projected convention inadmissible until you shall have special instructions from this department.

Long before the present communication can reach you, my instructions of August 17, No. 61, will have come to your hands. That paper directed you to ask Lord Russell to explain a passage in a note written to you, and then lying before me, in which he said: "I need scarcely add that on the part of Great Britain the engagement (to be contained in the projected convention) will be prospective, and will not invalidate anything already done;" which explanation I stated would be expected as a preliminary before you could proceed further in the transaction.

You have thus been already prepared for the information that your resolution to await special instructions in the present emergency is approved.

I feel myself at liberty, perhaps bound, to assume that Lord Russell's proposed declaration, which I have herein recited, will have been already regarded, as well by him as by yourself, as sufficiently answering the request for preliminary explanations which you were instructed to make.

I may, therefore, assume that the case is fully before me, and that the question whether this government will consent to enter into the projected treaty with Great Britain, subject to the condition of admitting the simulta neous declaration on her Majesty's part, proposed by Lord Russell, is ready to be decided.

I am instructed by the President to say that the proposed declaration is inadmissible.

It would be virtually a new and distinct article incorporated into the projected convention. To admit such a new article would, for the first time in the history of the United States, be to permit a foreign power to take cognizance of and adjust its relations upon assumed internal and purely domestic differences existing within our own country.

This broad consideration supersedes any necessity for considering in what manner or in what degree the projected convention, if completed either subject to the explanation proposed or not, would bear directly or indirectly on the internal differences which the British government assume to be prevailing in the United States.

I do not enlarge upon this branch of the subject. It is enough to say that the view thus adopted by the President seems to be in harmony equally with a prudent regard to the safety of the republic and a just sense of its honor and dignity.

The proposed declaration is inadmissible, among other reasons, because it is not mutual. It proposes a special rule by which her Majesty's obligations shall be meliorated in their bearing upon internal difficulties now prevailing in the United States, while the obligations to be assumed by the United States shall not be similarly meliorated or at all affected in their bearing on internal differences that may now be prevailing, or may hereafter arise and prevail, in Great Britain.

It is inadmissible, because it would be a substantial and even a radical departure from the declaration of the congress at Paris. That declaration makes no exception in favor of any of the parties to it in regard to the bearing of their obligations upon internal differences which may prevail in the territories or dominions of other parties.

The declaration of the congress of Paris is the joint act of forty-six great and enlightened powers, designing to alleviate the evils of maritime war, and promote the first interest of humanity, which is peace. The government of Great Britain will not, I am sure, expect us to accede to this noble act otherwise than upon the same equal footing upon which all the other parties to it are standing. We could not consent to accede to the declaration with a modification of its terms unless all the present parties to it should stipu late that the modification should be adopted as one of universal application. The British government cannot but know that there would be little pros

pect of an entire reformation of the declaration of Paris at the present time, and it has not even told us that it would accept the modification as a general one if it were proposed.

It results that the United States must accede to the declaration of the congress of Paris on the same terms with all the other parties to it, or that they do not accede to it at all.

You will present these considerations to Lord Russell, not as arguments why the British government ought to recede from the position it has assumed, but as the grounds upon which the United States decline to enter into the projected convention recognizing that exceptional position of her Majesty.

If, therefore, her Britannic Majesty's government shall adhere to the proposition thus disallowed, you will inform Lord Russell that the negotiation must for the present be suspended.

I forbear purposely from a review of the past correspondence, to ascertain the relative responsibilities of the parties for this failure of negotiations, from which I had hoped results would flow beneficial, not only to the two nations, but to the whole world-beneficial, not in the present age only, but in future ages.

It is my desire that we may withdraw from the subject carrying away no feelings of passion, prejudice, or jealousy, so that in some happier time it may be resumed, and the important objects of the proposed convention may be fully secured. I believe that that propitious time is even now not distant; and I will hope that when it comes Great Britain will not only willingly and unconditionally accept the adhesion of the United States to all the benignant articles of the declaration of the congress of Paris, but will even go further, and, relinquishing her present objections, consent, as the United States have so constantly invited, that the private property, not contraband, of citizens. and subjects of nations in collision shall be exempted from confiscation equally in warfare waged on the land and in warfare waged upon the seas, which are the common highways of all nations.

Regarding this negotiation as at an end, the question arises, what, then, are to be the views and policy of the United States in regard to the rights of neutrals in maritime war in the present case. My previous despatches leave no uncertainty upon this point. We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag, according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods not contraband of war. Goods of her Majesty's subjects, not contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation though found under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be committed by our naval forces or by those of any of our citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels or property of British subjects. Our blockade, being effective, must be respected.

The unfortunate failure of our negotiations to amend the law of nations in regard to maritime war does not make us enemies, although, if they had been successful, we should have perhaps been more assured friends.

war.

Civil war is a calamity from which certainly no people or nation that has ever existed has been always exempt. It is one which probably no nation ever will escape. Perhaps its most injurious trait is its tendency to subvert the good understanding and break up the relations existing between the distracted state and friendly nations, and to involve them, sooner or later, in It is the desire of the United States that the internal differences existing in this country may be confined within our own borders. I do not suffer myself for a moment to doubt that Great Britain has a desire that we may be successful in attaining that object, and that she looks with dread upon the possibility of being herself drawn into this unhappy internal controversy of our own. I do not think it can be regarded as disrespectful if you should remind Lord Russell that when, in 1838, a civil war broke out in

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