must transfer the property to a trustee, or declare that he holds it himself in trust.- Young v. Young et al., 137.
4. In case of voluntary settlements or gifts, a trust will not be implied where one was not in fact contemplated.—Id.
5. Defendant purchased a mortgage made by one B., relying upon B.'s sworn statement that it was given for a full consideration, and afterward sold it for the full sum secured by it. In an action to establish a trust in favor of B.'s assignees for the difference between the face of the mortgage and the sum paid for it by defendant, Held, That no trust could be implied; that B.'s representation estopped him from denying its truth.-Grissler et al. v. Powers, 196.
6. Where a deposit is made in the savings bank by a person in his or her name, as trustee for another, it is a' complete and valid transfer of the title to the fund.-Boone v. The Citi- zens' Savings Bk., 208.
7. Where in an action by a judgment creditor of the beneficiary a judgment is rendered fixing the surplus income of a trust estate, and directing the trustees to pay the debt and costs out of such surplus, the trustees are bound by the judgment, and if they disobey its command become personally liable for the debt.-Williams v. Thorn et al., 332.
8. D., S. & Co. gave their check on themselves to plaintiffs for a sum due plaintiffs. These checks were known as cashier's checks. By general arrangement with the National Bank of the State of New York, such checks were cashed by said last named bank through the clearing house. After the check in suit was drawn, D., S. & Co. made a deposit of securi- ties with said National Bank for the payment of certain over-drafts of cashier's checks, of which the check aforesaid was one. After depositing such securities, D., S. & Co. made a general assignment before the check in suit had been paid. Held, That such securi- ties deposited created an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the holders of the checks, and that the holders of such checks were entitled to payment from such securities in preference to the general creditors of D., S. & Co.-Watts v. Shipman et al., 360. See FACTORS.
TURNPIKE COMPANIES.
See APPEAL, 30, 31; REPLEVIN, 5.
1. Proof of usage will not make a contract where the parties have made none, and it can only be admitted to interpret the meaning of the language employed.-The Nat. Savings Bk. of D. C. v. Ward, 330.
2. Proof of a custom which is general is not ob- jectionable when there is nothing in the con- tract to exclude its application. Parties are presumed to contract in reference to a gen- eral usage or custom which prevails in the particular trade or business to which the contract relates.-Fuller et al. v. Robinson, 487.
Defendants' intestate being indebted to plain- tiff, procured a loan from him, on mortgage, nothing being said about the rate of interest. A statement of the indebtedness, a receipted attorney's bill and a check for the balance were handed to intestate as covering the loan. He objected to an item in the attor- ney's bill of $150 for commissions in procur- ing the loan, and plaintiff said it was all right; that he could not do any better, Held, That while intestate was deprived of the $150 by false pretence, it was not done by virtue of any agreement, and therefore, there could be no usury.-Guggenheimer v. Geiszler et al., 287.
It is enough that the facts making out usury are stated with sufficient certainty in the pleading to enable the other party to know what he would be called upon to meet.- Leon v. Bernheimer, 288.
3. Defendants applied to certain brokers for a loan on mortgage, agreeing to pay them 12 per cent. for procuring it. One B agreed to make the loan, and left with one O, his at- torney, checks signed in blank. O filled up the checks during B.'s absence, one of which was for the 12 per cent.; this was endorsed by defendants and handed to the brokers who transferred it to O, and the latter re- tained all but a small commission which he paid the brokers. No portion of this sum was received by B or the estate he repre- sented. Held, That this did not constitute usury.-Van Wyck et al. v. Walters et al.,
7. If a contract is usurious it is absolutely void, and no agreement between the parties can give it vitality; the taint of usury perme- ates all transactions based upon it, and all are void alike.-Maybee et al. v. Crozier, 524.
8. Where an answer sets up usury in that notes were discounted at a rate of from ten to fourteen per cent. per annum, evidence that the rate of discount was sixteen per cent. is properly excluded.-The Farmers' & Mech. Nat. Bk. of Buffalo v. Lang, 574.
9. A claim for a penalty under sec. 5198, U. S. Rev. Stats., for payment of excessive interest can be enforced only by action brought espe- cially for that purpose, and cannot be set up as a counterclaim in an action upon evidence of debt. Id.
See MORTGAGE, 13; NATIONAL BANKS, 6.
