secrecy," with no restriction, however, upon the exercise of the power of declaring whether the business is such as really requires secrecy.

In Kentucky (sec. 57) no Act, except general appropriation bills, shall become a law until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was passed, except in cases of emergency, when by the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each House, by a yea and nay vote entered upon their journals, an Act may become a law when approved by the Governor; "but the reasons for the emergency that justifies this action must be set out at length in the journal of each House."

This is plainly insufficient, for there is no provision made that the Supreme Court can pass upon the question whether the emergency was real. In the absence of such a provision, no court would undertake to pass upon such a question, but would declare the Legislature to be the sole judge of the question. If it is necessary to place such restrictions upon the power of the Legislature, and then to enlarge its powers in case of "emergency, "it would seem to be equally necessary to guard against abuse of this enlargement by giving power to the Supreme Court to declare an Act unconstitutional and void, when the emergency under pretext of which the Act was passed was not real. There is a similar defect in the constitution of Idaho, in regard to the provision there adopted (Art. III. sec. 22):· that, except in case of "emergency, which shall be declared in either the preamble or body of the Act, no law shall take effect until sixty days from the end of the session at which it was passed.

Further evidence of the apprehension that the Legislature may go wrong is afforded by section 121 in Mississippi, which provides that when convened in extraordinary session, by public proclamation of the Governor, the Legislature shall have no power to consider or act upon anything not designated in the proclamation, or submitted to them in writing by the Governor, except impeachments and examination into the accounts of State officers. In Kentucky (sec. 83) and Idaho (Art. IV. sec. 9) there are similar limitations.

In Idaho (Art. III. sec. 10) it is provided that, a quorum being in attendance, if either House fail to effect an organization within the first four days thereafter, the members of the House so failing shall be entitled to no compensation from the end of the said four days until an organization shall have been effected.

Kentucky (sec. 44) and Idaho (Art. III. sec. 23) provide in their constitutions a fixed compensation for the members of their Legislatures (five dollars a day and mileage). Kentucky wisely allows this to be changed by law (but no change shall take effect during the session at which such change is made; and sessions are limited to sixty days, except the first session). Wyoming (Art. III. sec. 6) fixes the compensation of the first Legislature (five dollars a day and mileage). No session after the first, which may be sixty days, shall exceed forty days. After the first session the compensation of members shall be as provided by law; but no Legislature shall fix its own compensation. Mississippi (sec. 46) leaves the compensation to be prescribed by law; but no alteration can take effect during the session at which it is made.

Idaho (Art. III. sec. 23) provides that whenever any member of the Legislature shall travel on a free pass in coming to or returning from the session of the Legislature, the number of miles actually travelled on such pass shall be deducted from the mileage of such member. Mississippi (sec. 188) forbids railroads or other transportation companies granting passes or tickets free, or at a discount, to members of the Legislature, or to any State, district, county, or municipal officers, except Railroad Commissioners. Kentucky (sec. 205) still more stringently provides that no common carrier, under heavy penalty, to be affixed by the General Assembly, shall give any free passes, or sell tickets at reduced rates not common to the public, to any State, district, city, town, or county officer, or member of the General Assembly, or judge. Any such person who shall accept the above shall forfeit his office.

Finally, the following scattered restrictions are worth notice, in addition to those mentioned by Professor Thorpe (see above) as common to the four constitutions discussed by him :

In Mississippi (sec. 99), the Legislature shall not elect any other than its own officers, the State Librarian, and United States Senators, but it may appoint Presidential Electors. (Sec. 100) No obligation or liability due the State, levee board, county, city, or town shall ever be remitted, released, postponed, or diminished, etc. (but doubtful claims may be compromised). (Sec. 92) The Legislature shall not authorize the payment to any person of the salary of a deceased officer beyond the time of his death; nor (sec. 93) shall it retire an officer on pay or part pay, or make any grant to him. (Sec. 96) The Legislature shall never grant extra

compensation, fee, or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant, or contractor, after service rendered or contract made; nor authorize payment, or part payment, of any claim under any contract not authorized by law; nor (sec. 95) shall lands belonging to the State ever be donated, directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals, or to railroad companies; nor sold to corporations or associations for a less price than to individuals.

We are reminded of the anecdote of the Irish groom who confessed to his priest he had fed the horses on wooden oats. He was reproached for it by his father confessor, who asked him where he had learned such wickedness; and his answer was that he never had heard of it until he had been asked by this same father, at some preceding confession, whether he had ever done it!

In the new constitution of Kentucky, also, further vexatious restrictions upon the power of the Legislature are to be found. Sec. 46 provides that no senator or representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, or for one year thereafter, be appointed or elected to any civil office of profit in the State which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased, during his term, except to such offices as are filled by the election of the people. Sec. 47 provides that no person who at any time may have been a collector of public moneys for the State, or for any county, city, town, or district, shall be eligible to the General Assembly, unless he shall have obtained a quietus six months before the election.

