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An act conferring a franchise on a railroad company must be construed favorably to the public, and all reasonable doubts must be resolved against the company.- Brooklyn & R. B. R. Co. v. L. I. R. Co., 72 App. Div. (N. Y.) 496, 76 N. Y. Supp. 777.

A transfer statute, even though it imposes penalties, should be construed against the company and favorably to the right of the public to receive a transfer.- O'Reilly v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 95 App. Div. (N. Y.) 253, 89 N. Y. Supp. 41.

A public service corporation will not be sustained in a claim of exclusive privilege unless such claim is explicitly sustained by the terms of its grant.- Hudson R. Tel. Co. v. Watervliet T. & R. Co., 56 Hun (N. Y.), 67, 9 N. Y. Supp. 177.

In interpreting the charter of a corporation, the sovereignty of the state to regulate, tax or license, will never be reduced by implication.— St. Louis v. Boatmen's I. & T. Co., 47 Mo. 150.

[31] Matters which may be considered in construing statutes.

In clearing up any doubtful point in a regulative statute, the title is of value as an aid to construction, and the consequences to the public will be considered, in order to give it a beneficial construction, but not when the legislative intent is clear.- Hines v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 95 N. C. 434.

[31a] Construction of statutes declaratory of common law.

When a statute is merely declarative of the common law, it should be construed in accordance with the common law rule.- Cumberland T. & T. Co. v. Kelly, 160 Fed. 316.

[32] Purpose of acts regulating railroads.

The purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act is to promote and facilitate commerce, and commission and courts must consider this, in applying it.- Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 666, revg. s. c. 57 Fed. 948, affg. s. c. 52 Fed. 187.

The Interstate Commerce Act was not designed to prevent competition among railroads, but to encourage it.- Interst. Com. Commission v. Ch. G. W. R. Co., 141 Fed. 1003.

The purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act is to promote and facilitate trade and commerce, and it must be so interpreted.Interst. Com. Commission v. Ala. Midl. R. Co., 74 Fed. 715, affg. s. c. 69 Fed. 227; affd., 168 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 45.

The purpose of the provisions of the N. Y. Railroad Law as to reasonable charges, accommodations, etc., is to secure a reasonable degree of equity in the business of railways, and to require them to afford the use of their facilities to all who may have occasion for their employment, and without any unjust or unreasonable discrimination as to the terms of compensation.- People ex rel. Ohlen v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 22 Hun (N. Y.), 533.

[33] Effect of previous holdings and constructions.

If a state statute as construed by its highest court is not in conflict with the U. S. Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States is bound by that construction.- People ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 714.

The construction placed upon the Interstate Commerce Act by the Interstate Commerce Commission which has long obtained and which has been impliedly sanctioned by the subsequent re-enactments of the statute without alteration, must be treated, when not obviously erroneous, as read into the statute and having binding force on the commission and on the courts. However, the binding force of such construction on the court will be restricted to the precise conditions passed upon and not broadened.- New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 272.

The federal courts cannot review the construction put upon a state statute by the state courts. They can only ascertain whether such statute, as construed by the courts of the state that enacted it, is a violation of rights protected by the federal Constitution.- Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650. 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 214, affg. s. c. 33 Fla. 162, 14 So. 588, 25 L. R. A. 120.

Upon a revision of statutes, when provisions from existing or previous statutes, English or American, are embodied in the new, the known and settled construction of those acts is to be regarded as having been intended to be silently incorporated into the new act, and a different interpretation is not to be given to them without some substantial change of phraseology other than what may have been necessary to abbreviate the form of law.- McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 4 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 142.

When the substantial provisions of a previous statute have been incorporated into a new statute, the construction thereof will not be held changed by such alterations as are merely designed to render the provisions more precise.- McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 4 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 142; Taylor v. Delancey, 2 Caines' Cas. (N. Y.) 143; Moers v. Bunker, 29 N. H. 421.

The English cases are valuable in defining what constitutes undue preference or prejudice, but their value is greatly limited in cases where

the statute itself defines the offense it declares unlawful.- Railroad Commission of Ga. v. Clyde Ss. Co., 4 Inters. Com. R. 120, 5 I. C. C. R. 324.

The frequent citation of English decisions in cases affecting interstate transportation is with manifest disregard of vast differences in facts, time, extent of country, methods of trade and transportation, and language of statutory provisions.- Railroad Commission of Ga. v. Clyde Ss. Co., 4 Inters. Com. R. 120, 5 I. C. C. R. 324.

The construction of the statutes of this State by its Supreme Court should be followed by a justice sitting at Special Term, rather than that of a foreign tribunal of similar jurisdiction.— Matter of Interborough-Metropolitan Co., 56 Misc. 128.

No principle of comity requires the courts of one state to place the same construction upon an act of Congress, with reference to its effect upon a contract for an interstate shipment, as given to it by the decisions of the Supreme Court of another state in which the contract was made.-Southern R. Co. v. Harrison, 119 Ala. 539, 24 So. 552, 43 L. R. A.

385.

The practical construction of statutes by executive and legislative officers is entitled to great weight in determining the judicial interpretation of the same.- - Nye v. Foreman, 215 Пl. 285, 74 N. E. 140.

