Your answer to offers of service and of materiel of war seems to have been judicious. If the War Department should find need for the latter, it will commission proper agents. As for the former, the offers for military service, and by our own citizens, surpass equally our calls and our needs. Colonel Frémont's purchases are thankfully approved, and the drafts of yourself and Mr. Adams, mentioned by you, will be accepted. The President expresses great satisfaction with the promptness and decision manifested by you in the matter.

We wish to act singly and in good faith with the French government. We understand, and shall continue to understand, that France does not concede belligerent rights to the insurgents in contravention of our sovereignty. We shall insist that she does nothing adverse to our position, whatever may be said to the contrary.

She has proposed to tell us that she thinks the confederate States are entitled to belligerent rights. We have declined to hear that. We have not heard it. We shall continue to regard France as respecting our government, throughout the whole country, until she practically acts in violation of her friendly obligations to us, as we understand them. When she does that, it will be time enough to inquire whether, if we accede to the treaty of Paris, she could, after that, allow pirates upon our commerce shelter in her ports; and what our remedy then should be. We have no fear on this head.

We are dealing now as a nation at peace with France as a friend. We have told her that we shall not consent to her change of this relation.

She knows, distinctly, if she accepts our adhesion to the declaration of the congress of Paris, the ground on which it is given by us.

While saying this, however, we also confess that our solicitude on the subject is not so intense now, since the responsibility for the next step remains with France and not with us.

Still we wish you to act directly and frankly, being always ready to perform all we have offered.

This despatch is strictly confidential.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.

[Extracts.]

PARIS, June 22, 1861.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose to you a copy of the reply of Mr. Thouvenel to my proposition, on the part of the United States, to open negotiations for its accession to the treaty of Paris of 1856, according to the terms therein stated.

Love

In our first conversation up is subject, I understood from Mr. Thou

venel that on a written proposition from me for negotiation he would address the other powers (parties to the treaty) upon the subject. That a note from me would afford him a starting point for communicating with such powers. Upon further reflection, or upon conference with his associates in the government, he now writes that it will be necessary that I address myself jointly (if I understood him rightly) to all the powers associated in that treaty, before my proposition can be considered.

Our condition as respects privateering and the belligerent rights conceded to the south has been so changed by the action of Great Britain, France and Spain, subsequent to the first declaration of Lord John Russelll, (stating that such belligerent rights would be conceded,) that I know not what may be the views of the government of the United States at this time as respects an accession to the treaty of 1856, pure and simple. But as I have learned that nothing substantially has been done in that direction at other points, and I do not see that the interests of the country will be jeoparded by a little delay, I shall await further instructions upon this subject. My first despatch referring to this matter was dated 22d of May last, and I doubt not I shall now receive an answer at an early day. If the government of the United States shall, in view of the circumstances, direct me to make the proposition to the French government to accede to the Paris treaty, pure and simple, I will, acting under such express direction, lose no time in making the proposition. *

*

*

*

With high consideration, I am yours, very truly,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

*

*

WM. L. DAYTON.

Secretary of State.

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 14.]

PARIS, June 28, 1861.

SIR: Your despatches (Nos. 13 and 14) are duly received. The copy of your letter to Lord Lyons, recognizing the rights of neutrals to property taken in vessels of the insurgents, will be communicated on the first opportunity to Mr. Thouvenel. This will relieve any doubts the French government may have had heretofore on this subject.

* * *The Emperor and most of the ministers being in the country, and the legislative chambers about to adjourn, there is little probability of anything of interest occurring here at an early day, unless something shall occur in America which shall give rise to it.

With much respect, I am yours, very truly,

Hon. WM. H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State.

WM. L. DAYTON

The President is highly gratified by the disposition which Mr. Thouvenel has made of the application of the agents of the insurrectionists for recognition of their pretended revolution. What you have reported to us in this respect is happily confirmed in even more emphatic language by the communication which Mr. Mercier has made to us to-day under instructions from his government.

We are pleased that you called Mr. Thouvenel's attention to the mischievous paragraph in the Moniteur, because it has drawn out renewed and most satisfactory assurances of the friendly feelings and good wishes of the government of France. At the same time, it is but just to ourselves that you shall now inform Mr. Thouvenel that it is our settled habit never to overhear what the press, or the ministers, or even the monarch of a foreign country with which we are in amity, says concerning us, and never to ask any explanations so long as such observations are not directly communicated by the government itself to us, and it, at the same time, discharges all its customary functions without hostility or injury to us. Our reasons for this are that we know, first, there are state necessities which do not always permit, in any country, the practice of entire frankness concerning foreign questions; secondly, that unguarded and inconsiderate expressions, even by persons in high authority, ought not to disturb established and harmonious relations between friendly nations; and, thirdly, that we know that the maintenance of our rights and character depend, as they ought, chiefly on our own fidelity to ourselves, and very little on the favorable opinion of even the most candid and liberal nations. Friendship towards, and confidence in, the good will of France towards us are settled habits of mind on the part of the American people. If anything is hastily written or spoken on either side that would seem to indicate a different sentiment, it is wise to let it pass without sensibility, and certainly without querulous animadversion.

Mr. Burlingame will, before this time, have been advised of his appointment as minister to China. His delay at Paris is approved in consideration of the peculiar circumstances of the case.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM L. DAYTON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

No. 27.]

Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, July 6, 1861.

