Opinion of the Court.

3

287 U.S.

The case of a park is not unique as the court below seems to have thought. See Quinn v. Dougherty, 30 F. (2d) 749, 751. It has often been decided that when lands are acquired by a governmental body in fee and dedicated by statute to park purposes, it is within the legislative power to change the use, Clark v. Providence, 16 R. I. 337; 15 Atl. 763; Mowry v. Providence, 16 R. I. 422; 16 Atl. 511; Seattle Land & Improvement Co. v. Seattle, 37 Wash. 274; 79 Pac. 780; Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co., 57 Wash. 225; 106 Pac. 777; see Higginson v. Boston, 212 Mass. 583; 99 N. E. 523, or to make other disposition of the land. Wright v. Walcott, 238 Mass. 432; 131 N. E. 29; see Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 245; compare East Chicago Co. v. East Chicago, 171 Ind. 654; 87 N. E. 17; Whitney v. New York, supra; Eldridge v. Binghamton, 120 N. Y. 309; 24 N. E. 462. The abutting owner cannot complain; the damage suffered by him "though greater in degree than that of the rest of the public, is the same in kind." See United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333, 339.

A different question is presented in the cases relied on by the court below which indicate that a dedication of land to the public, by an individual, or a conveyance to a municipality, to be used as a park, is subject to a condition or imposes a trust that the use be continued, breach of which may be restrained. Douglass v. Montgomery, 118 Ala. 599; 24 So. 745; cf. Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 431; Sheffield & Tuscumbia Street Ry. Co. v. Rand, 83 Ala. 294; 3 So. 686; see also, Riverside v. MacLain, 210 Ill. 308; 71 N. E. 408; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 361; 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.), § 1102. There, rights in the land or against the municipality were said to have been reserved in the grantor or created in the owners of neighboring land by the terms of the grant.

Equally distinguishable are the decisions which likewise deal with the authority of a municipality, not the power of the legislature, to divert park lands from park uses, but in which the lands were acquired by unrestricted purchase or by eminent domain. See 3 Dillon, supra, §§ 991, 1023,

Second. The fact that lands, including those now owned by respondents, were assessed for benefits, as directed by the Rock Creek Park Act, leads to no different conclusion. Respondents urge that the special benefits required to be assessed included those accruing from the perpetual maintenance of the park; that by virtue of the assessment they have paid for the right to enjoy those benefits in perpetuity. We may assume that the landowners acquired rights commensurate with the assessments authorized. But the statute does not purport to place restrictions on the park lands in their favor, and the decision of this Court sustaining the constitutionality of the assessment provision (Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U. S. 611), gives no hint that among the benefits for which they were required to pay was a right against the government to have the lands forever used as a park.

All that the statute says is that the lands acquired shall be perpetually dedicated as a park for the enjoyment of the people of the United States (§ 1) and that benefits shall be assessed (§ 6). Statutes said to restrict the power of government by the creation of private rights are, like other public grants, to be strictly construed for the protection of the public interest. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 544-548; Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 33; Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U. S. 429. Thus construed, the dedication of the park, a declaration of a present purpose, does not imply a promise to neighboring land-owners that the park would be continued in perpetuity. Cf. Newton v. Commissioners, supra. The benefit of a governmental obligation which the statute neither expresses nor implies obviously was not to be assessed.

We think that the benefits intended must be taken to be those obvious advantages which would accrue to lands in the vicinity of a park, because of their location, and

Opinion of the Court.

287 U.S.

which would be reflected in their market value, even though there were no guaranty that the park would be continued for any particular length of time. See Wilson v. Lambert, supra, 617; cf. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commn., 283 U. S. 291, 296; Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57, 64. So it was held in Thayer v. Boston, 206 Fed. 969, where contentions very similar to those made here were rejected. See also Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, supra, 245. The same result has been reached with regard to the assessment of benefits arising from other types of public improvements, Whitney v. New York, supra, 246; Chicago v. Union Building Assn., 102 Ill. 379, 397; Kean v. Elizabeth, 54 N. J. L. 462; 24 Atl. 495, affirmed 55 N. J. L. 337; 26 Atl. 939; see Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 429, 430; 89 N. E. 124; 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (2d ed.), § 116, and is implicit in the statement, frequently made, that such assessments are an exercise of the taxing power. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 588; Wilson v. Lambert, supra, 614; Memphis & Charleston Ry. v. Pace, 282 U. S. 241, 245.

