accomplish such use by a clear and positive statement negativing any con- nection between them and those having the exclusive right in such secondary signification of the name." (Chickering et al. v. Chickering & Sons et al., 215 Fed. 490; Chickering et al. v. Chickering & Sons et al., 120 Fed. 69.)
"While a party can not be enjoined from honestly using his own name in advertising his goods and putting them on the market, where another person, having the same surname, has previ- ously used the name in connection with his goods in such manner and for such length of time as to make it a guaranty that the goods bearing the name emanate from him, he will be protected against the use of that name, even by a person bear- ing the same name, in such form as to constitute a false representation of the origin of the goods, and thereby inducing purchasers to believe that they are pur- chasing the goods of such other person.' (Syllabus.) (Landreth v. Landreth, 22 Fed. 41.)
(See also Allegretti Chocolate Cream Co. v. Keller, 85 Fed. 643; Tarrant & Co. v. Johann Hoff, 76 Fed. 959; Walter Baker & Co. (Ltd.) v. Baker, 77 Fed. 185; Walter Baker & Co. (Ltd.) v. San- ders, 80 Fed. 889; Walter Baker & Co. (Ltd.) v. Baker, 87 Fed. 209; Walter Baker & Co. (Ltd.) v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514.)
"The name of a person or town may become so associated with a particular product that the mere attaching of that name to a similar product without more would have all the effect of falsehood, and while the use of that name can not be absolutely prohibited, it can be restrained except when accompanied by sufficient explanation to prevent confusion with the product of the original manufacturer or original place of production." (Syllabus.) (Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Halls Safe Co., 208 U. S. 554.)
(See also L. E. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen. Co., 235 U. S. 88; Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S.
Where a corporation organized to man- ufacture and sell snuff had assumed the
name of an employee holding a few shares of its stock with the evident purpose of appropriating the trade of others of the same name who had long used the name in connection with their snuff, held that such corporation would be enjoined from using the name as a part of its corporate name, or in its business. (Garrett et al. v. T. H. Garrett & Co., 78 Fed. 472.)
(See also Ball v. Best, 135 Fed. 434.)
USE OF SAME GEOGRAPHIC NAME.
"Complainants adopted the name 'Angostura' as the name of bitters orig- inally manufactured by them in the town of that name in Venezuela, and continuously used the same thereafter, though the name of the town was subse- quently changed. Complainants' bit- ters became widely and favorably known under such name; held that complainants were entitled to protection in the use of the name as against persons using it to create a dishonest competition, though complainants could not obtain a monop- oly in the use of the word as a trade-mark." (Syllabus.) (Siegert v. Gandolfi et al., 149 Fed. 100.)
(See also Chancellor, etc., of Oxford University v. Wilmore-Andrews Pub- lishing Co., 101 Fed. 443; American Wal- tham Watch Co. v. Sandman, 96 Fed. 330.)
CONFUSION OF GEOGRAPHICAL OR PER-
"The name of a person or town may become so associated with a particular product that the mere attaching of that name to a similar product without more would have all the effect of a falsehood, and while the use of that name can not be absolutely prohibited, it can be restrained, except when accompanied by sufficient explanation to prevent confu- sion between the product of the original manufacturer or original place of produc- tion." (Syllabus.) (Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208 U. S. 554.)
IN AN INFRINGEMENT SUIT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL CONFUSION UNNECESSARY
where the words themselves suggest it; the word "Meje" infringed "Hebe." (Gehl v. Hebe Co., 276 Fed. 271.)
EXTENT OF PROTECTION.
The law of unfair competition seeks only to restrain fraudulent practices inducing confusion of goods and deception of the public, and it can not be used to prevent a defendant from adopting a trade-mark or label intended to attract attention and popularize its product, although it results, and is intended to result, in better enabling it to com
pete with complainant, where no deception or confusion of goods is caused or intended thereby. (G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co., 130 Fed. 703.)
CURRENT ARTICLES AND DISCUSSION.
Use of one's own name, adoption by corporation, 20 Columbia Law Review 626, May, 1920..
See also Blacklisting; Boycotting; Cutting off supplies; Price cutting; Price discrimination; Price fixing; Price maintenance; Refusal to sell.]
I. To cut off supplies of competitors, 1-5.
II. To induce less favorable terms to competitors, 6-9.
III. To induce less favorable terms to objectionable competitors of customers, 10. IV. To maintain prices and allocate business, 11.