SIR: Your despatch No 12 (dated June 22) has been received. It relates to our proposition for accession to the declaration of Paris. This

affair has become very much complicated, by reason of the irregular and extraordinary proceeding of the French government in proposing to take notice of the domestic disturbance which has occurred in this country. I do not know that even now I can clear the matter up effectually without knowing what may be the result of the communication which, in my despatch No. 19, I instructed you to make to the French government. I will try, nevertheless, to do so. The instructions contained in my despatch No. 4, dated 24th of April last, required you to tender to the French government, without delay, our adhesion to the declaration of the congress of Paris, pure and simple.

The reason why we wished it done immediately was, that we supposed the French government would naturally feel a deep anxiety about the safety of their commerce, threatened distinctly with privateering by the insurgents, while at the same time, as this government had heretofore persistently declined to relinquish the right of issuing letters of marque, it would be apprebended by France that we too should take up that form of maritime warfare in the present domestic controversy. We apprehended that the danger of such a case of depredation upon commerce equally by the government itself, and by its enemies, would operate as a provocation to France and other commercial nations to recognize the insurrectionary party in violation of our national rights and sovereignty. On the contrary, we did not desire to depredate on friendly commerce ourselves, and we thought it our duty to prevent such depredations by the insurgents by executing our own laws, which make privateering by disloyal citizens piracy, and punish its pursuit as such. We thought it wise, just, and prudent to give, unasked, guarantees to France and other friendly nations for the security of their commerce from exposure to such depredations on either side, at the very moment when we were delivering to them our protest against the recognition of the insurgents. The accession to the declaration of Paris would be the form in which these guarantees could be given-that for obvious reasons must be more unobjectionable to France and to other commercial nations than any other. It was safe on our part, because we tendered it, of course, as the act of this federal government, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal citizens.

The instructions waived the Marcy amendment, (which proposed to exempt private property from confiscation in maritime war,) and required you to propose our accession to the declaration of the congress of Paris, pure and simple. These were the reasons for this course, namely: First. It was as well understood by this government then, as it is now by yourself, that an article of that celebrated declaration prohibits every one of the parties to it from negotiating upon the subject of neutral rights in maritime warfare with any nation not a party to it, except for the adhesion of such outstanding party to the declaration of the congress of Paris, pure and simple. An attempt to obtain an acceptance of Mr. Marcy's amendment would require a negotiation not merely with France alone, but with all the other original parties of the congress of Paris, and every government that has since acceded to the declaration. Nay, more: we must obtain their unanimous consent to the amendment before being able to commit ourselves or to engage any other nation, however well disposed, to commit itself to us on the propositions actually contained in the declaration. On the other hand, each nation which is a party to the declaration of Paris is at liberty to stipulate singly with us for acceptance of that declaration for the government of our neutral relations. If, therefore, we should waive the Marcy proposition, or leave it for ultimate consideration, we could establish a complete agreement between ourselves and France on a subject which, if it should be left open,

might produce consequences very much to be deprecated. It is almost unnecessary to say that what we proposed to France was equally and simultaneously proposed to every other maritime power. In this way we expected to remove every cause that any foreign power could have for the recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent power.

The matter stood in this plain and intelligible way until certain declarations or expressions of the French government induced you to believe that they would recognize and treat the insurgents as a distinct national power for belligerent purposes. It was not altogether unreasonable that you, being at Paris, should suppose that this government would think itself obliged to acquiesce in such a course by the government of France. So assuming, you thought that we would not adhere to our proposition to accede to the declaration, pure and simple, since such a course would, as you thought, be effective to bind this government without binding the insurgents, and would leave France at liberty to hold us bound, and the insurgents free from the obligations created by our adhesion. Moreover, if we correctly understand your despatch on that subject, you supposed that you might propose our adhesion to the treaty of Paris, not pure and simple, but with the addition of the Marcy proposition in the first instance, and might afterwards, in case of its being declined in that form, withdraw the addition, and then propose our accession to the declaration of Paris, pure and simple.

While you were acting on these views on your side of the Atlantic, we on this side, not less confident in our strength than in our rights, as you are now aware, were acting on another view, which is altogether different, namely, that we shall not acquiesce in any declaration of the government of France that assumes that this government is not now, as it always has been, exclusive sovereign, for war as well as for peace, within the States and Territories of the federal Union, and over all citizens, the disloyal and loyal all alike. We treat in that character, which is our legal character, or we do not treat at all, and we in no way consent to compromise that character in the least degree; we do not even suffer this character to become the subject of discussion. Good faith and honor, as well as the same expediency which prompted the proffer of our accession to the declaration of Paris, pure and simple, in the first instance, now require us to adhere to that proposition and abide by it; and we do adhere to it, not, however, as a divided, but as an undivided nation. The proposition is tendered to France not as a neutral but as a friend, and the agreement is to be obligatory upon the United States and France and all their legal dependencies just alike.

The case was peculiar, and in the aspect in which it presented itself to you portentous. We were content that you might risk the experiment, so, however, that you should not bring any responsibility for delay upon this government. But you now see that by incorporating the Marcy amendment in your proposition, you have encountered the very difficulty which was at first foreseen by us. The following nations are parties to the declaration of Paris, namely: Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Bremen, Brazils, Duchy of Brunswick, Chili, the Argentine Confederation, the Germanic Confederation, Denmark, the two Sicilies, the Republic of the Equator, the Roman States, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, Hamburgh, Hanover, the two Hesses, Lubeck, Mecklenburgh Strelitz, Mecklenburgh Schwerin, Nassau, Oldenburgh, Parma, Holland, Peru, Portugal, Saxony, Saxe Altenburgh, Saxe Coburg Gotha, Saxe Meiningen, Saxe Weimar, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuscany, Wurtemburg, Anhault Dessau, Modena, New Granada, and Uruguay.