Vol. 6, p. 334), disallowing the claim of the Commonwealth Title, Insurance and Trust Co., aforesaid, after the same had been approved by this Department, your office held that the application of the Valley Land and Irrigation Company must be denied. The said company has now appealed here.

From authenticated papers filed in this case it appears that on July 25, 1883, Pramheis and wife executed a mortgage, which was duly recorded, on the land in question in favor of John W. Smith, trustee of the Valley Land and Irrigation Company, to secure the sum of $450. $200 of which was paid as the purchase price of said land; that upon application of the Valley Land and Irrigation Company the mortgage was foreclosed and the land sold by the sheriff of Spink county, South Dakota, on July 9, 1892, the said company becoming the purchaser; and that on August 2, 1893, after the expiration of the period of right of redemption, the land was conveyed by sheriff's deed to the company.

The facts of this case clearly bring it within the ruling announced in the cases of California Mortgage, Loan and Trust Co., and the Commonwealth Title, Insurance and Trust Co., supra. In the last mentioned case the Auditor for the Interior Department concurred with the conclusion reached therein and recommended repay ment, but this action, as stated, was disapproved by the Comptroller of the Treasury, who in effect holds that a mortgage is simply the security for a debt and not a conveyance of title, and that a mortgagee who purchased the land under foreclosure proceedings initiated after the cancellation of the entry is not an assignee within the meaning of the act of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat., 287). This matter was fully discussed in the cases referred to, and upon examination of the Comptroller's decision no sufficient reason, in the opinion of this Department, is presented for changing the ruling made in those cases. Believing as it does, for the reasons stated in the cases referred to, that the ruling therein is proper, this Department is unable to agree with the views expressed by the Comptroller and is therefore unwilling to recede from said ruling. Under that ruling the Department is of opinion that the Valley Land and Irrigation Company is an assignee within the meaning of said act, and as such entitled to repayment.

The decision of your office is reversed, the claim of the Valley Land and Irrigation Company for repayment of the purchase money paid by Pramheis is approved, and the same will be forwarded to the Treasury Department for payment.

MINING CLAIM-DEPUTY MINERAL SURVEYOR - EMPLOYE OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE.

W. H. LEFFINGWELL.

A deputy mineral surveyor who has no interest, real or contingent, in a mining claim at the date of the survey thereof by him, nor at the date of the application for patent thereto, but who subsequently makes entry thereof, does not come within the spirit of section 452 of the Revised Statutes, prohibiting employes of the General Land Office from "purchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of the public land."

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (W. V. D.) July 9, 1900.

(G. B. G.) W. H. Leffingwell has filed a motion for review of departmental decision of September 9, 1899 (unreported), which affirmed the decision of your office holding for cancellation mineral entry, No. 1573, for the Lucky Jack, Carlo, Maud S. and Mable S. lode claims, situated in the Pueblo land district, Colorado.

This entry was made by the said Leffingweil December 31, 1897, he being, at the date of the location of the claims, at the date of the surveys thereof, and at the date of the application for patent, a deputy mineral surveyor, being the surveyor who surveyed the claims, but it affirmatively appears that he was not and did not contemplate becoming interested in the claims until after the surveys thereof had been made and approved by the surveyor-general.

The decision of your office and the decision of the Department in affirmance thereof are put upon the ground that a deputy mineral surveyor is disqualified from making an entry of mineral lands by reason of section 452 of the Revised Statutes which provides that:

The officers, clerks, and employes in the General Land-Office are prohibited from directly or indirectly purchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of any of the public land; and any person who violates this section shall forthwith be removed from his office.

And by reason of the circular of September 15, 1890 (11 L. D., 348), based upon said section, which provides that:

all officers, clerks, and employes in the offices of the surveyor-general, the local land offices, and the General Land Office, or any persons, wherever located, employed under the supervision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, are, during such employment, prohibited from entering, or becoming interested, directly or indirectly, in any of the public lands of the United States.

Without at the present time considering the correctness of the conclusion arrived at in the case of Floyd et al. . Montgomery et al. (26 L. D., 122, 136) and similar cases, in so far as it was therein held that the prohibitive provisions of said section embrace a deputy mineral surveyor, it is sufficient to say that the facts in this case, as disclosed by the record, are materially different from those stated in the cases referred to.

Independently of the statute it would be within the power of the land department in making regulations for the survey of mining claims to provide against the survey thereof by one interested in the claim, the reason therefor being manifest. In the case under consideration Leffingwell had no interest, real or contingent, in the claims involved at the date of the survey thereof by him, or at the date of the application for patent thereto, and under these circumstances it is not believed that he is within the spirit of the statute or circular above quoted.

Departmental decision of September 9, 1899, is hereby vacated, and your office will pass this entry to patent, unless other objection appears.

ABANDONED MILITARY RESERVATION-ACT OF MAY 28, 1896.

SNYDER. STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA.

The purpose of the second proviso to the act of May 28, 1896, was to validate and protect homestead and pre-emption claims upon lands in the Fort Sully abandoned military reservation initiated by settlement prior to the date of its passage, and to this extent said act supersedes the general act of July 5, 1884, as to the disposition of lands in said reservation.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (W. V. D.) July 9, 1900. (W. M. W.)

