should be married, in which case her life estate shall cease." Held, that the daughter's right to the homestead given by the will ceased upon her marriage. The intention of the testator, gathered from the whole instrument, was not to promote celibacy, but to give the daughter the homestead until, by her marriage, another home should be provided. Mann v. Jackson, 24 Atl. Rep. 886 (Me.).

The early English rule against devises of real estate with conditions subsequent intended to operate in restraint of marriage was borrowed by the English ecclesiastical courts from the Roman civil law. The courts of equity, desiring to follow the plain intention of the testator, and yet unwilling to depart from the decision of the ecclesiastical courts, were led into a multitude of confusing distinctions as to whether the bequest amounted to a condition or only to a limitation. No general principle of classification can be found in the hundreds of conflicting cases, and courts have of late attempted to fall back upon the reason and good sense of the question. Mann v. Jackson will be welcomed as a step forward out of the difficulty. See 2 Redf. Wills 290, § 20, and note; Id. 297; 2 Jarm. Wills, 569; Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 98, and the cases cited in Mann v. Jackson.

REAL PROPERTY CONSTRUCTION OF DEED BOUNDARY ON FRESH WATER LAKE.- In construing a deed purporting to pass land bounded “along” a fresh water lake covering forty-five acres: Held, (1) that under the common law of New York the soil under the pond belonged to the riparian proprietors; (2) that unless the contrary appeared, a deed of land adjoining would be presumed to convey the soil as far as the centre of the pond; (3) that the use of the word "along" was not sufficient evidence of such contrary intention. Gouverneur v. Nat. Ice. Co., 31 N. E. Rep. 865 (N. Y.).

On the first point, the court disapprove of the dictum in 54 N. Y. 377, and follow 92 N. Y. 463, which appears on the whole to represent the modern tendency. See 140 U. S. 371. But this tendency is comparatively recent, and the greater number of jurisdictions are still probably adverse. See Angell on Watercourses, § 41, seq.; 12 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 615, 642. On the second and third points, the Court assimilate the rule for ponds, in all respects, to that for running streams. Sed quære. There may be a certain argument, in the case of a stream, in favor of substituting for the boundary expressed, another line roughly parallel to it and not far distant. But it is going beyond the limits of possible construction to say that the expression "from point A three chains due south along the pond to point B," means the same as this: "From point A mile E. S. E. to the centre of the pond, thence mile W. S. W. to point B."

REAL PROPERTY RULE IN SHELLEY'S Case. - - Lands were limited "to the use of E. and his assigns during his life without impeachment of waste," with an ultimate limitation to the use "of such person or persons as at the decease of the said E. shall be his heir or heirs at law, and of the heirs and assigns of such person or persons." Held (reversing the decision of Kekewich, J.), that the rule in Shelley's Case did not apply, but that the case came under Archer's Case, and that E took, not an estate in fee simple, but merely a life estate with a contingent remainder over. Evans v. Evans, [1892] 2 Ch. 173.

Archer's Case (1 Co. 66 b) must be regarded as a well-recognized exception to the rule in Shelley's Case (see discussion of Shelley's Case in 1 Hayes, Conv. 5th ed. 542546). Quare whether any extension of the exception in Archer's Case will not lead to great confusion, and whether in jurisdictions where the rule in Shelley's Case is maintained at all, the exception in Archer's Case should not be confined to the exact words of that case.

- ASSESSMENTS.

REAL PROPERTY STREET IMPROVEMENTS - A city charter empowered the city to make street improvements, "provided the city council shall pay one third, and the owners of the property two-thirds, the cost thereof." A certain street having been paved, it is sought to enforce a lien for two-thirds the cost thereof, upon the abutting property; or, if that could not be done, to enforce a claim in personam against the owners of such property.

Held, 1. That no lien could be enforced in absence of provision in the statute. 2. That there was no personal obligation, as the charter failed to mention what persons should be charged, or to prescribe any rule by which they could be ascertained. City of El Paso v. Mundy, 20 S. W. Rep. 146 (Texas).

TORT-MALICIOUS INJURY- DAMAGE. — Defendant falsely published in his paper that plaintiff had gone out of business, and in consequence thereof there was a considerable falling off in plaintiff's business. Held, that no action of libel would lie against the defendant, as the words were not defamatory, but that this action could be supported as an action on the case for damage wilfully and intentionally done with

out just occasion or excuse, analogous to an action for slander of title. To support such action actual damage must be shown; but proof that the publication had caused a general falling off of plaintiff's business, without showing the loss of any particular customers, was sufficient proof of such damage. Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524 (Eng.).

