E. PARIS, May 26, 1861. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 24th instant, calling my attention to the fact that my predecessor, on the 27th of September last, requested you to have the goodness to deliver to him, from the gov ernment arsenal, four fire-arms (4 armes à feu) and two other arms (armes blanches) for the State of Virginia, and that you authorized the said delivery, with the approbation of the Emperor, on the 22d of October, 1860; and that you informed Mr. Faulkner that the artillery board of Paris held those arms at the disposition of the Virginia delegates; that up to the date of your note to me the letter from the colonel of the artillery staff and your own despatches of the 21st of March last, addressed to Mr. Faulkner, have remained unanswered, &c. I beg to say to your excellency that I am altogether ignorant of the causes of delay on the part of my predecessor in answering the communications referred to, and asking for the delivery of the arms in question. I pray you, sir, to accept for yourself, and convey to the Emperor, my grateful acknowledgments, in behalf of the United States, for the courtesy extended in the expression of a readiness to grant the request of my predecessor; while I deem it proper to say at once that the request for the arms referred to will not, under existing circumstances, be renewed by me in behalf of the State of Virginia. I beg to assure you, sir, of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be your obedient servant, Mons. le Marechal Comte RANDON, WM. L. DAYTON. Minister de la Guerre. H. PARIS, May 23, 1861. EXCELLENCY: The necessity which exists for arming our steamer, the Fulton, against any attack of the privateers of the southern confederacy obliges Captain Walton to provide himself with two hundred rifles. These guns, which we have purchased at Leige, (Belgium,) will be delivered today or to-morrow at Havre. But we have no cartridges for these guns, and are obliged to buy them in France, and cannot obtain them without an authorization from the minister of war. We are thus obliged to appeal to you, to beg your powerful influence in obtaining the necessary munitions. We desire that the French government furnish us, delivered on board the steamer Fulton, at Havre, twenty thousand cartouches for hunting rifles, of the calibre 17 for the muzzle of the guns. Either our house, at Paris, or that of Messrs. W. Selim & Co., at Havre, will pay the bills. The steamer Fulton will quit Havre Tuesday morning, 28th instant, and it will be necessary that the munition should be delivered Monday. We pray your excellency to accept, in entram, the expression of the profound gratitude and our distinguished consideration of your excellency's most obedient servants, His Excellency Mr. DAYTON, SHELBERT, KANE & CO., Minister of the United States of America, Paris. Mr. Seward to Mr. Daylon. No. 10.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, May 30, 1861. SIR: Mr. Sanford, who was requested by me to look to our interests in Paris in the interval which might elapse between the withdrawal of Mr. Faulkner and your own arrival, has transmitted to me (in his despatch No. 2) an account of a very interesting conversation which he has recently held with Mr. Thouvenel on our internal affairs. In that conversation Mr. Thouvenel intimated that, in view of the great commercial interests which are involved in the domestic controversy which is now agitating the United States, the French government had felt itself constrained to take measures, in conjunction with the government of Great Britain, to meet a condition of things which imperiled those interests. That it had been decided that communications of a similar tenor should be addressed by both of those governments to the government of the United States, and that those communications would be forwarded in the current week. Mr. Thouvenel kindly foreshadowed the points of those communications. As those papers may be expected to arrive by, perhaps, the next steamer, I shall reserve comments upon the propositions indicated until they shall thus be fully and directly brought to the attention of the President. There are, however, some points in the conversation, or suggested by it, which I cannot properly suffer to pass unnoticed. First. I desire that Mr. Thouvenel may be informed that this government cannot but regard any communications held by the French government, even though unofficial, with the agents of the insurrectionary movement in this country as exceptionable and injurious to the dignity and honor of the United States. They protest against this intercourse, however, not so much on that ground as on another. They desire to maintain the most cordial relations with the government of France, and would therefore, if possible, refrain from complaint. But it is manifest that even an unofficial reception of the emissaries of disunion has a certain though measured tendency to give them a prestige which would encourage their efforts to prosecute a civil war destructive to the prosperity of this country and aimed at the overthrow of the government itself. It is earnestly hoped that this protest may be sufficient to relieve this government from the necessity of any action on the unpleasant subject to which it relates. Secondly. The United States cannot for a moment allow the French government to rest under the delusive belief that they will be content to have the confederate States recognized as a belligerent power by States with which