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designed to render obligatory between France and the United States the principles upon maritime rights proclaimed by the congress of Paris. This declaration has for its object, as you will see, to prevent all misunderstanding upon the nature of the engagements which the government of the Emperor is disposed to contract.

If you were ready to sign the convention contemplated, we might be able to agree to make it the same day when Lord Russell should proceed from his side to the signing of a similar act with Mr. Adams..

Accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

Mr. DAYTON,

Minister of the United States at Paris.

[Translation.]

Draft of declaration.

ENEL.

THOUVENE

In affixing his signature to the convention concluded in date of this day between France and the United States, the undersigned declares, in execution of the orders of the Emperor, that the government of his Majesty does not intend to undertake, by the said convention, any engagement of a nature to implicate it, directly or indirectly, in the internal conflict now existing in the United States.

No. 37.]

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.

PARIS, August 29, 1861.

SIR: Herewith I beg to enclose a copy of a communication made by me to Mr. Thouvenel, in answer to his formal notice of a purpose on the part of the French government to make an outside declaration of its intentions at the time of the execution of the treaty, copies of which were enclosed in despatch No. 35.

It is in part the same matter suggested to him by me in the conference in which he first notified me of his purpose. His written communication subsequent to that conference required a like formal reply. I am happy to learn from a communication received from Mr. Adams that he concurs with me in the propriety of stopping the negotiation where it is, and referring the matter to the government at home. I should have been most reluctant, under the circumstances, to execute this convention, had Mr. Adams insisted upon it, making only a counter declaration, such as was referred to in despateh No. 35; but I was very desirous, after what had passed, not to be considered an obstacle in the way of carrying out the wishes of the administration. I doubt now, however, if England and France would themselves have assented to proceed with the execution of the convention in the face of such declaration. With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

His Excellency WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, &c., &c.

WM. L. DAYTON.

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Thouvenel.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris, August 26, 1861.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 20th instant, in which (carrying out the purpose expressed by you in our prior conversation of that day) you communicate to me the text of a written declaration which you propose to make simultaneous with the execution of the convention between the United States and France, in reference to the principles upon maritime rights proclaimed by the Congress of Paris in 1856. You further suggest in your note that if I were ready to sign the convention contemplated, we might be able to agree to do so the same day when Lord Russell should proceed, on his side, to the signing of a like convention with Mr. Adams.

The declaration which you propose to make in writing, simultaneous with the execution of the convention, has for its object, you say, to prevent all misunderstanding as to the nature of the engagements which the government of the Emperor is disposed to contract," and this declaration is, that "in the execution of the orders of the Emperor the government of his Majesty does not intend to undertake, by said convention, any engagements of a nature to implicate it directly or indirectly in the internal conflict now existing in the United States."

My impressions, hastily thrown out when this proposition was verbally suggested, have been strengthened by subsequent reflection. I do not stop to inquire how such outside declaration as you propose may affect the rights or obligations of parties under the treaty. Indeed, it is so general that it may not be possible to anticipate its entire scope or operation. It gives us notice that the engagements of your government are not to be "of a nature to implicate it directly or indirectly in the internal conflict," &c. It may be that the conduct of the government of France, under this declaration, would practically extend no further than would be agreeable to the United States; yet I cannot act upon such assumption. My instructions are to negotiate a particular convention, the text of which has been examined and approved, as I understand, by your excellency. If the declaration which you propose to make does not alter the obligations or duties which would otherwise devolve upon France, in virtue of that convention, it is useless to make it. If it does alter such obligations or duties, then I am not authorized to execute the convention subject to such declaration. This, indeed, so far as my action at present is concerned, is the whole case. But the subject justifies, and perhaps requires some other remarks. You stated that you thought it more frank and loyal to make your declaration in advance, and in this I entirely concurred. If the treaty without such declaration would impose any duty upon France which she would be unwilling to perform, it was manifestly proper that she should declare her purpose in advance. It was proper, not only for the purpose of preventing misunderstanding as to the nature of her intended engagements, but for the other purposes of leaving to the United States the option of determining, with full knowledge, whether she would or would not enter into the treaty subject to such declaration. The declaration, it is true, is not strictly a part of the treaty, yet, for the purpose intended, its effect and operation would be the same as if it were incorporated into the treaty itself. It will prevent misunderstandings as to the nature of the engagements, or, in other words, it will prevent one party complaining of a non-performance of supposed engagements by the other under the treaty, just as effectively as if it were a condition added to the treaty itself. But for the interposition of this declaration I should have

assented to the execution of the treaty at once; as it is, I have no power to

do so.

From this it must not be inferred that there is now, or at any time has been, the slightest wish upon the part of the United States to involve France or any other foreign government in its domestic controversy. The wish, nay, stronger than this, the right to be let alone by other nations, has been claimed at all times, so far as I know, by our government and its representatives abroad. They have never failed to deprecate, in the most earnest manner, all interference in this question upon the part of foreign powers. Yet the declaration which it is now proposed to make would seem to imply that such interference might be claimed by us at the hands of those powers with whom such treaty might be made. I submit, with great respect, that there is nothing in the present position of the United States, or in the past history of this negotiation, which would justify such an inference. When the present administration at Washington came into power it almost immediately gave orders to its representatives abroad to open negotiations upon this general subject; not, it is to be assumed, for any small purpose or object growing out of what they then believed to be a mere temporary insurrection, but with a view to the settlement, so far as their assent could settle the same, of certain great principles of maritime law.

The second and third of those principles, enunciated in the declaration of Paris, has been already proposed and urged upon the attention of other nations by the United States.

