Regulation, Federalism, and Interstate CommerceOelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981 - 167 sider |
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Side 70
... less openly " balancing " the " national interest " and the " local interest . " While this may produce opinions a little less intellectually offensive , it is , in my view , even more objectionable than the " mechanical " approach in ...
... less openly " balancing " the " national interest " and the " local interest . " While this may produce opinions a little less intellectually offensive , it is , in my view , even more objectionable than the " mechanical " approach in ...
Side 72
... less inclined to substitute its policy judgments for those of the states , but , unlike Kitch , I dread to see the ... less governed to some tiny degree according to the views of Justice Brennan - or that the Court will interfere less ...
... less inclined to substitute its policy judgments for those of the states , but , unlike Kitch , I dread to see the ... less governed to some tiny degree according to the views of Justice Brennan - or that the Court will interfere less ...
Side 157
... less regulation . But , the first half of Kitch's paper actually suggests the opposite result . It suggests that an active Supreme Court would result in more free trade , not less . The theory would go as follows : When will states pass ...
... less regulation . But , the first half of Kitch's paper actually suggests the opposite result . It suggests that an active Supreme Court would result in more free trade , not less . The theory would go as follows : When will states pass ...
Innhold
IntroductionA Dan Tarlock | 3 |
Why Has Federal Power Increased at the Expense | 5 |
Regulation and the American Common | 9 |
Opphavsrett | |
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agencies American common market argued argument Articles of Confederation authority Bank barriers Carolina central Commerce Clause doctrine Commission common market competition conflict Congress constitutional law corporations Court held decentralized decisions discrimination duties economic effect efficiency example federal government federal level federal power federal regulation federal system Federalist foreign free rider problem free trade George Stigler Gibbons going Graglia important impose incentives interest group internal trade interstate commerce Interstate Compact issues Jersey judicial jurisdiction Justice Kitch Kitch's paper lawyers legislature limited Marshall Maryland ment merce Murray Weidenbaum national market negative Commerce Clause Pennsylvania period political problem prohibit protectionism public choice Public choice theory question Railroad rates regulatory restrictions result role Sam Peltzman Shreveport Rate South Carolina standards statute substantive due process Supreme Court Taney tariff Texas theory tion transactions costs uniform United Weidenbaum York