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must transfer the property to a trustee, or
declare that he holds it himself in trust.-
Young v. Young et al., 137.

4. In case of voluntary settlements or gifts, a
trust will not be implied where one was not
in fact contemplated.—Id.

5. Defendant purchased a mortgage made by
one B., relying upon B.'s sworn statement
that it was given for a full consideration, and
afterward sold it for the full sum secured by
it. In an action to establish a trust in favor
of B.'s assignees for the difference between
the face of the mortgage and the sum paid
for it by defendant, Held, That no trust could
be implied; that B.'s representation estopped
him from denying its truth.-Grissler et al. v.
Powers, 196.

6. Where a deposit is made in the savings bank
by a person in his or her name, as trustee for
another, it is a' complete and valid transfer
of the title to the fund.-Boone v. The Citi-
zens' Savings Bk., 208.

7. Where in an action by a judgment creditor
of the beneficiary a judgment is rendered
fixing the surplus income of a trust estate,
and directing the trustees to pay the debt
and costs out of such surplus, the trustees are
bound by the judgment, and if they disobey
its command become personally liable for
the debt.-Williams v. Thorn et al., 332.

8. D., S. & Co. gave their check on themselves
to plaintiffs for a sum due plaintiffs. These
checks were known as cashier's checks. By
general arrangement with the National Bank
of the State of New York, such checks were
cashed by said last named bank through the
clearing house. After the check in suit was
drawn, D., S. & Co. made a deposit of securi-
ties with said National Bank for the payment
of certain over-drafts of cashier's checks, of
which the check aforesaid was one. After
depositing such securities, D., S. & Co. made
a general assignment before the check in
suit had been paid. Held, That such securi-
ties deposited created an irrevocable trust
for the benefit of the holders of the checks,
and that the holders of such checks were
entitled to payment from such securities in
preference to the general creditors of D., S.
& Co.-Watts v. Shipman et al., 360.
See FACTORS.

TURNPIKE COMPANIES.

See NEGLIGENCE, 32, 33.

UNDERTAKING.

See APPEAL, 30, 31; REPLEVIN, 5.

USAGE.

1. Proof of usage will not make a contract where
the parties have made none, and it can only
be admitted to interpret the meaning of the
language employed.-The Nat. Savings Bk. of
D. C. v. Ward, 330.

2. Proof of a custom which is general is not ob-
jectionable when there is nothing in the con-
tract to exclude its application. Parties are
presumed to contract in reference to a gen-
eral usage or custom which prevails in the
particular trade or business to which the
contract relates.-Fuller et al. v. Robinson,
487.

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2.

USURY.

Defendants' intestate being indebted to plain-
tiff, procured a loan from him, on mortgage,
nothing being said about the rate of interest.
A statement of the indebtedness, a receipted
attorney's bill and a check for the balance
were handed to intestate as covering the
loan. He objected to an item in the attor-
ney's bill of $150 for commissions in procur-
ing the loan, and plaintiff said it was all
right; that he could not do any better,
Held, That while intestate was deprived of
the $150 by false pretence, it was not done
by virtue of any agreement, and therefore,
there could be no usury.-Guggenheimer v.
Geiszler et al., 287.

It is enough that the facts making out usury
are stated with sufficient certainty in the
pleading to enable the other party to know
what he would be called upon to meet.-
Leon v. Bernheimer, 288.

3. Defendants applied to certain brokers for a
loan on mortgage, agreeing to pay them 12
per cent. for procuring it. One B agreed to
make the loan, and left with one O, his at-
torney, checks signed in blank. O filled up
the checks during B.'s absence, one of which
was for the 12 per cent.; this was endorsed
by defendants and handed to the brokers
who transferred it to O, and the latter re-
tained all but a small commission which he
paid the brokers. No portion of this sum
was received by B or the estate he repre-
sented. Held, That this did not constitute
usury.-Van Wyck et al. v. Walters et al.,

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7. If a contract is usurious it is absolutely void,
and no agreement between the parties can
give it vitality; the taint of usury perme-
ates all transactions based upon it, and all
are void alike.-Maybee et al. v. Crozier,
524.

8. Where an answer sets up usury in that notes
were discounted at a rate of from ten to
fourteen per cent. per annum, evidence that
the rate of discount was sixteen per cent.
is properly excluded.-The Farmers' &
Mech. Nat. Bk. of Buffalo v. Lang, 574.

9. A claim for a penalty under sec. 5198, U. S.
Rev. Stats., for payment of excessive interest
can be enforced only by action brought espe-
cially for that purpose, and cannot be set up
as a counterclaim in an action upon evidence
of debt. Id.

See MORTGAGE, 13; NATIONAL BANKS, 6.

VENUE.

See PRACTICE, 31.

VERDICT.

See PRACTICE, 8, 19, 20.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS.

WARRANTY.

1. There is no implied warranty on the part of

the vendor of a bill valid in the hands of the
indorser that it is drawn against funds or
that it is not accommodation paper.-The
People's Bk. v. Bogart et al., 307.

2. Defendants' intestate having an agreement
with A & B, by which they were to share
equally with him in the profits of the busi-
ness carried on by him, made an agreement
with C&D, by which he sold them each a
quarter interest therein. In an action by C,
Held, That intestate was liable for breach of
his contract of warranty of title the differ-
ence between what C acquired by his pur-
chase and that which he purchased.-Con-
verse v. Miner et al., 424.

See EVIDENCE, 16; LIFE INSURANCE, 5.

WATERCOURSES.