TORT NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR INJURIES-DEFECTIVE HIGHWAY. A statute required notice to be given to the city within a certain time after the injury alleged to have been caused by defective highways within the city. Plaintiff's notice described with particularity the place and manner of the accident, and stated that he had received severe bodily injuries." Held, that it was not a sufficient notice to sustain an action. Goodwin v. City of Gardiner, 24 Atl. Rep. 846 (Me.).

In Blackington v. Rockland, 66 Me. 332, a statement that "my [plaintiff's] horse was injured, at a certain time and place," was held sufficient description of the nature of that plaintiff's injury. The court in Goodwin's Case distinguish the early decision in language which is, to say the least, ingenious; they say that a man can usually tell his own personal sufferings more exactly than he can describe those of a horse. A man may be able to practice an imposition as to his own personal injury, but would find it difficult to do so in respect to an injury to his horse." It is submitted that this distinction is not well taken, and that there is no real difference between the two cases.

TORT NUISANCE - LIABILITY OF LESSOR'S GRANTEE. A let land to B, and afterwards granted the reversion to C. B, without violating his covenants, and while making a use contemplated in the lease, created a nuisance. Held, that as C had no power to prevent B's acts, he was not liable; and the fact that C received rent from B was immaterial. Lufkin v. Zane, 31 N. E. Rep. 757 (Mass.).

A landlord becomes liable for nuisance only if he sanctions the abuse; and since C had no power to abate this nuisance, his mere act of taking the premises could not make him a wrongdoer. The court criticises Rex v. Pedley, 1 Adol. & El. 822, and follows Ahern v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 203, a case decided by a bare majority.

TORT TRESPASS

VENUE.-Held, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Esher dissenting: (1) That there is no reason founded on principle why an action relating to land in a foreign country should not lie by a plaintiff in England against a defendant in England, unless the action is of such a nature that it would be impossible for the court to give a judgment which could be enforced, as, e. g., an action of ejectment.

(2) That the only obstacle to such actions heretofore has been the technical law of local venue.

(3) That, therefore, since the abolition of local venue by the Judicature Rules Judicature Acts, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66) and 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 77), and Order 36, Rule I- the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an action for damages in respect of trespass to land situate in a foreign country against a defendant who is within the jurisdiction of the court. Companhia De Mocambique v. British So. Africa Co.- De Sonsa v. Same, [1892] 2 Q. B. 358 (Eng.).

This decision is in accordance with the view expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in Livingston v. Jefferson, I Brock, 203. See also Story on the Conflict of Laws, § 554. TRUST, SPENDTHRIFT WILLS. Held, that a testator may so give to his son for life the annual income of a trust estate that the life tenant cannot alienate or his creditors reach it. Roberts v. Stevens, 24 Atl. Rep. 873 (Me.).

English courts are opposed to such restrictions as this, and hold that a creditor of a cestui que trust can reach in equity whatever the latter has the right to demand from his trustee. Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429.

Decisions in several of our State courts are in accord with the English rule, but others, together with two of the Federal Supreme Court, uphold such trusts. See 96 Mo. 439; 91 U. S. 716, 727; 94 U. S. 523; 135 Pa. St. 586, 596; 133 Mass. 170 (see also 146 Mass. 369; 146 Mass. 395; and 149 Mass. 307); 69 Md. 77; 59 Vt. 530.

The Legislatures of four or five States sanction similar trusts by express statutes, though Kentucky by legislative enactment forbids them. 83 Ky. 306.

WILLS-POWERS. In 1861 A made a will leaving all her estate to B. In 1867 a lot of land was conveyed to a trustee for the use of A for life, with power to dispose of it by her will. Held, that the power was executed by a will made previous to its creation. McIver, C. J., dissents. Burkett v. Whittemore, 15 S. E. Rep. 616 (So. Car.). This follows the settled English doctrine.

WILLS INVALID Probate.—1870 A, B, died, leaving a will, which was admitted to probate. Under it his widow took certain realty which she sold to T for value. 1880, one of A, B,'s children, who was a minor when the will was proved, petitioned to have

it set aside. This was decreed on ground that A, B, was non compos mentis when he executed the will. Held, that the proceedings under the original probate were not void, but voidable, since the court had jurisdiction, and therefore a purchaser from a devisee under the will would be protected. The court says that the case is like that of a man who buys from an executor whose appointment is revoked, where the purchaser gets a good title. Thompson v. Samson, 30 Pac. Rep. 980 (Cal.).

