have a quasi property in results of his enterprise as against a rival in the same business, and the appropriation of these results at the expense and to the damage of the one and for the profit of the other is unfair competition against which equity will afford relief. (International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215.) The Chicago Board of Trade collected at its own expense quotations of prices offered and accepted for wheat, corn, and provisions in its exchange and distributed them under contract to persons approved by it and under certain conditions. It brought suit to restrain parties, without the authority of the board, from using the quotations obtained. In deciding this case, the court said: "The plaintiff's collection of quotations is entitled to the protection of the law. It stands like a trade secret. The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or paid for doing, to itself. The fact that others might do similar work, if they might, does not authorize them to steal the plaintiff's. The plaintiff does not lose its right to communicate the results to persons, even if many, in confidential relations to itself, under contract but not to make it public, and strangers to the trust will be restrained from getting at the knowledge by inducing a breach of trust and using the knowledge obtained by such a breach." (Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236.) A parallel case to the above and decided in a similar manner is Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 205 U. S. 322, which affirms the decision rendered in 144 Fed. 511. (Also see Board of Trade of Chicago v. Hadden-Krall Co. et al., 109 Fed. 705; Board of Trade of Chicago v. Cella Commission Co. et al., 145 Fed. 28; Sullivan v. Postal Telegraph Co., 123 Fed. 411; Board of Trade v. Consolidated Stock Exchange, 121 Fed. 433; Board of Trade v. O'Dell Commission Co., 115 Fed. 574; Metropolitan Grain, etc., Exchange v. Chicago Board of Trade, 15 Fed. 847.) In affirming an appeal from an interlocutory order restraining a news company from using information gathered and transmitted by a telegraph company, Judge Grosscup of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, said: "Standing apart the symbol of speech is not property. Disconnected from the business in which it is utilized it can not be monopolized. But used as a method of making an enterprise succeed, so that its appropriation by another would be distinct injury to the enterprise to which it is attached, the name, or mark, becomes at once subject matter of equitable protection. Here, as elsewhere, the eye of equity jurisdiction seeks out results and though the immediate thing to be acted upon by injunction is not itself, alone considered, property, it is enough that the act complained of will result, even though somewhat remotely, in injury to property." (The National Telegraph News Co. et al., v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 119 Fed. 294.) (See also Illinois Commission Co. et al. v. Cleveland Telegraph Co. et al., 119 Fed. 301; Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 Fed. 562; Board of Trade v. Tucker, 221 Fed. 305.) TAKING THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER'S ADVERTISING, NO GROUND FOR FINDING OF UNFAIR COMPETITION. That complainants spent large sums in advertising its products and defendant's sale of its product under the same name increased, though it spent little in advertising, is no ground for the finding of unfair competition. (Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 Fed. 657.) (See also Eisenstadt Mfg. Co. v. J. M. Fisher Co., 232 Fed. 957; Meccano v. Wanamaker, 250 Fed. 450; Hubbell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 262 Fed. 155.) CURRENT ARTICLES AND DISCUSSIONS. Appropriation (the Associated Press cases), 28 Yale Law Journal 387, February, 1919. Restricting use of container in sale of contents, etc., 31 Yale Law Journal 668, April, 1922. ARTIFICIAL MARKET. 1. Creation of same by paying prices unwarranted by market condi- BIDDING UP PRICES. [See Artificial market.] BLACKLISTING. [See also Boycotting.] 1. By wholesale association, to prevent mixed jobbers from getting 2. By retailers, of wholesalers selling to consumers.-Actively co- 3. By retail, dealers to cut off supply of mail-order houses, etc.-In- 105756-22- -5 dealers, the members of the wholesale association to refuse to sell to mail-order houses, general stores, hardware stores, and other jobbers of the retail harness business, and inducing members of the wholesale association to use their influence with manufacturers to prevent them from selling to mail-order houses, held, under the circumstances set forth, to constitute unfair methods of competition. (The Wholesale Saddlery Association of the United States and the National Harness Manufacturers Association of the United States, 1 F. T. C. 335.) The foregoing acts and practices so far as they related to the National Harness Manufacturers' Association, its officers, committees, and the members of its subsidiary and affiliated associations, were declared to be "unfair methods of competition." (National Harness Mfgrs. Assn. v. F. T. C., 268 Fed. 705.) WE DON'T PATRONIZE " AND "Irrespective of compulsion or even agreement to observe its intimation, the circulation of a 'we don't patronize' or 'unfair' lists manifestly intended to put the ban upon those whose names appear therein, among an important body of possible customers, combined with a view to joint action and in anticipation of such reports, is within the prohibition of the antitrust act of July 2, 1890, if it is intended to restrain and does restrain commerce among the States." (Syllabus.) (Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522.) CIRCULATION OF OFFICIAL REPORTS BY trade by preventing it with such list of dealers, and was within the prohibition of the Sherman law." (Syllabus. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, 234 U. S. 600. PRACTICE CONDEMNED IN COURT DECREES. The Federal courts have entered in a number of cases decrees condemning, in its various forms, the practice of blacklisting where it is in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. (See Decrees and Judgments in Federal Antitrust Cases for the following: U. S. v. National Assn. of Retail Druggists, 115; U. S. v. Southern Wholesale Grocers Assn., 247 (consent decree) (207 Fed. 434); U. S. v. Pacific Coast Plumbing Supply Assn., 323 (consent decree); U. S. v. Master Horseshoers National Protective Assn., 381; U. S. v. American Thread Co., 449 (consent decree); U. S. v. New De "The Sherman law, as construed by this court in the Standard Oil case, while not reaching normal and usual contracts incident to lawful purposes and in further-parture Mfg. Co., 471 (consent decree) ance of legitimate trade, does broadly condemn all combinations and conspiracies which restrain the free and natural flow of trade in the channels of interstate commerce. 