1. The right of an owner of lands through
which a watercourse runs to have the same
kept open, and to discharge therein the sur-
face water, is not limited to the drainage and
discharge of surface water into the stream
in the same precise manner as when the land
was unimproved and uncultivated.-McCor-
mick et al. v. Horan, 231.

1. A court of equity cannot be called upon to
dissolve a voluntary association until all the 2.
remedies given by the constitution and by-
laws for the redress of the evils complained
of have been exhausted.-Lafond et al. v.
Deems et al., 463.

2. Voluntary associations, organized for the
mutual benefit of its members, should not be
dissolved for slight causes, and if at all, only
when it is entirely apparent that the organ-
ization has ceased to answer the ends of its
existence and no other mode of relief is at-
tainable.-Id.

3. The members of such an association are not
co-partners.-Id.

4. The rent of rooms not used by the association,
but which they were compelled to hire, with
fines and initiation fees, had accumulated so
as to form a large fund, but not so large as
to be beyond the reasonable wants of the as-
sociation. Held, That there was no such ac-
cumulation of funds as called for a dissolu-
tion of the association.-Id.

WAIVER.

See APPEAL, 5, 33; CONTRACT, 18; FIRE INsur-
ANCE, 5, 10; GUARDIAN, 4; LIEN; LIFE IN-
SURANCE, 3, 4, 10, 11; REFEREE.

WAREHOUSEMEN.

1. A warehouseman is only bound to use ordi-
nary diligence in caring for and protecting
the property, but if, when demanded, it is
gone, he is bound to show that it has dis-
appeared without his fault.-Golden v. Romer
et al., 5.

Such an owner may change and control the
natural flow of the surface water, and by
ditches, or otherwise, accelerate the flow or
increase the volume of water, and if he does
so in the reasonable use of his premises, and
does not discharge surface water into the
stream in quantities beyond its natural ca-
pacity, to the damage of the other owners,
he exercises only a legal right.-Id.

WHARFAGE.

1. A municipal corporation owning improved
wharves and other artificial means, which it
has provided and maintains at its own cost
for the benefit of those engaged in commerce
upon the public navigable waters of the
United States, is not prohibited by the
national constitution from charging and col-
lecting from those using the wharves and
facilities such reasonable fees as will fairly
remunerate it for the use of its property.-
The Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. The
City of St. Louis, 521.

2. No state can, consistently with the National
Constitution, impose upon the products of
other States, brought therein for sale or use,
or upon citizens because engaged in the
sale therein, or the transportation thereto,
of the products of other states, more
onerous public burdens or taxes than it im-
poses upon the like products of its own
territory.-Guy v. The Mayor of Baltimore,

547.

3. A state statute or municipal ordinance, in
pursuance of which vessels, landing at the
public wharves of a city, laden with the pro-

ducts of other states, are required to pay
wharfage fees which are not exacted from
vessels landing thereat with the products of
the state, is in conflict with the National
Constitution.-Id.

WILLS.

1. Testator by his will gave to his wife the use
of all his real and personal property for life;
the income of the estate was given to his
four daughters to be divided equally among
them during their lives, with remainder to
their respective children, heirs and assigns.
The will also provided that in case of the
death of either of the daughters without
issue, her share should be divided equally
among the survivors and to their children |
respectively. Held, That there was no illegal
suspension of the power of alienation; that
the bequest to the daughters of the income
for life was equivalent to a devise of a life
estate in the land; that the remainder vested
on the death of testator in the children of
the daughters then living, subject to open
and let in afterborn children.- Monarque v.
Monarque et al., 118.

2. Testator by his will bequeathed to his wife
one-third of all his property real and per-
sonal, and the control of his farm as long as
she remained a widow, and at her death
directed all his property to be equally divided
between his children. Held, That the widow
took an absolute fee in one-third of the prop-
erty mentioned and the use of the whole
during widowhood.-Roseboom v. Roseboom
et al., 309.

3. Testator by his will bequeathed $50,000 to
his daughter A., and the same amount to
"the children of I.," a deceased daughter:
and after other bequests, he directed the re-
mainder of his estate to be divided between

A., the children of I., the son of another de-
ceased daughter, and his sons. Held, That
the residuary legatees took per stirpes and
not per capita.—Ferrer et al. v. Pyne et al.,
334.

4. Testator by his will bequeathed a sum of
money to
"the Presbyterian cemetery."
There was a cemetery known by that name,
but no corporation in the town known to the
law by that name. Held, That the bequest
must fail for want of a beneficiary capable of
taking, and that it was not such a charitable
bequest as the court could execute - The
First Presbyterian Soc. v. Bowen et al., 400.
5. An executor who drew the will is a compe-
tent witness to prove its execution.-Rugg et
al. v. Rugg et al., 401.

6.

7.

8.

Mere failure of memory on the part of the

witnesses will not defeat a will if the attesta-
tion clause and other circumstances are satis-
factory to prove its execution.-Id.

An alien devisee, upon acceptance of the de-
vise, takes a conditional title, absolute against
the heirs of the testator, but defeasible by
the state until he makes and files the depo-
sition required by statute; this he may do at
any time before the state recovers the lands,
upon paying the costs of any proceeding for
escheat which may have been instituted.-
Hall et al. v. Hall et al., 414.

Under chap. 115, Laws of 1845, where a de-
vise is made to aliens, and one of the devisees
files the requisite deposition, the estate vests
in such devisee.-Id.

See EVIDENCE, 3; TRUSTS, 1.

WITNESS.

See EVIDENCE, 3, 14, 17; NEGOTIABLE PAPER,
7; WILL, 5.

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