Debts contracted by the General Assembly to meet casual deficits in the revenue shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars, and the money arising from such loans shall be applied only to the purposes for which they were obtained, or to repay such debts; but the General Assembly may contract debts to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, etc. (sec. 51).

In any Act to create a debt (except those last provided for), provision shall also be made for the levy and collection of an annual tax to pay the interest stipulated, and to discharge the principal within thirty years; and such an Act shall not take effect until after submission to the people at a general election; but the Genera! Assembly may contract debts by borrowing money to pay any part of the State debts, without submission to the people and without provision for a tax to discharge such debt or the interest thereon (sec. 52). Sec. 61 in Kentucky provides that the Legislature shall neither audit nor allow any private claim or account against the

State. One is tempted to inquire whether this convention expected the State Legislature to consist of fools and knaves.

A noticeable prohibition in Mississippi is to be found in sec. 98. "No lottery shall ever be allowed, or be advertised by newspapers, or otherwise, or its tickets be sold in this State; and the Legislature shall provide by law for the enforcement of this provision; nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn or its tickets sold." So in Idaho (Art. III. sec. 20) the Legislature is forbidden to authorize any lottery or gift enterprise. So in Kentucky (sec. 235).

Passing now to a comparison of the powers and duties of the Executive in these four States, we find here also the same disposition towards minute and often petty limitations.

In Mississippi (sec. 116), Kentucky (sec. 72), and Wyoming (Art. IV. sec. 1), the Governor shall hold his office for the term of four years; in Idaho (Art. IV. sec. 7), for two years. The longer term would seem to be preferable on many accounts. If he holds his office no longer than the Legislature, and is elected at the same time, any sudden change of feeling by the voters may change the Legislature and the Executive at the same time, which would tend to a departure from stability of administration. In Kentucky (sec. 73) and Mississippi (sec. 116) he is ineligible for the succeeding four years after the expiration of his term of office, -a mark of the fear entertained that a Governor would become too powerful if allowed to be immediately re-elected.

We will not dwell upon the usual powers given to the Governor in these four constitutions, since our object is not to give a full account of them, but rather to point out wherein recent constitutions depart from the older ones, and to consider the causes and effects of such departures.

The usual power of veto is given to the Governor in Mississippi (sec. 73). In addition, he may veto parts of any appropriation bill. and approve parts. So in Idaho (Art. IV. sec. 11), and in Wyoming (Art. IV. sec. 9). None of these four States, however, follow the examples of Washington and Montana, in giving the power to the Governor to veto parts of any bill.

Elaborate provisions had been made in many recent constitutions for a board of pardons; as, for instance, in South Dakota and Montana. So, in Idaho (Art. IV. sect. 7), such a board is created, to consist of the Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney-General. This board- or, in Wyoming (Art. IV. sec. 5),

and also in Mississippi (sec. 124), and in Kentucky (sec. 80), the Governor alone-may remit fines and forfeitures and grant reprieves and pardons (except in cases of treason or impeachment). The curious provision that no pardon shall be granted before conviction is common to Mississippi, Wyoming, and Idaho. The question naturally arises: Before conviction what is there to pardon? In Mississippi it is provided that in cases of felony, after conviction, no pardon shall be granted until the applicant shall have published for thirty days, in some newspaper in the county where the crime was committed, etc., his petition for pardon, setting forth the reasons why it should be granted. In Kentucky, the Governor shall file with each application for pardon a statement of the reasons for his decision thereon, and both application and statement shall always be open to public inspection. So in Idaho (Art. IV. sec. 7), the Board of Pardons shall advertise hearings upon applications for pardon, and shall reduce their proceedings and decisions to writing, with their reasons for their action in each case, and the dissent of any member; all to be filed in the office of the Secretary of State. In Wyoming (Art. IV. sec. 5) the Legislature may pardon, commute the sentence, direct its execution, or grant further reprieve after a reprieve by the Governor, in cases of conviction for treason; and the Governor shall communicate to the Legislature, at each regular session, each case of remission of fine, reprieve, commutation, or pardon granted by him, with full details as specified, and his reasons. All these minute provisions may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the so-called power of pardon, but they also show the apprehensions felt lest the Governor be not a man to be trusted.

Another striking evidence of the same fear is to be found in the provisions concerning bribery of or by the Governor, in the four constitutions we are examining.

Wyoming (Art. IV. sec. 10) follows the example of North and South Dakota by guarding in the constitution against bribery of the Governor or bribery by him. Why encumber a constitution with such details of legislation? For of course a statute of the Legislature will provide for all cases of bribery, And it may well be doubted whether such deep-seated corruption can be prevented by constitutional or legislative inhibition. If the Chief Executives of our States are to be men open to receive or give bribes, the remedy would seem to be, not provision against it by constitution or statute, but the awakening of the moral sense of the people.