Regulation, Federalism, and Interstate CommerceOelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981 - 167 sider |
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Side 80
... costs ; other- wise the individuals would not be maximizing . Typically , an ineffi- ciency is said to arise because there are positive transactions costs , but as soon as we recognize that these are real costs , the alleged ...
... costs ; other- wise the individuals would not be maximizing . Typically , an ineffi- ciency is said to arise because there are positive transactions costs , but as soon as we recognize that these are real costs , the alleged ...
Side 137
... costs not on you ( or the factories in your state ) but on someone else : you get the benefit and someone else pays the cost , and there is no effective mechanism to bring that back to haunt you . Cooperation among states may be a ...
... costs not on you ( or the factories in your state ) but on someone else : you get the benefit and someone else pays the cost , and there is no effective mechanism to bring that back to haunt you . Cooperation among states may be a ...
Side 149
... costs . That is not at all what I was saying . What I was saying is that once you have posi- tive transactions costs , you get a different world than this general equilibrium system that we economists are used to talking about . We ...
... costs . That is not at all what I was saying . What I was saying is that once you have posi- tive transactions costs , you get a different world than this general equilibrium system that we economists are used to talking about . We ...
Innhold
IntroductionA Dan Tarlock | 3 |
Why Has Federal Power Increased at the Expense | 5 |
Regulation and the American Common | 9 |
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agencies American common market argued argument Articles of Confederation authority Bank barriers Carolina central Commerce Clause doctrine Commission common market competition conflict Congress constitutional law corporations Court held decentralized decisions discrimination duties economic effect efficiency example federal government federal level federal power federal regulation federal system Federalist foreign free rider problem free trade George Stigler Gibbons going Graglia important impose incentives interest group internal trade interstate commerce Interstate Compact issues Jersey judicial jurisdiction Justice Kitch Kitch's paper lawyers legislature limited Marshall Maryland ment merce Murray Weidenbaum national market negative Commerce Clause Pennsylvania period political problem prohibit protectionism public choice Public choice theory question Railroad rates regulatory restrictions result role Sam Peltzman Shreveport Rate South Carolina standards statute substantive due process Supreme Court Taney tariff Texas theory tion transactions costs uniform United Weidenbaum York