this nation is in amity. No concert of action among foreign States so recognizing the insurgents can reconcile the United States to such a proceeding, whatever may be the consequences of resistance. Thirdly. The President turns away from these points of apprehended difference of opinion between the two governments to notice other and more agreeable subjects. The tone of Mr. Thouvenel's conversation is frank, generous, and cordial; and this government feels itself bound by new ties to France when her Emperor avows his desire for the perpetual union of the States. Especially does this government acknowledge that it is profoundly moved by the declaration of his Majesty, that he would be willing to act as mediator in the civil strife that unhappily convulses our country. These expressions of good will are just what have been expected from the Emperor of France. This government desires that his Majesty may be informed that it indulges not the least apprehension of a dissolution of the Union in this painful controversy. A favorable issue is deemed certain. What is wanted is that the war may be as short, and attended by as few calamities at home and as few injuries to friendly nations, as possible. No mediation could modify in the least degree the convictions of policy and duty under which this government is acting; while foreign intervention, even in the friendly form of mediation, would produce new and injurious complications. We are free to confess that so cordial is our regard for the Emperor and our confidence in his wisdom and justice, that his mediation would be accepted if all intervention of that kind were not deemed altogether inadmissible. This government perceives, as it thinks, that the French government is indulging in an exaggerated estimate of the moral power and material forces of the insurrection. The government of the United States cheerfully excuses this error, because it knows how unintelligible the working of the American system and the real character of the American people are to European nations. This government knows, moreover, and painfully feels, that the commercial interests of European states are so deeply involved in the restoration of our domestic peace as to excite the highest anxiety and impatience on their part. But it desires the French government to reflect that our commercial interests involved in the issue are even greater than their own; and that every motive that France can have for desiring peace operates still more powerfuily on ourselves, besides a thousand motives peculiar to ourselves alone. The measures we have adopted, and are now vigorously pursuing, will terminate the unhappy contest at an early day, and be followed by benefits to ourselves and to all nations greater and better assured than those which have hitherto attended our national progress. Nothing is wanting to that success except that foreign nations shall leave us, as is our right, to manage our own affairs in our own way. They, as well as we, can only suffer by their intervention. No one, we are sure, can judge better than the Emperor of France how dangerous and deplorable would be the emergency that should intrude Europeans into the political contests of the American people. I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, WILLIAM L. DAYTON, Esq., &c., &c., &c. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward. PARIS, May 30, 1861. SIR: Since the date of my despatch No. 6 I have had an interview with Mr. Thouvenel. I told him I was authorized to accept the propositions adopted at the congress of Paris in 1856, but with the desire expressed by the President that the provisions should be added exempting private property afloat, unless contraband, from seizure and confiscation. I did not say, nor did he ask, whether the four propositions would be accepted without amendment. He said nothing could be done except by conference with the other powers, but if I would submit the proposition in writing, which I shall at once do, he would immediately address the other powers, and we would probably receive an answer in ten or twelve days. I have been induced to suggest again the adoption of this amendment exempting private property afloat from seizure and confiscation: (1.) From the preference or wish of the President expressed in your letter of instruction. (2.) From the great importance, as it seemed to me, of securing the adoption of the principle, if possible, before the United States should give up the right of privateering. (3.) From the facts patent on the correspondence of this legation in 1856, whereby it appears that France and Russia were both favorably disposed at that time to the adoption of the principle of the amendment, (see Mr. Marcy's despatch to Mr. Mason, No. 94, dated October 4, 1856, and Mr. Mason's confidential letter to Mr. Dallas, of December 6, 1856,) and the obvious fact that it would be the interest of all the other powers (having little naval force) to concur in the amendment. (4.) From the fact that since the date of your despatch to me authorizing the acceptance of the four propositions adopted by the congress at Paris, Mr. Sanford, our minister to Belgium, on a visit to England, learned from Mr. Adams that the British government had given, as he understood, general instructions on the subject to Lord Lyons; and the impression made on the mind of Mr. Adams, as reported to me by Mr. Sanford, was that it was not improbable that England would now, to secure our concurrence in the other