Robert M. Snyder has appealed from your office decision of February 2, 1900, affirming the action of the local office rejecting his application to make homestead entry for the W. of the NE. and the NE. 4 of the SE. 4 of W., Pierre, South Dakota, land district.

of the NE. 4, the SE. I Sec. 20, T. 113 N., R. 81

The land applied for is situated within the boundaries of the Fort Sully military reservation which was established by executive order of December 10, 1869, and modified by a similar order of January 17, 1877. The lands embraced in said reservation were placed under the control of the Interior Department November 5. 1894, for disposition under the provisions of the act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 103). The survey of the township in which the land here involved is situated was accepted by your office March 14, 1899.

The local officers gave notice that the lands embraced within said abandoned reservation would be opened to entry May 15, 1899, at 10 o'clock, A. M. At the time thus fixed Snyder filed his application to enter the land in question under the homestead law, alleging his qualification to make homestead entry, and further--

That prior to the 19th day of March, 1896, I placed a house and other improvements on said land and settled upon the same and established my residence in said house thereon prior to said date and have since continued to reside on and improve

said land all for the purpose of entering the same under the homestead laws of the United States.

That prior to and on the 28th day of May, 1896, I was a bona fide homestead settler on said land and have since continued to be such.

The register and receiver rejected Snyder's application for the reason that he failed to show that he was "in the occupation of said land, or any portion of the Fort Sully military reservation prior to the location of such reservation, or that he had settled thereon prior to January 1, 1884. Snyder appealed, and February 2, 1900, your office affirmed the judgment of the local officers, and he appeals therefrom to the Department.

Snyder claims the right to make homestead entry for the land in question by virtue of the provisions of the act of May 28, 1896 (29) Stat.. 189), which provides:

That the lands situated in the Fort Sully military reservation, in the State of South Dakota, may be selected at any time within one year after the passage of this act, or the approval of the survey of said reservation by the Secretary of the Interior, by the State of South Dakota as a part of the lands granted to the State under the provisions of an act to provide for the admission of South Dakota into the Union, approved February twenty-second, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, and for indemnity school lands; and when said lands are selected as herein provided the Secretary of the Interior shall cause patents to be issued therefor to the State of South Dakota: Provided, That the State of South Dakota shall have a preference right over any person or corporation to select said lands subject to entry by said State, granted thereto by the act of Congress approved February twenty-second, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, for a period of sixty days after the foregoing lands have been surveyed and duly declared to be subject to selection and entry under the general land laws of the United States: Provided further, That such preference right shall not accrue against bona fide homestead or pre-emption settlers on any of said lands at the date of the

passage of this act.

The purpose of Congress in passing this act was to validate and protect homestead and pre-emption claims upon lands in said reservation initiated by settlement prior to the date of its passage, and to this extent the act of 1896 supersedes the general act of July 5, 1884, as to the lands embraced in this reservation.

Snyder makes a prima facie showing that he settled on the land applied for prior to the 28th day of May, 1896, and was at that time living upon said land, and that he continued to reside upon it up to the time he applied to enter it. Under the circumstances, his showing, in the absence of anything to the contrary, appears to be sufficient to bring his claim as a settler within the terms of the act of May, 1896.

It appears from your office decision that on the same day Snyder's application to enter was rejected, the State of South Dakota was permitted to select the tracts applied for by Snyder, among others, as school indemnity lands, in list No. 3, Pierre series. You will therefore order a hearing, after due notice to the State, in order to afford

Snyder an opportunity to establish his claim to a prior right of entry in this land by reason of settlement antedating May 28, 1896, and upon such evidence the case will be readjudicated in the light of the decision herein made. The decision of your office is accordingly reversed.

MINING RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN ALASKA-ACT OF JUNE 6, 1900.

CIRCULAR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

GENERAL LAND OFFICE, Washington, D. C., July 11, 1900.

The following provisions in the act of Congress approved June 6, 1900, entitled "An act making further provision for a civil government for Alaska, and for other purposes," relate to mining rights and mining claims in Alaska and are published for the guidance of the local officers in their administration of the law and for the information of those concerned.

ESTABLISHMENT OF RECORDING DISTRICTS BY THE JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT COURT.

SEC. 13. The judges of the district, or a majority of them, shall, as soon as practicable after their appointment, meet, and by appropriate order, to be thereafter entered in each division of the court, divide the district into three recording divisions, designate the division of the court to supervise each, and also define the boundaries thereof by reference to natural objects and permanent landmarks or monuments, in such manner that the boundaries of each recording division can be readily determined and become generally known from such description, which order shall be given publicity in such manner by posting, publication, or otherwise as the judges or any division of the court may direct, the necessary expense of the publication of such order and description of the recording divisions to be allowed and paid as other court expenses.

At any regular or special term an order may be made by the court establishing one or more recording districts within the recording division under the supervision of such division of the court and defining the boundaries thereof by reference to natural objects and permanent landmarks or monuments, in such manner that the boundaries thereof can be readily determined.

The order establishing a recording district shall designate a commissioner to be ex officio recorder thereof, and shall also designate the place where the commissioner shall keep his recording office within the recording district:

Provided, The clerk of the court shall be ex officio recorder of all that portion of the recording division under the supervision of his division of the court not embraced within the limits of a recording district established, bounded, and described therein as authorized by this act, and when any part of the division for which a clerk has been recording shall be embraced in a recording district, such clerk shall transcribe that portion of his records appertaining to such district and deliver the same to the commissioner designated as recorder thereof.

Whenever it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the public interests demand, or that the convenience of the people require, the court may change or