Regulation, Federalism, and Interstate CommerceOelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981 - 167 sider |
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Side 12
... jurisdictions for laws , practices , and procedures that people prefer . Second , the scope of governmental jurisdiction should be large enough so that the jurisdiction's decisions do not produce important externalities and allow ...
... jurisdictions for laws , practices , and procedures that people prefer . Second , the scope of governmental jurisdiction should be large enough so that the jurisdiction's decisions do not produce important externalities and allow ...
Side 31
... jurisdiction ( unless , of course , the regulation is contrary to federal statute ) as long as its taxation or regulation does not discriminate between commerce wholly within that state and commerce between the state and other states ...
... jurisdiction ( unless , of course , the regulation is contrary to federal statute ) as long as its taxation or regulation does not discriminate between commerce wholly within that state and commerce between the state and other states ...
Side 43
... jurisdiction by the federal government in various commercial areas . The federal government assumed jurisdiction over interstate trucking in 1932 and pursued policies designed to substantially restrict competition . The federal ...
... jurisdiction by the federal government in various commercial areas . The federal government assumed jurisdiction over interstate trucking in 1932 and pursued policies designed to substantially restrict competition . The federal ...
Innhold
IntroductionA Dan Tarlock | 3 |
Why Has Federal Power Increased at the Expense | 5 |
Regulation and the American Common | 9 |
Opphavsrett | |
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agencies American common market argued argument Articles of Confederation authority Bank barriers Carolina central Commerce Clause doctrine Commission common market competition conflict Congress constitutional law corporations Court held decentralized decisions discrimination duties economic effect efficiency example federal government federal level federal power federal regulation federal system Federalist foreign free rider problem free trade George Stigler Gibbons going Graglia important impose incentives interest group internal trade interstate commerce Interstate Compact issues Jersey judicial jurisdiction Justice Kitch Kitch's paper lawyers legislature limited Marshall Maryland ment merce Murray Weidenbaum national market negative Commerce Clause Pennsylvania period political problem prohibit protectionism public choice Public choice theory question Railroad rates regulatory restrictions result role Sam Peltzman Shreveport Rate South Carolina standards statute substantive due process Supreme Court Taney tariff Texas theory tion transactions costs uniform United Weidenbaum York