V. To prevent dealers buying direct, 12.
I. TO CUT OFF SUPPLIES OF COMPETITORS.
1. By jobbers.-Where certain jobbers in competition with a corporation in which retail grocers held stock but which did not limit its sales to stockholders, and did not sell to consumers, conspired to induce and compel a manufacturer's agent to whom all had severally given orders, to withhold its purchases, by threatening to refuse their own which had arrived and in the aggregate far exceeded their competitor's, held that such practices, under the circumstances set forth, constituted an unfair method of competition. (McKnight-Keaton Grocery Co. et al., 3 F. T. C. 87.)
2. By retailers.--Inducing and endeavoring to induce on the part of a number of corporations, firms, partnerships, and individuals engaged in the sale of lumber and lumber products at retail, manufacturers and wholesalers of lumber and building materials to refrain from selling lumber and building materials to mail order concerns, held, under the circumstances set forth, to constitute an unfair method of competition. (Botsford Lumber Co. et al., 1 F. T. C. p. 60.)
3. Same. Conspiring, on the part of an unincorporated association of retail harness dealers (engaged also to some extent in manufacturing) to influence the members of a wholesale association to prevent manufacturers from selling concerns which did a combined wholesale and retail business, held to be an unfair method of competition. (The Wholesale Saddlery Association of the United States and National Harness Manufacturers Association of the United States, 1 F. T. C. 335.)
4. By retailers and wholesalers.-Procuring, on the part of an unincorporated association of retail harness dealers (engaged also to
some extent in manufacturing) the members of the wholesale associa- tion to refuse to sell mail-order houses, general stores, hardware concerns and other competitors of the retail harness dealers, held, under the circumstances set forth, to constitute an unfair method of competition. (The Wholesale Saddlery Association of the United States and National Harness Manufacturers Association of the United States, 1 F. T. C. 335.)
TRADE COMMISSION HAS POWER TO PRE- VENT COERCION TO SEPARATE JOBBING AND RETAIL BUSINESS.
"Attempts by an association of harness manufacturers and by a saddle maker's association to coerce the separation of the wholesale and retail harness dealers, by refusing to recognize those who engage
both in the wholesale and retail trade as authorized jobbers, and to prevent the sale by manufacturers of accessories to such persons, are unlawful and may be restricted by order of the Federal Trade Commission." (Syllabus.) (National Harness Mfrs. Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 268 Fed. 706.)
5. By wholesalers.-Inducing on the part of members of an unin- corporated association engaged in the distribution and sale of har- ness and saddlery goods at wholesale manufacturers to refuse to sell to retailers who had previously been competitors of the whole- salers by reason of doing both a wholesale and retail business; declin- ing on the part of the same association to admit to membership jobbers or wholesalers who did any retail business; and preventing and endeavoring to prevent manufacturers from selling to such jobbers, although allowing its own members at times to do a retail business, held to be unfair methods of competition. (The Whole- sale Saddlery Association of the United States and National Harness Manufacturers Association of the United States, 1 F. T. C. 335.)
II. TO INDUCE LESS FAVORABLE TERMS TO COMPETITORS.
6. By brokers and jobbers.-Where certain brokers because of coercion, persuasion, boycott, and threats to boycott on the part of jobbers refused to sell at the usual price to jobbers to a corporation competing with its customers and by them held not to conform to certain standards, and advised manufacturers whom they repre- sented not to sell at such prices, held, under the circumstances set forth, to constitute an unfair method of competition. (Western Sugar Refinery et al., 2 F. T. C. 151.)
"EVIDENCE HELD NOT TO SUSTAIN FIND- ING OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION that brokers conspired with others to induce food manufacturers and distrib- utors, by coercion, persuasion, boycott, or threats, to refuse to sell merchandise directly to wholesale grocery concern at the same prices and on same terms as to
its competitors, in violation of Federal Trade Commission act, paragraph 5 (Comp. St., par. 8836e), prohibiting un- fair methods of competition in interstate commerce." (Syllabus.) (Western Su- gar Refinery Co. v. Federal Trade Com- mission 275 Fed. 725.)
7. Same. Agreeing and conspiring with jobbers, on the part of certain brokers, to refuse to sell upon the usual jobbing terms and prices to an objectionable competitor of said jobbers, and recommending the same course to their principals, and further compelling said "objectionable competitor" to purchase from and through them at higher prices than regular jobbers' prices, held, under the circumstances set forth, to constitute unfair methods of competition. (McKnight-Keaton Grocery Co. et al., 3 F. T. C. 87.)