The fourth of those principles, which requires that blockades to be respected shall be effective, had never been denied (at least by the United States) as a principle of international or maritime law. It was the first only of the points enunciated in that celebrated declaration about which hesitation existed.

The abandonment of the right, by belligerents, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, under proper restraints, was a serious matter to a country having the extended commerce and limited navy of the United States; yet such abandonment by all nations would, we well knew, tend much to lessen the afflictions incident to war; and so, too, the exemption of property of noncombatants at sea, (except contraband,) as it is on land, would, in a still greater degree, tend to the same end.

Hence the disposition manifested on the part of the United States, on every proper occasion, to connect in its negotiations the two; to make the concession of the one the equivalent, if possible, of the concession of the other. This was the condition of things when the present administration at Washington came into power. Not trammelled by certain considerations which had affected some of their predecessors, they immediately took up the negotiation where it had been left by a prior administration. Ascertaining definitely that the exemption of private property afloat (except contraband) would not be conceded by all the powers, they assented at once to the execution of a convention, adopting the four principles of the declaration of Paris as they are, without addition and without limitation.

Then, for the first time, we were informed that the government of his Majesty the Emperor (in connexion with that of her Britannic Majesty) would only execute such convention subject to a certain condition, which it declares for itself, and of the extent and operation of which it is itself to judge.

I cannot, of course, anticipate with certainty what view the government of the United States may take of this question, but I can scarcely suppose it will assent to the execution of a convention adopting the declaration of Paris, except upon terms of entire reciprocity, and subject to no other condition than those existing by and between the original parties; nor do I believe

that it will, in its negotiations with foreign governments, at all assent to exceptions and reservations, verbal or written, predicated upon the existing state of things in that country. It will, I apprehend, exact no more and be content with no less than it would have been entitled to had the convention been executed in advance of its present internal controversy. If, therefore, the government of France shall consider that an unconditional execution of that convention will demand of it interference in our affairs, or will implicate it in any shape in the civil war now raging in our country, then it is obvious this is not a proper time for her or for us to enter into such agreements.

But these suggestions are made, of course, subject to correction from the government at Washington. To it I shall at once refer the communication of your excellency, together with a copy of the declaration which you have done me the honor to submit upon the part of the French government.

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to your excellency assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, sir, your very humble and obedient servant,

Monsieur THOUVENEL,

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton.

No. 53.1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, September 5, 1861.

SIR: Your despatch of August 19, No. 31, has been received.

Before this shall reach you, my instruction, No. 41, will have come to your hands. In that paper you were informed that you would be expected to rest in your negotiation concerning maritime rights until after we should have received some explanations from Lord Russell on a point raised in the negotiation at London.

Those explanations have not yet been received here.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM L. DAYTON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.

PARIS, September 7, 1861.

No. 44.]
SIR: Your despatches, 41, 42, and 43, are duly received through Captain
Schulz.

Your action, indicated in 41 and 42, has been anticipated by me. In a letter from Mr. Adams, dated London, August 1, 1861, he encloses me a copy of Lord John Russell's note of July 31, 1861, and in reference to the vague paragraph to which your despatches refer he says: "I do not quite comprehend the drift of the last paragraph, but I presume you will find it out in the progress of your negotiation." This I immediately answered by a letter, of which I herewith send you a copy.

Their subsequent offer to make a written outside declaration cotemporaneous with the execution of the treaty was a degree of frankness which I did

not anticipate, and for which I had not given them credit. I shall wait with great pleasure, according to your instructions, "the result of the explanations which Mr. Adams is instructed to ask," but I expect that both he and I have already received all necessary explanations on that point. My conversations, at least with Mr. Thouvenel, have covered the whole ground, as stated to you in despatch No. 35. I add that I communicated immediately to Mr. Adams the substance of that conversation with Mr. Thouvenel.

The exequatur of James Lesley, appointed consul of the United States to Lyons, was applied for immediately on the receipt of his commission. With much respect, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, WILLIAM L. DAYTON.

His Excellency WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, &c.

PARIS, August 5, 1861.

SIR: I acknowledge with pleasure the receipt of yours of the 1st instant, enclosing a copy of your note to Lord John Russel and his reply. I feel that we have done a good thing in getting the reply of the British government (declaring the amendment to the treaty of Paris inadmissible) in writing. At least, we can proceed now, under our instructions, with a consciousness that we not only have not neglected this point, but that we have the evidence of having pressed it affirmatively. You say you do not comprehend the drift of the last paragraph in Lord John's reply. I think I do, at least, in part, and I shall not be surprised if the meaning, which he has purposely wrapped up in that general language, should in the end break off all negotiation. He may not refer to this language again, but unless you ask its meaning before the treaty is negotiated, it will be used by them afterwards as an excuse for not carrying it in effect as respects the insurrectionists of the south. The paragraph states, "the engagement of Great Britain will be prospective, and will not invalidate anything already done." The comment after the treaty, predicated upon this language, will be: "We had declared before the treaty that the southern insurrectionists were a belligerent party, and entitled to belligerent rights, (among which is the right to issue letters of marque,) and the treaty was to be prospective only, and not to invalidate anything already done. That, in other words, it does not bind your disloyal citizens, recognized by us as a belligerent party." I long ago wrote Mr. Seward that these powers would, in my judgment, either refuse to negotiate, or, if they did negotiate, it would be with the understanding that it secured us no rights not already conceded, and charged them with no duties not heretofore acknowledged, It is advisable that we raise no question in advance in reference to this matter, but it is necessary that we know what they mean as we go along.

With much respect, I am yours truly,

His Excellency CHAS. F. ADAMS,

United States Minister.

WM. L. DAYTON.

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