terest was that private interests should be reconciled. The distinction attempted was not proved, and was therefore a begging of the whole question.

In State v. Coal and Coke Co. 1another section of the same Statute which forbade employers to sell to their employés merchandise and supplies at a greater profit than to persons not employed by them, was held unconstitutional for the same reasons. The remedy, it was stated, was in the hands of the employé.

A third case cited is that of Millitt v. People; 2 the distinction already criticised is again made, and the rights of the laborer are similarly described as in the cases just noted. The defendant was indicted for failure to obey a Statute of Illinois 3 which required all owners of coal mines to furnish a track scale upon which to weigh coal lifted from the mines, and which provided that all contracts for the mining of coal in which the weighing of the coal as required in the Statute should be dispensed with, should be null and void. The defendant was discharged, on the ground that there was nothing in the condition of the laborer in mines to disqualify him from contracting in regard to the price of his labor, or in regard to the mode of ascertaining that price. *

4

Judge Holmes cites the case of Hancock v. Yaden, 5 decided in Indiana in the same month as State v. Goodwill. The plaintiff in this case demanded payment in United States money for services as workman in the defendant's mine. The latter set up a written contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to accept payment in goods and merchandise at the defendant's store, and waived his right to payment in money. The question was whether this contract was valid, a Statute of Indiana forbidding the making of such contracts between employers and employés engaged in coal mining. The court said: "The right to contract is not and never has been in any country where, as in ours, the common law prevails and con

4 The court in Commonwealth v. Perry also cite People v Marx, 99 N. Y. 377; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, where a law forbidding the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses was held unconstitutional, on the ground that while it was ostensibly a health law, it was not in fact of such a character; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389. a case denying the validity of an Act restraining the giving of prizes in connection with the sales of merchandise. See also Ex parte Kubeck, 85 Cal. 274: an eight-hour ordinance of the city of Los Angeles is held unconstitutional, as an infringement of the right to make and enforce contracts.

6 121 Ind. 366.

stitutes the source of all civil law, entirely beyond legislative control." Numerous instances of legislative control of contracts are mentioned. "It cannot be denied, without repudiating all authority, that the Legislature does possess some power over the right to contract; and if it does, then nothing can be clearer than that this power extends far enough to uphold a Statute providing that payment of wages shall be made in money, where there is no agreement to the contrary after the services have been rendered." It is denied that this is class legislation; it operates on all who are similarly situated, and neither confers special privileges nor makes unjust discrimination.1

As an additional authority, we may refer to the case of Weil v. State.2 A Statute of Ohio 3 made it unlawful for the vendor of personal property, sold on the condition that the title should remain in him until payment in full had been made, to take possession of such property without tendering or refunding to the purchaser the sums already paid by him. This was held a constitutional enactment. The decision was that the Legislature simply established an equitable rule for an adjustment of claims of parties to such a contract. The oppression and hardship which grew into the contracts formerly allowed, whereby the vendee forfeited not only the property, but also the instalments of the purchase price paid by him, were remedied. The defendant was at liberty to enter into

a contract of this kind or not, but having once entered, the Statute was binding upon him. This case is closely analogous to Commonwealth v. Perry.1

It is thus seen that the authorities are divided on the question whether the police power should be extended to uphold a Statute like that of the Weavers' Fines Bill. It must be remembered that a wide discretion rests in the Legislature. The constitutional provisions protecting the right to enjoy property are not in any sense superior to the legislative right to use the police power for the public benefit. An ostensible exercise of the power which in reality cannot be sustained from any point of view as legitimately within

1 Johns v. State, 78 Ind. 332; McAnnich v. Miss. R. R. Co., 20 Ia. 338. 3 45 Ohio St. 450 (1889).

3 Stat. May 24, 1885.

• For other interesting cases where property rights were held to be constitutionally regulated by use of the police power, see Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509; Prentiss v. Weston, III N. Y. 460; Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302; Commonwealth v. Morningstar, 22 Atl. Rep. 867; Commonwealth v. Barrett, 17 S. W. Rep. 336.

that power is undoubtedly invalid;1 but if there is any doubt, however slight, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the Legislature. That is, if from any point of view there is justification for legislative interference for the interests of the public, and if the means adopted are appropriate to the end, there is no conflict with the constitutional guarantees protecting private property, though the legislation may restrict property rights. The courts at times lose sight of the force of this principle; e. g., in State v. Goodwill, where much of the language used is not in point, because dealing with the Statute there under examination as a matter of public policy, Public policy cannot enter into consideration in the determination of the constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature. That the Statute assumes that the employer is at times dishonest, and the employé at times an imbecile, is a political question to be discussed in the Legislature. The caution required of the court in reviewing legislation has been stated in numerous cases.2

The Weavers' Fines Bill in effect simply modified the remedies secured to the employer under his contracts for weaving. The only constitutional restraint upon changes in remedies seems to be this, that no remedies under contracts existing at the time of the passage of the Statute can be taken away, if by so doing the obligation of the contracts is substantially impaired. A party to a contract has a vested right in the contract, and if the law is afterwards so changed that the means of legally enforcing the contract are materially impaired, the obligation no longer remains the same. Such a change in the laws violates the Federal Constitution. The Constitution, however, does not guarantee that future contracts shall be enforced by existing remedies. It does not forbid the passing of laws which restrict the operation of future contracts. A rule of law allowing certain remedies is like any other rule of law. It is subject to amendment or repeal, and all such changes 1 In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98.