8. Same. Certain brokers induced by coercion, intimidation, and threats of boycott by certain jobbers who had secretly agreed that a competitor which dealt in groceries at retail as well as wholesale and which had been purchasing supplies from manufacturers at regular jobbers' prices, was not entitled to and should not be permitted to continue purchasing from such, and other necessary wholesale sources of supply agreed and conspired among themselves and with said jobbers, and did (1) refuse to sell to it upon the usual jobbing terms and prices; (2) recommended, justified, and urged the same course upon other members; and (3) compelled it to purchase from and through said competing jobbers at prices exceeding regular jobbers' prices; held that such acts and practices of said brokers and jobbers, substantially as described, constitute unfair methods of competition. (Wholesale Grocers Association of El Paso, Tex.,
9. By jobbers.--Certain jobbers in groceries for the purpose of preventing a competing corporation, in which a large number of retailers held stock and which sold to the retail trade generally, and only to such trade, and which had been purchasing from a large number of manufacturers at prices usually charged the jobbing trade, from purchasing from manufacturers and manufacturers' agents, secretly conspired among themselves, (1) to represent and did represent to various manufacturers and to brokers representing such manufacturers that said company should not be permitted to purchase from them at prices usually charged the jobbing trade, and (2) to induce and compel manufacturers and their agents by means of boycotts and threats of boycott to decline to sell to said company upon the terms usually given to jobbers; held that such agreement and understanding, carried out in the manner described, constituted an unfair method of competition. (Western Sugar Refinery et al., 2 F. T. C. 151.)
"EVIDENCE HELD TO SUSTAIN FINDING OF FEDERAL TRADE CONMISSION THAT jobbers entered into a conspiracy to induce, coerce, and compel manufacturers and distributors to refuse to sell directly to wholesale grocery concerns on the terms and prices charged competitors of such
concern, in violation of Federal Trade Commission act, paragraph 5 (Comp. St., par. 8836e), prohibiting unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce. (Syllabus.) (Western Sugar Refinery Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 275 Fed. 725.
"What the associated jobbers severally did went beyond each of them refraining altogether or to a less extent from buying from manufacturers whose products were sold directly to the Standard Grocery Co. They combined and cooperated with others to keep manufacturers willing to do so from selling their products directly to the Standard Grocery Co., and by that means to obstruct or prevent that com- pany from competing as a wholesaler in territory sought to be appropriated by dealers not doing a combined wholesale and retail business. The combining of wholesaling and retailing is not a novelty,
and is not unlawful. The success of the
concerted action participated in by the petitioners meant the monopolizing of the wholesale grocery business in the El Paso territory by dealers not engaged in retail- ing.
"We are of opinion that the practices forbidden by the attacked order were 'unfair methods of competition in com- merce,' within the meaning of the pro- vision of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission act, because, in the circum- stances disclosed, they were against the public policy evidenced by the Sherman Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, supra; National Harness Mfrs. Association v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A.) 268 Fed. 705." (Wholesale Grocers Assn. of El Paso v. Federal Trade Commission 277 Fed. 657, 664.)
III. TO INDUCE LESS FAVORABLE TERMS TO OBJECTIONABLE COMPETI- TORS OF CUSTOMERS.
10. By manufacturers with brokers and jobbers.-Certain refiners of sugar, principals of certain brokers, for the purpose of preventing a corporation objectionable to some of its customers, from competing on equal terms with said customers, conspired and agreed among themselves and with brokers and jobbers to refuse to sell sugar to the said corporation at the usual prices to jobbers, held that such action, under the circumstances set forth, constituted an unfair method of competition. (Western Sugar Refinery et al., 2 F. T. C. 151.)
"EVIDENCE HELD INSUFFICIENT TO SUS- TAIN FINDING OF FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION that sugar refiners entered into a conspiracy to refuse to sell to a particular wholesale grocery company on the same terms and at the same price charged com- petitors of such company, in violation of
Federal Trade Commission Act, para- graph 5 (Comp. St., par. 8836e), pro- hibiting unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce." (Syllabus.) (Western Sugar Refg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 275 Fed. 725.)
IV. TO MAINTAIN PRICES AND ALLOCATE BUSINESS.
11. By printers.-Where a number of concerns engaged in the printing of railway tariffs, schedules, and other printed matter entered into and carried out a combination, conspiracy, understand- ing, or pool to keep and maintain fixed prices for such printing, and for the purpose of allocating to each member certain contracts for printing, and so manipulated the bidding that the respective members secured the busines allocated to them, held that such a combination constituted an unfair method of competition. (Blakely Printing Co. et al., 1 F. T. C. 277.)
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