propositions, concur in the amendment. That in view of this information, Mr. Adams, who had like instructions with my own, had referred the matter back to be treated of and discussed at Washington. I could not, therefore, at once accept the four propositions, pure and simple, without running the hazard of conflicting with what might be done elsewhere. I will probably receive an answer from Mr. Thouvenel (after he shall heve communicated my proposition to the other powers) before even I shall receive my next despatch on this subject from Washington, which I shall await with some anxiety. * * * * * The laws, however, in connexion with the practice of the tribunals of France are, I think, as follows: 1. That the captain who accepts a commission from a foreign government and takes command of a cruiser is guilty of a piratical act. 2. That all French subjects enlisting on board of such cruiser, without authority of the Emperor, lose their citizenship, and consequently forfeit their right to the protection of their government. 3. That the principle applied in the French tribunals is unlike that which has been applied in England (and I fear it will be found in the United States) as to harboring privateers; and while their prizes are in a neutral port having them condemned in courts of admiralty of the country licensing such privateer. The laws and practice of the French courts do not admit of this. But these matters, as Mr. Thouvenel now says, must be all left for determination to the tribunals of France. I am happy to say that there is no disposition manifested here, so far as I have observed, to favor the rebellion in our southern States, or to recog nize them as an independent power. All recognition of rights on their part is for commercial purposes only. But the government of France cannot, it says, look at this rebellion as a small matter. That, embracing as it does a large section and many States, they cannot apply to it the same reasoning as if it were an unimportant matter or confined to a small locality. Mr. Thouvenel says he has had no application from southern commissioners for any purpose of recognition, and he does not know even that such persons are or have been in Paris. * * * * * * * I send you a copy of "Gallignani's Messenger," containing a report of the proceedings of a large and enthusiastic meeting of Americans yesterday at the Hotel du Louvre. With high consideration, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State. WM. L. DAYTON. Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward. [Extracts.] No. 11.] PARIS, June 1861. SIR: Your despatch (No. 10) was received by me on the 18th instant, and its substance communicated to Mr. Thouvenel on the 19th. On that day I had with him an interesting conversation. I communicated to him the very kind language which you had used in behalf of the President in reference to the Emperor and his willingness to mediate between the north and south, should such mediation be desired. Nothing could have been better expressed than the language of your own despatch; and, without formally reading it to him, I endeavored to repeat, substantially, its language. Mr. Thouvenel seemed much gratified at its tone, and inasmuch as the Emperor had made like remarks to me personally, I begged that your reply might be specially communicated to him, which was readily promised. This, as you may infer, was the most agreeable part of my duty, as connected with your despatch. A short editorial in reference to the recognition of the independence of Italy, and in that connexion of the States of the south, which is herewith enclosed, first appeared in the Patrie, (a newspaper published in this city, and which has heretofore had a semi-official character.) It was republished on Sunday last in the "Moniteur" without remark, thus giving it an official significance which would not otherwise have been attached to it. It attracted much attention here, and some anxiety. I resolved that, at the first opportunity, I would seek an explanation from the minister of foreign affairs. After my communication of your kind remarks, before referred to, I availed myself of the opportunity of calling his attention to this matter. He at once said that his own attention had been arrested by it; that it was a "silliness;" that Mr. Persigny (minister of the interior) was more dissatisfied with it even than he was; that the Patrie had ceased, ten days ago, to be a semi-official paper; that he did not know how the paragraph had crept into the Moniteur, but that Count Walewski (minister of state) had been out of the city for ten days past, and that as a consequence matters had not had the usual oversight. He read me a note from the count, in answer to one he (Mr. Thouvenel) had written, inquiring if it would not be better to insert something to show that the paragraph was printed in the Moniteur by mistake, to which note the count replied that he thought it would be giving an unnecessary importance to the matter, and in that view Mr. Thouvenel, upon reflection, concurred. But he said he was vexed at the insertion in the Moniteur, and at the commentaries likely to be made upon it. He said, furthermore, (what he has so often said before,) that the French government had no sympathy whatever with the seceding States of the south; that it had no idea of recognizing them as an independent power; that should they, in the course of time, obtain a status as an independent power among nations, and show themselves able to maintain that posi |