guilty of abetting the burning of the house, is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act and not a probable consequence of the burning.

(c) A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the purpose of robbery, and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C break into the house, and being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder.

It is sufficient if the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment. It is not, it seems, necessary that the abettor should know it to be a probable consequence.

Abettor when liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and for act done.

112. If the act for which the abettor is liable under the last preceding Section is committed in addition to the act abetted and constitutes a distinct offence, the abettor is liable to punishment for each of the offences.

Illustration.

A instigates B to resist by force a distress made by a public servant. B, in consequence, resists that distress. In offering the resistance, B voluntarily causes grievous hurt to the officer executing the distress. As B has committed both the offence of resisting the distress and the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, B is liable to punishment for both these offences; and if A knew that B was likely voluntarily to cause grievous hurt in resisting the distress, A will also be liable to punishment for each of the offences.

intended by the abettor.

113. When an act is abetted with the intention Liability of abettor for an on the part of the abettor of effect caused different from that causing a particular effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, causes a different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is liable for the effect caused, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act with the intention of causing that effect; provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect.

Illustration.

A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z. B, in consequence of the instigation, causes grievous hurt to Z. Z dies in consequence.

Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause death, A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder.

A person would not be liable for an unexpected effect or for an effect which could not have been foreseen to be probable. Suppose the instigation was to inflict some small hurt on Z, not calculated of itself to endanger his life, and Z by intemperance, or neglect, or bad treatment, dies, A would not be answerable for his death.

The illustrations shew clearly the distinct operation of this Section and Section 111.

is committed.

114. Whenever any person, who, if absent would Abettor present when offence be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of his abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence.

By virtue of this provision such an abettor may, on his trial, be charged with the offence as if he had himself committed it. Suppose several persons are present and concerned in the commission of an offence, but it is uncertain which of them actually committed it, and which aided the commission; each may be charged as a principal offender.

115. Whoever abets the commission of an offence Abetment of an offence punish- punishable with death or transable with death or transpor- portation for life, shall, if

tation for life if the offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment.

that offence be not committed

in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if any act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, and which causes hurt to any person, is done, the

If an act which causes harm be done in consequence of the abetment.

abettor shall be liable to imprisonment of either de

scription for a term which may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Illustration.

A instigates B to murder Z. The offence is not committed. If B had murdered Z he would have been subject to the punishment of death or transportation for life. Therefore A is liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also to fine; and if any hurt be done to Z in consequence of the abetment, he will be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years, and to fine,

For the offences which are punishable with death or transportation for life. See page 33.

"If that offence be not committed in consequence," &c. The notes to Section 109 should be referred to. The present Section punishes the abetment of certain offences which are either not committed at all, or not committed in consequence of abetment, or only in part committed.

"Hurt"-whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, causes hurt. See Section 319.

There should be proof of instigation or some other kind of abetment, and of the object of such instigation; and (under the latter clause) of hurt caused by an act done in consequence. 116. Whoever abets an offence punishable with Abetment of an offence punish- imprisonment shall, if that able with imprisonment, if the offence be not committed in offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment. consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for that offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for that offence, or with

If the abettor or the person abetted be a public servant whose duty it is to prevent the offence.

both; and if the abettor or the person abetted is a public servant, whose duty it is to prevent the commission of such offence, the abettor shall be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for that offence, for a term which may

extend to one-half of the longest term provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.

Illustrations.

(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the exercise of B's official functions. B refuses to accept the bribe. A is punishable under this Section.

(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. Here, if B does not give false evidence, A has nevertheless committed the offence defined in this Section, and is punishable accordingly.

(c) A, a police officer, whose duty it is to prevent robbery, abets the commission of robbery. Here, though the robbery be not committed, A is liable to one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, and also to fine.

(d) Babets the commission of a robbery by A, a police officer, whose duty it is to prevent that offence. Here, though the robbery be not committed, B is liable to one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence of robbery, and also to fine.

For the offences punishable with transportation, see p.33, ante. The proof will be the same as under the preceding Section; except that to support a charge under the last clause of the present Section, there must be proof that the person is a Police Officer or other such public servant. Proof that he acted as such public servant will be sufficient. See Section 21, Explanation 2.

more than 10 persons.

117. Whoever abets the commission of an offence Abetting the commission of by the public generally or by an offence by the public or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Illustration.

A affixes in a public place a placard, instigating a sect consisting of more than ten members to meet at a certain time and place, for the purpose of attacking the members of an adverse sect, while engaged in a procession. A has committed the offence defined in this Section.

The word "public" is explained. See Section 12.

It will be sufficient to shew any instigation or other mode of abetment, though neither the effect intended, nor any effect follows from it. It seems the evidence should show either some act done, or if words spoken are relied on, that they were spoken deliberately and advisedly.

The remaining Sections of this Chapter relate to an offence (the concealing, or making a false representation, of a design to commit certain offences) which does not, it seems, amount to abetment of any of the kinds hitherto mentioned. We have seen that a wilful misrepresentation or concealment constitutes abetment by instigation, only when it concerns a material fact which a person is bound by some legal duty to disclose. All the modes of abetment hitherto spoken of are such as by their influence and positive efficacy conduce to the commission of the act or offence.

In the offences made punishable by the three remaining Sections,—which offences although treated of in this Chapter of Abetment, are nowhere said to constitute abetment,-the aid given is of a remote kind: and the offences, which appear rather to belong to the Chapter of Offences against Public Justice than to Abetment, are complete although that which constitutes them falls short of any of the modes of abetment yet described. The offender facilitates the commission of an offence, because by his concealment or misrepresentation the attention of those interested, who would probably prevent the commission, is not excited. But his conduct, though it tends to facilitate the offence, does so in a remote degree. Indeed a concealment may possibly be in no way intended to obstruct public justice, but rather calculated to prevent the commission of an offence: as if a person should conceal,-that is, omit to disclose,-some criminal design of his friend in the hope that his influence might prevail to induce him to lay aside his purpose.

118. Whoever intending to facilitate, or knowing