tribution of second-class matter, and since these publications wield a large influence because of their special concessions in the mails, it is not only equitable but highly desirable that the public should know the individuals who own or control them." (Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288.) "When the D. M. Osborne & Co. purchase was made, while the International bought all the stock, it permitted the Osborne Co. to continue to appear to be independent. It is claimed that this was done to enable the Osborne Co. to collect its bills receivable, which were not acquired by the International. There was a commercial advantage in claiming not to be associated with the International. Many persons were opposed to buying from it, and for two years the Osborne Co. persistently advertised that it was independent. "While under the old-time law of warranty it might be justified for the Osborne Co. to conceal its relation with the International, there can be no excuse for the affirmation upon its part that it was independent after it had been acquired by the International." At this point the court quoted from Parsons on Contracts in ninth edition, page 615, as follows: "The seller may let the buyer cheat himself ad libitum, but must not actively assist him in cheating himself." (U. S. v. International Harvester Co. et al., 214 Fed. 987.) UNFAIR TO USE SECRET SUBSIDIARY FOR LOCAL PRICE CUTTING. Where the American Can Co. acquired control of independent companies and then held them out to the public as being outside of the trust," for price cutting purposes, the court said: "There can be no question as to either the moral or legal character of such methods. Laying aside all ethical considerations, the wonder always is that a great company like defendant does not see that it can not afford to be caught in such a position, and, in the long run, caught it is likely to be. The loss of dignity and prestige in the public eye must usually cost more than was gained, even if nothing worse happens. It is like enough to suffer from lowering the moral tone of its own employes. The practices referred to, however, ceased three years or more before the institution of these proceedings." (U. S. v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859.) (See also U. S. v. Hamburg-American S. S. Line, 216 Fed. 971.) The practice of operating subsidiary or controlled companies, and at the same time holding them out and representing them to be independent concerns, for the purpose of injuring the business of a competitor by misleading the public has been condemned in a number of decrees entered by the Federal courts. (U. S. v. American Tobacco Co. 165 (221 U. S. 106); U. S. v. Central-West Publishing Co. 359 (consent decree); U. S. v. American Coal Products Co. 461 (consent decree); U. S. v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 193 (188 Fed. 127); U. S. v. General Electric Co. 267 (consent decree); U. S. v. National Cash Register Co. 315 (consent decree).—Decrees and Judgments in Federal Antitrust Cases.) BOYCOTTING. [See also Blacklisting; Conspiracy; Refusal to Sell.] 1. Agreement not to sell a concern at same prices charged its competitors in a similar business-By brokers.-Agreeing and conspiring on the part of certain brokers, induced by coercion, persuasion, and boycott of certain jobbers, to refuse to sell a competitor of said jobbers upon the same terms and at the same prices offered and charged them (the jobbers) and others engaged in a similar business, held, when carried out in the manner described, to constitute an unfair method of competition. (Western Sugar Refinery et al., 2 F. T. C. 151.) EVIDENCE NOT SUFFICIENT. "Evidence held not to sustain finding of Federal Trade Commission that brokers conspired with others to induce food manufacturers and distributors, by coercion, persuasion, boycott, or threats, to refuse to sell merchandise directly to wholesale grocery concern at the same prices and on same terms as to its competitors, in violation of Federal Trade Commission act, paragraph 5 (Comp. St., par. 8836e), prohibiting unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce." (Syllabus.) Western Sugar Refinery Co. v. F. T. C., 275 Fed. 725. AGREEMENT OR CONSPIRACY TO REFUSE "While a retail dealer may unquestionably stop dealing with a wholesaler for any reason sufficient to himself, he and other dealers may not combine and agree that none of them will deal with such wholesaler without, in case interstate commerce is involved, violating the Sherman law." (Syllabus.) Eastern States Lumber Assn. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 600. 2. To induce less favorable terms to competitors By jobbers.— Threatening by jobbers of automobile accessories, with the intent, purpose, and effect of embarrassing, harassing, hampering, and restricting retail competitors, a manufacturer of such accessories, that unless it ceased allowing to such retailers the same rate of discount as it allowed to them, they would cease to purchase its goods, held to constitute an unfair method of competition. (Baltimore Hub-Wheel Manufacturing Co. and The Holland-Baden-Ramsey Co., 1 F. T. C. 395). 3. Same. Certain jobbers in groceries, for the purpose of preventing a competing corporation from purchasing from manufacturers and manufacturers' agents, secretly conspired among themselves to induce and compel manufacturers and their agents, by means of boycotts and threats of boycotting, to decline to sell to said company upon the terms usually given to jobbers, and pursuant to such agreement, advised some of such agents, and, through them, certain sugar refiners, their principals, that they objected to sales to said corporation on the usual jobbing terms. They also threatened various brokers who secretly sold to said competing corporation with boycott, and refused, in the case of several of their number, to handle a certain product because the manufacturer thereof sold to said corporation at the usual jobbing prices, held that such agreements and understandings, carried out in the manner described, constituted unfair methods of competition. 2 F. T. C. 151.) "EVIDENCE HELD TO SUSTAIN FINDING OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION that jobbers entered into a conspiracy to induce, coerce, and compel manufacturers and distributors to refuse to sell directly to wholesale grocery concern on the terms and prices charged competitors of such (Western Sugar Refinery et al., concern in violation of Federal Trade Commission act, paragraph 5 (Comp. St., par. 8835e), prohibiting unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce.” (Syllabus.) (Western Sugar Refinery Co. v. F. T. C., 275 Fed. 725.) 