REVIEWS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION. By Morris M. Cohn, Attorney-at-Law. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1892. That his book is of no use to the practising lawyer as such is almost admitted by the author. Its field is in the most general study of constitutional history, "a study showing the play of physical and social factors in the creation of institutional law," as his sub-title puts it. Its use within this field is decidedly elementary. A fairly complete, though somewhat vague, summary of the author's theories on the general philosophy of political growth, getting what semblance of unity it has from the conclusion that our Constitution, like unwritten ones, is "amenable to the under-current of national life," makes up the treatise. It is, in short, an average essay of the kind naturally so popular, in which the names and general methods of science play a larger part than any actual useful research. The author gives his judgment on many ultimate laws of history, ethics, and sociology, but treats no subject in a manner thorough enough to aid a real student.

N. H.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. By Simon Greenleaf, LL.D. In three volumes. Fifteenth edition, revised, with large additions, by Simon Greenleaf Croswell. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1892.

The number of editions through which this work has run in the fifty years of its existence is a striking commentary on, its importance. Despite the shortcomings which have been brought out by modern critical study, it is to this day a standard referred to more frequently and respectfully than any other book in its department of the law.

Mr. Croswell has added about nineteen hundred cases, mostly those decided since the last edition in 1883, and has summarized the advance of the law in several of the most important and most rapidly developing branches, by means of long and elaborate notes. So far the work is well done. The latest authorities, however, are not always given; but, as is stated in the preface, there are included "mainly such cases deemed most important in principle or instructive as showing the tendency of the courts in new lines of decision." . . . However judicious this selection has been, it must somewhat lessen the utility of the work to a busy practitioner.

as are

The added notes simply piece out the statements made originally by Mr. Greenleaf. They contain the recent cases, their results, and the reasons assigned by the courts, but their value would be greatly increased if Mr. Croswell had given his own conclusions in his own

words, and produced original work instead of compilation. As it stands, the book is a good piece of regulation revision, but not more.

G. R. P.

LEADING CASES DONE INTO ENGLISH, AND OTHER DIVERSIONS. By Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart. Macmillan & Co. London and New York.

It is pleasing occasionally to receive for review a book that is not to be treated too strenuously. All of us who ever unbend know what a rich field the law offers for humorous banter, especially if we have read the literature of judicial humor in the biographies of the legal great. It is the law looked at from this distance, treated in a tone of frivolous disinterestedness, that gives Sir Frederick Pollock's light verses their charm and their excuse. Those who have found his fun an oasis among the text-books will look with interest at his more airy flight. His wings, by the way, are cased in a binding of perfect taste. And it may be said to the sober that the verses follow so accurately the facts of the cases that time spent over them is not useless as a review.

N. H.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF WILLS, WITH SELECTED CASES. Chaplin, Professor of Law in the Metropolitan Law School. Baker, Voorhis, & Co. 1892. Pages xxiv, 505.

By Stewart New York:

This book is admirably adapted to its purpose. It is a book for the use of students, clear, concise, teaching all branches of the laws of wills generally and none exhaustively. It is a view of the general principles that it is written to present, not of the details. The text is followed by cases without head-notes and freely shortened, and occasionally by abstracts of decisions, called "Illustrations.” Fuller references are given in the notes. No extended discussions are undertaken of doubtful or difficult points; but for a clearly arranged and clearly written elementary explanation of the general law of wills, it is in every respect satisfactory.

N. H.

THE AMERICAN DIGEST. ANNUAL FOR 1892, Sept. 1, 1891, to Aug. 31, 1892. Edited by the Editorial Staff of the National Reporter System. St. Paul, Minn. : West Publishing Co., 1892.

This digest, standing fairly as the best and most complete in existence, keeps the same general form as last year. The new minor changes are improvements. The size is increased (6046 pages), the new thousand pages being due largely to many new cases, partly to the methods for increased facility in finding cases (already admirable), given by more cross-references and black letter headings.

N. H.

[The notes by Chief-Justice Doe, of which the following pages constitute the second part, were made some time since in the investigation of a case then pending before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. He may use them in preparing the opinion to be hereafter reported in that case. EDITORS.]

WOULD

OULD the result be different1 if the charter, instead of being granted by the Crown before the Revolution, had been granted by the Legislature since the adoption of the State Constitution in 1784? This question may arise in determining the effect to be given to the clause reserving the power of alteration, amendment, and repeal, now generally inserted in corporate charters. In construing a reserved power of amending and repealing a charter, it is necessary to inquire whether the reservation has any effect, whether the charter would be amendable and repealable without it, and whether it was a useless effort of a perpetual body of public servants to retain a power of which they were incapable of divesting themselves. By the true construction of the State Constitution

1 [At the end of the first part of this article (6 Harvard Law Review 161, at pages 176-81) the writer reached the conclusion that the actual charter of Dartmouth College which dated from 1769, was not irrepealable, and could not legally have been made so by the king, its grantor.-EDITORS.]