2 The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the Statute. Hawthorn v. People, 109 Iil. 302; Chief Justice Shaw in Wellington et al., Petitioners, etc., 16 Pick. 95; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573; Matter of Gilbert Elevated Railway Co.,70 N. Y. 361; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50; Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dallas, 12. The Legislature must be the sole judge of the necessity of action. Harshness of the measures adopted has no effect on the question of power. Bancroft v. City of Cambridge, 126 Mass. 438; Eastman v. State, 109 Ind. 278; Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678.

8 Knight v. Dorr, 19 Pick. 48; Edwards v. Johnson, 105 Ind. 594; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 84; Curran v. State, 15 How. 304; Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 432 Wynehamer v. People, 13, N. Y. 399.

are valid if they are made to operate in futuro. They are even valid retrospectively if they do not interfere with vested rights.1

In the opinion of the court, the remedy left to employers of weavers is not one of practical value. While that consideration, admitting it to be true, would have been pertinent in a case involving a contract made before the passing of the Statute, it does not seem to be so in discussing a Statute wholly prospective in its operation, and passed by the Legislature in the exercise of its police power. An employer is given sufficient notice of his rights under the contracts he may make. It would be absurd to say that he has a vested right in the remedies he may gain, provided he enters into contracts with his employés. The Statute must be read into each contract; it is as much a part of the contract as if expressly included.2 Bankruptcy laws are upheld on this ground. They limit the rights of creditors, and declare that certain formalities shall operate to discharge the debtor and put an end to his liability. The creditor cannot complain, since the laws give him full notice of the limitations upon his rights under his contracts.8

In view of these well-settled doctrines, it is somewhat surprising that any reference to the clause forbidding the impairment of contracts should have crept into the opinion of the court in Commonwealth v. Perry. The Weavers' Fines Bill had nothing to do with existing contracts, and could not impair obligations arising from them.

Boston, January, 1891.

Herbert Henry Darling.

1 Commonwealth v. Commissioners, 6 Pick. 501; Sampeyreal v. United States, 7 Pet. 222; Butterfield v. Rudde, 58 N. Y. 489; Richardson v. Akin, 87 Ill. 138; Read v. Bank, 23 Me. 318.

State Legislatures have unquestionably the right to pass laws which operate to control and modify the express or implied provisions of contracts. James v.Stull,9 Barb. 482; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124.

* Smith v. Parsons, 1 Ohio, 236,242 ; Jewell v. Railway Co., 34 Ohio St. 601; Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627; Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450; Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; Long v. Straus, 107 Ind. 94.

Bigelow v. Pritchard, 21 Pick. 169; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1, 19; Wheelock v. Leonard, 20 Penn. St. 440; Eckstein v, Shoemaker, 3 Wheat. 15.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students.

THE LAW SCHOOL.

Readers of Professor Langdell's last Annual Report are familiar with the fact that the resoures of the Law School have been strained-in reading-room, lecture-rooms, and library alike- by its recent growth. The question has become a very pressing one, how to deal with the further increase next year. Such an increase is reasonably certain. Of the second-year class of 1890-91, 66 per cent returned in 1891-92 to complete their course. If the same ratio an unusually low one holds, the third-year class 1892-93 will be larger than the present one by twenty-seven. The present second-year class is now stronger by eleven than when it entered the School. If the present firstyear, instead of gaining eleven, loses the same number, the second-year in 1892-93 will still show an increase of twenty-nine. The entering class will probably not surpass the record. But assuming that the firstyear men and special students remained stationary, the latter an improbable assumption, for reasons that appear below, the School would nevertheless show a net increase, at the very least, of more than fifty. The total will rise above four hundred. The necessity of taking vigorous steps to meet this emergency, for an emergency it really is, has been self-evident. Almost all the changes announced for the coming year are referable to this cause.

In the first place, the facilities of the reading-room, as regards both seating capacity and the distribution of books, will be enlarged. For the latter purpose, an opening will be made into the stack on the side opposite the present desk, and a second and larger delivery desk will be established. The problem of finding extra seats is more difficult. Already this year, during the Christmas recess, five new tables have been put in the reading-room, in addition to the original twelve. This fills the main room; further crowding is physically impossible. The only resource left is the vacant space to the east of the stack, adjoining the new delivery desk. When the ceiling is knocked out, and light admitted from above, three tables, with seats for forty men, can be placed here. There will then be accommodations for about two hundred and fifty men in all. This is the utmost that can be done in preparation for next year.