4. Same. Certain brokers, induced by coercion, intimidation, and threats of boycott by certain jobbers, who had secretly agreed that a competitor which dealt in groceries at retail as well as wholesale, and which had been purchasing supplies from manufacturers at regular jobbers' prices, was not entitled and should not be permitted to continue purchasing from such and other necessary wholesale sources of supply, agreed and conspired among themselves and with said jobbers and did— (a) Refuse to sell to it upon the usual jobbing terms and prices; (b) Recommended, justified, and urged the same course upon its principals; (c) Compelled it to purchase from and through said competing jobbers at prices exceeding regular jobbers' prices; all of which was done with the intent and effect of suppressing and preventing its competition as a jobber and caused it to lose a large volume of business; held that such acts and practices of said jobbers and brokers constituted unfair methods of competition. (Wholesale Grocers Association, El Paso, Tex., et al., 3 F. T. C. 109.) and retail business. The combining of wholesaling and retailing is not a novelty and is not unlawful. The success of the concerted action participated in by the petitioners meant the monopolizing of the wholesale grocery business in the El Paso territory by dealers not engaged in retailing. We are of opinion that the practices forbidden by the attacked order were 'unfair methods of competition in commerce,' within the meaning of the provision of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission act, because, in the circumstances disclosed, they were against the public policy evidenced by the Sherman Act. (Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, supra); National Harness Mfrs. Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 268 Fed. 705." (Wholesale Grocers' Assn., El Paso, Tex. v. F. T. C., 277 Fed. 657.) "It well may be inferred that the law- | dealers not doing a combined wholesale makers, in using in the Trade Commission act the words 'unfair methods of competition in commerce,' intended to include concerted action to eliminate competition, in pursuance of what amounts to a conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, within the meaning of the Sherman Act (Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, supra). What the associated jobbers severally did went beyond each of them refraining altogether or to a less extent from buying from manufacturers whose products were sold directly to the Standard Grocery Co. They combined and cooperated with others to keep manufacturers willing to do so from selling their products directly to the Standard Grocery Co., and by that means to obstruct or prevent that company from competing as a wholesaler in territory sought to be appropriated by 5. To cut off supplies of objectionable competitors—By jobbers. The inducing and compelling, by certain jobbers, in competition with a corporation in which retail grocers held stock but which did not. limit its sales to stockholders and did not sell to consumers, of a manufacturer's agent, to whom all had severally given orders, to withhold its purchase, by threatening to refuse their own, which had arrived, and in the agregate far exceeded their competitor's, held, under the circumstances set forth, to constitute an unfair method of competition. (McKnight-Keaton Grocery Co., Wood & Bennett, Scutters-Gale Grocers Co., and Ray L. Hosmer & Co., 3 F. T. C. 87.) 6. To cut off supplies of objectionable competitors-By wholesalers.A corporation dealing in groceries at wholesale threatened to return to the manufacturer all goods of his manufacture which it had in stock if certain commissions on goods shipped to a competitor, also engaged in retailing, were not allowed, or if other sales were made directly to said competitor, and to cease buying from him in the future and did so cease, held that such practices, under the circumstances, constituted unfair methods of competition. (Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 3 F. T. C. 295.) 7. Same. Notifying its members, on the part of an unincorporated association engaged in the distribution and sale of harness and saddlery goods at wholesale, of manufacturers who sold to wholesalers contrary to the wishes of the association, with the result that the members of the association withheld their patronage from such manufacturers and manufacturers declined to sell to jobbers not approved by the association through fear of loss of patronage of the association members; and seeking to prevent manufacturers from making direct shipments to retailers on order of jobbers, and from making freight allowance to jobbers on such shipments, by withdrawing their patronage from such manufacturers as made such shipments, held to be, when carried out in the manner described, unfair methods of competition. (The Wholesale Saddlery Association of the United States and The National Harness Manufacturers Association of the United States, 1 F. T. C. 335.) 8. To cut off supplies of wholesalers selling at retail also-By retailers.-An unincorporated association of retail harness dealers admitted to associate membership manufacturers who refused to sell mail-order houses and were otherwise in harmony with the association, and issued credentials to the salesmen of such associate members; and systematically urged members to withhold patronage from concerns whose salesmen were not equipped with such credentials; held that such acts, when carried out in the manner described, constituted unfair methods of competition. (The Wholesale Saddlery Association of the United States and The National Harness Manufacturers Association of the United States, 1 F. T. C. 335.) CUTTING OFF SUPPLIES OF COMPETITORS "Attempts by an association of harness manufacturers and by a saddle makers' association to coerce the separations of the wholesale and retail harness dealers, by refusing to recognize those who engaged both in the wholesale and retail trade as authorized jobbers, and to prevent the sale by manufacturers of accessories to such persons, are unlawful, and may be restricted by order of the Federal Trade Commission." (Syllabus.) (National AGREEMENT BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND "Evidence that employers agreed to in- IN GENERAL. withdraw patronage from those who do "While the Clayton Act declares that Where an association of fire under- writers of the Pacific et al., 67 Fed. 310.) unlawful and will be enjoined by a court A combination of labor organizations CLAYTON ACT DOES NOT LEGALIZE SEC- "Section 6 of the Clayton Act, in de- |