'Held, in this case, that the circulation of a so-called official report among members of an association of retail dealers calling attention to actions of listed wholesale dealers in selling direct to consumers, tended to prevent members of the association from dealing with the listed dealers referred to in the report, and to directly and unreasonably restrain (204 Fed. 107); U. S. v. National Wholesale Jewelers Assn. et al., 509 (consent decree); U. S. v. National Assn. of Master Plumbers, 603 (consent decree); U. S. v. Colorado & Wyoming Lumber Dealers Assn., 670 (consent decree); U. S. v. Hollis et al., 619 (246 Fed. 611); U. S. v. Kluge et al., 631 (consent decree); U. S. v. Hartwick et al., 649 (consent decree); U. S. v. Phila. Jobbing Confectioners Assn. et al., 397 (consent decree).) Sending out a list indicating to manufacturers or jobbers those with whom they might deal is just as effective blacklisting as one indicating with whom they might | lists was compiled a list of all the cusnot deal; an agreement or combination to restrain trade in such a manner violates the antitrust law. (Knauer . U. S., 237 Fed. 8.) In a prosecution for criminal contempt, it was held that continuance to send lists to manufacturers, and, on request, furnish manufacturers information as to the standing of complainants, for the privilege of buying direct from manufacturers, constituted a violation of a decree prohibiting the practice of blacklisting. (U. S. v. Southern Wholesale Grocers' Assn., 207 Fed. 434.) 66 'Defendants were members of a voluntary membership association of retail lumber dealers which adopted the practice of making on the first of each year a 'customers' list, according to the following plan: By means of circular letters a list was obtained from each member of the manufacturers and wholesalers with whom such member dealt. From such tomers of each such manufacturer and wholesaler within the association. By exchange with other associations the lists were extended to their territory. The secretary, through reports from members and otherwise, obtained information of 'unethical' or 'irregular' shipments by such manufacturers or wholesalers, to consumers, cooperative associations. or mail-order houses, and notified their customers who took the matter up direct with the offending dealer. Information so obtained was also furnished to and published in trade papers. The result, as intended, was to prevent such sales and shipments to outside parties to a large extent. Held that such action on the part of the association and its members was in restraint of interstate commerce, and defendants were chargeable with conspiring to restrain such commerce in violation of antitrust act." (Syllabus.) (U. S. v. Hollis et al., 246 Fed. 611.) BOGUS INDEPENDENTS. 1. Operating secret subsidiary as independent organization.—Concealing its control of and affiliation with a certain yeast company, on the part of a manufacturer selling approximately 90 per cent of the compressed yeast used by bakers in the United States, and permitting it to be held out as and advertised as independent, held to constitute an unfair method of competition. (Fleischmann Co., 1 F. T. C. 119, 120.) 2. Same. A corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of fertilizers owning the capital stock of a subsidiary corporation engaged in the same business held the same out to be an independent farmers' cooperative company, and took no steps to disclose to the trade or purchasing public the truth regarding its actual ownership and control; and through such subsidiary controlled the purchase of raw material used by it and the prices at which its products were sold, held that, under the circumstances, the concealed operation of the subsidiary constituted an unfair method of competition. (Armour & Co. and Farmers' Cooperative Fertilizer Co., 1 F. T. C. 430.) 3. Same. A corporation engaged in the sale of farm, garden, and flower seed, with a capacity to mislead the public, dealt with retailers and agents as the "Standard Seed Co.," and advertised such Standard Seed Co. as a separate and distinct company, issuing and circulating throughout the country a catalogue under the said trade name which it kept separate and distinct from the A. A. Berry Seed Co., although latter corporation supplied the seed thus sold from its general stock, usually purchased practically its entire stock under its own name and made only occasional purchases under the name of Standard Seed Co., held that such course of conduct, under the circumstances set forth, constituted unfair methods of competition. (A. A. Berry Seed Co., 2 F. T. C. 427.) 4. Same. A corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of lightning rods, couplings and fixtures under its patents, brands, trade-marks, and trade names of "Franklin," "Franklin Lightning Rods," and "C. B. F. R." (Cole Bros. Franklin Rods), and in its stationery and advertising used therewith a picture of Benjamin Franklin; thereafter a competitor whose acknowledged products were made and sold under its own well-known name, brand, and trade-marks, secretly organized and operated two other companies with fictitious addresses for nonexistent officers and manufacturing plants, adopting for the name of one of these companies "Franklin Lightning Rod Co.," and selling its product under the name, "Franklin lightning rods," the same being held out as independent manufacturers and competitors, in whose names it solicited business and sold its own products to customers to whom it could not sell under its own name and brand, held that such acts and practices constituted unfair methods of competition. (St. Louis Lightning Rod Co., Monarch Lightning Rod Co., and Franklin Lightning Rod Co., 3 F. T. C. 327). THE OPERATION OF SUBSIDIARY COMPA- "It was contended that it was not un lawful merely to keep one's business affairs secret, nor for one corporation to obtain a controlling interest in another, nor merely to compete with a rival for trade and by mere competition to drive him out of business, nor to offer better terms and inducements than a rival in business offered, and we are by no means inclined to deny either of these propositions in the abstract, for neither is it in terms forbidden by the act, nor possibly, by any other consideration; but, as we have seen, the seventh section of the act in most general language provides that any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act he shall have a right to recover THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO KNOW CONTROLLING INTERESTS. Mr. Chief Justice White: "It is a common belief that many periodicals are secretly owned or controlled, and that in reading such papers the public is deceived through ignorance of the interests the publication represents. We believe that, since the general public bears a large portion of the expense of dis |