The state board of railroad commissioners had construed a "carload" of cordwood, under the Missouri statute, to be ten tons, rather than all the cars could safely or conveniently carry.-Held, that where the administrative officers charged with enforcing and applying a law have put upon it an interpretation which has been acted upon by them and by the public long enough to make it a virtual rule of the department, it will not be disturbed unless plainly against the law.— Ross v. K. C. St. J. & C. B. R. Co., 111 Mo. 18, 19 S. W. 541.

[34] Reasonable and practical construction.

The doctrine of practical construction of a statute has no application in case of a statute free from ambiguity and not subject to any reasonable doubt as to the meaning of its provisions.- People ex rel. W. S. El. Co. v. C. T. & E. S. Co., 187 N. Y. 58, 79 N. E. 892.

A reasonable construction of a statute should be adopted in all cases where there is doubt and uncertainty in regard to the intention of the lawmakers.- Topham v. Interurban St. R. Co., 96 App. Div. (N. Y.) 323, 89 N. Y. Supp. 298, revg. s. c. 42 Misc. (N. Y.) 503, 86 N. Y. Supp. 295.

[35] Statutes construed as penal.

Statutes allowing attorneys' fees to successful litigants in actions against carriers penal in nature,- see post, § 40, note [3]. Statutes allowing punitive damages are penal,- see post, § 40, note [4].

A statute declaring certain acts to be unlawful, if done by a common carrier, and allowing a person injured by the doing of any of them treble damages, has for its purpose punishment, not indemnity.Langdon v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 58 Hun (N. Y.), 122, 11 N. Y. Supp. 514, affg. s. c. 9 N. Y. Supp. 245.

A statute regulating telegraph companies, though penal to an offender, is generally beneficial, and should be equitably construed.U. S. Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 46.

A statute regulating common carriers, by prohibiting combinations to prevent continuous shipments, on pain of treble damages, is penal, not remedial, and must be strictly construed.— Clark v. Am. Exp. Co., 130 Iowa, 254, 106 N. W. 642.

A statute providing penalties for "extortion or unjust discrimination" is penal, and hence must be strictly construed.- Bond v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 67 Iowa, 712, 25 N. W. 892.

A statute authorizing recovery of a forfeiture from a railroad for its failure to furnish cars, must be construed as highly penal.— Houston &T. C. R. Co. v. Buchanan, 15 Tex. Ct. R. 521, 94 S. W. 199; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Hughes, 14 Tex. Ct. R. 894, 91 S. W. 567. A statute regulating the speed of trains and imposing penalties for violations of its provisions is a penal statute which should be construed strictly.-State v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., Wis. 113 N. W. 952.

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[36] Strict or liberal construction of statutes containing penal

provisions.

Proviso clause of statute relative to giving of passes to be strictly

construed, see post, § 33, note [14].

Statutes prescribing penalties for failure to furnish cars to be strictly construed,- see post, § 37, note [14].

Statutes in derogation of the common law, aiming at the safety and convenience of the travelling public and railway employees, are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of Congress as found in the language actually used according to its true and obvious meaning.-Johnson v. So. Pac. R. Co., 196 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 158.

The federal Act of 1906 as to safety appliances, employers' liability, etc., is remedial, not penal, and would therefore not only permit, but if necessary to sustain its validity, require, a liberal and favorable construction. Kelley v. Gt. Northern R. Co., 152 Fed. 211.

The Interstate Commerce Act should be as liberally construed in favor of commerce among the states as its language will permit; but, when complaint is made or relief is sought solely or mainly in the interest of the common carriers engaged in the transportation of such commerce the act complained of or the right asserted should not rest upon doubtful construction, but should clearly appear to have been forbidden or conferred.- Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. L. S. W. R. Co., 63 Fed. 775, 26 L. R. A. 192, affg. 59 Fed. 400.

The Interstate Commerce Act should be as liberally construed in favor of commerce among the states as its language will permit.Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 37 Fed. 567, 2 L. R. A. 289.

The Interstate Commerce Act, being highly remedial in purpose, should be liberally construed. In re The Express Companies, 1 Inters. Com. R. 22, 317, 355, 448, 451, 456, 677, 1 I. C. C. R. 349.

A statute which is penal in its nature should be strictly construed.Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 419; Schloss v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 85 Tex. 601, 22 S. W. 1014.

A statute for the public benefit may be equitably and beneficially construed, even though it is penal as to some persons.- Sickles v. Sharp, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 498.

The Nebraska Act providing for a board of transportation and giving such board power to regulate the business of railroads, is remedial in its nature and is not subject to strict construction.— State v. Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co., 22 Neb. 313, 35 N. W. 118.

The rule requiring the strict construction of a penal statute does not authorize the construing of everything to defeat an action brought under the statute.- Bartolett v. Achey, 38 Pa. 273.

A transportation statute which imposes penalties or forfeitures for violation of its provisions must be construed strictly.- Hall v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 36, 28 S. E. 754, 41 L. R. A. 669.

[37] Doubts to be resolved in favor of party of whom penalty is claimed.

Exception in case of transfer statutes,- see ante, note [30].

Where there is a reasonable doubt as to the construction of a statute prescribing a penalty for its violation, the party of whom the penalty is claimed is entitled to the benefit of it.- Goodspeed v. Ithaca St.

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