'As originally introduced and reported, the bill authorizing and establishing the park (S. No. 4, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.) had no provision for the assessment of benefited property. 21 Cong. Rec. 96, 353, 902, 1109, 2371, 2578-90. Such a method of financing was suggested by Representative Payson, ibid. 2580, who offered an amendment embodying this plan, ibid. 3939, which, after conference, was adopted, in substance, as § 6. See ibid. 3952-3, 5300-3, 5673, 5902-3, 5988, 6163, 10417-9, 10457-8, 10441-4. In explaining the assessment provision on the floor, Mr. Payson said: "Suppose that a man owns a piece of property, distant, we will suppose, a quarter of a mile from the park and that piece of property is worth today $1,000. Now, if by reason of the expenditure made by the Government in this great public improvement this man's property should become, in the judgment of the commission, worth $2,000, the direct benefit thus arising to the property would be assessed against it to assist in paying for the proposed improvement." Ibid. 3940,

315

Opinion of the Court.

The possibility that the United States might, at some later date, rightfully exercise its power to change the use of the park lands, so far as it affected present value, was a proper subject for consideration in valuing the benefits conferred. Cf. United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411; Sears v. Street Commissioners, 180 Mass. 274, 282; 62 N. E. 397; Whitney v. New York, supra; 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, supra.

Property was not taken without just compensation by either the Rock Creek Park Act or the statute authorizing the construction of the fire house. The only taking occurred when the lands were condemned for the park. Just compensation, the value at that time, Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 337; United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 344, was awarded if the benefits resulting from the proximity of the improvement, valued as the Act prescribed, were, as respondents assert, set off against the value of the property taken from the same owners. Bauman v. Ross, supra; Whitney v. New York, supra; Eldridge v. Binghamton, supra; see Matter of City of New York, 190 N. Y. 350, 357, 360; 83 N. E. 299.

We note, but do not discuss at length, the objection that the statute authorizing the construction of the fire house is invalid because inconsistent with regulations under the Zoning Act for the District (41 Stat. 500), setting apart the area in the vicinity of the park for residential properties of the highest class. It is enough to say that the zoning regulations are not contracts by the government and may be modified by Congress. The record and briefs disclose no facts which require us to consider how far the exercise of the power to modify may be subject to constitutional limitations.

Reversed.

ELTING, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, v. NORTH GERMAN LLOYD.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 42. Argued November 10, 11, 1932.-Decided December 5, 1932. 1. Section 6 of the Quota Act, as amended, imposing penalties for bringing to the United States any alien not admissible under the terms of the Act, applies to all aliens who are not within the quota or one of the excepted classes, whether seeking admission as immigrants or not. P. 327.

2. A penalty under the section may legally be imposed upon a transportation company for bringing to the United States an alien who upon arrival is found to be inadmissible, although the statute imposes no penalty, other than possible exclusion, upon the alien for coming here to present evidence in support of his right to enter. P. 327.

3. The Secretary did not abuse his discretion in refusing to remit a fine for bringing an inadmissible alien to the United States, where he gave the carrier a hearing and acted on substantial evidence tending to show that, by the exercise of reasonable diligence in making inquiry of the alien before sailing, it could have ascertained that the alien was not entitled to admission as a member of an excepted class. P. 328.

4. The transportation, company was bound to know the law that a consular visa on the alien's passport, noting that he was going to the United States "on business," did not of itself entitle the alien to entry as a member of that excepted class. P. 329.

54 F. (2d) 997, reversed.

CERTIORARI, 286 U. S. 538, to review a judgment affirming a judgment against the Collector in a suit brought by the steamship company to recover a fine imposed on it under the Quota Act.

Assistant Attorney General Rugg, with whom Solicitor General Thacher and Messrs. Paul D. Miller, W. S. Ward, and Bradley B. Gilman were on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. Melville J. France for respondent.