1. There is no implied warranty on the part of
the vendor of a bill valid in the hands of the indorser that it is drawn against funds or that it is not accommodation paper.-The People's Bk. v. Bogart et al., 307.
2. Defendants' intestate having an agreement with A & B, by which they were to share equally with him in the profits of the busi- ness carried on by him, made an agreement with C&D, by which he sold them each a quarter interest therein. In an action by C, Held, That intestate was liable for breach of his contract of warranty of title the differ- ence between what C acquired by his pur- chase and that which he purchased.-Con- verse v. Miner et al., 424.
See EVIDENCE, 16; LIFE INSURANCE, 5.
1. The right of an owner of lands through which a watercourse runs to have the same kept open, and to discharge therein the sur- face water, is not limited to the drainage and discharge of surface water into the stream in the same precise manner as when the land was unimproved and uncultivated.-McCor- mick et al. v. Horan, 231.
1. A court of equity cannot be called upon to dissolve a voluntary association until all the 2. remedies given by the constitution and by- laws for the redress of the evils complained of have been exhausted.-Lafond et al. v. Deems et al., 463.
2. Voluntary associations, organized for the mutual benefit of its members, should not be dissolved for slight causes, and if at all, only when it is entirely apparent that the organ- ization has ceased to answer the ends of its existence and no other mode of relief is at- tainable.-Id.
3. The members of such an association are not co-partners.-Id.
4. The rent of rooms not used by the association, but which they were compelled to hire, with fines and initiation fees, had accumulated so as to form a large fund, but not so large as to be beyond the reasonable wants of the as- sociation. Held, That there was no such ac- cumulation of funds as called for a dissolu- tion of the association.-Id.
See APPEAL, 5, 33; CONTRACT, 18; FIRE INsur- ANCE, 5, 10; GUARDIAN, 4; LIEN; LIFE IN- SURANCE, 3, 4, 10, 11; REFEREE.
1. A warehouseman is only bound to use ordi- nary diligence in caring for and protecting the property, but if, when demanded, it is gone, he is bound to show that it has dis- appeared without his fault.-Golden v. Romer et al., 5.
Such an owner may change and control the natural flow of the surface water, and by ditches, or otherwise, accelerate the flow or increase the volume of water, and if he does so in the reasonable use of his premises, and does not discharge surface water into the stream in quantities beyond its natural ca- pacity, to the damage of the other owners, he exercises only a legal right.-Id.
1. A municipal corporation owning improved wharves and other artificial means, which it has provided and maintains at its own cost for the benefit of those engaged in commerce upon the public navigable waters of the United States, is not prohibited by the national constitution from charging and col- lecting from those using the wharves and facilities such reasonable fees as will fairly remunerate it for the use of its property.- The Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. The City of St. Louis, 521.
2. No state can, consistently with the National Constitution, impose upon the products of other States, brought therein for sale or use, or upon citizens because engaged in the sale therein, or the transportation thereto, of the products of other states, more onerous public burdens or taxes than it im- poses upon the like products of its own territory.-Guy v. The Mayor of Baltimore,
3. A state statute or municipal ordinance, in pursuance of which vessels, landing at the public wharves of a city, laden with the pro-
ducts of other states, are required to pay wharfage fees which are not exacted from vessels landing thereat with the products of the state, is in conflict with the National Constitution.-Id.
1. Testator by his will gave to his wife the use of all his real and personal property for life; the income of the estate was given to his four daughters to be divided equally among them during their lives, with remainder to their respective children, heirs and assigns. The will also provided that in case of the death of either of the daughters without issue, her share should be divided equally among the survivors and to their children | respectively. Held, That there was no illegal suspension of the power of alienation; that the bequest to the daughters of the income for life was equivalent to a devise of a life estate in the land; that the remainder vested on the death of testator in the children of the daughters then living, subject to open and let in afterborn children.- Monarque v. Monarque et al., 118.
2. Testator by his will bequeathed to his wife one-third of all his property real and per- sonal, and the control of his farm as long as she remained a widow, and at her death directed all his property to be equally divided between his children. Held, That the widow took an absolute fee in one-third of the prop- erty mentioned and the use of the whole during widowhood.-Roseboom v. Roseboom et al., 309.
3. Testator by his will bequeathed $50,000 to his daughter A., and the same amount to "the children of I.," a deceased daughter: and after other bequests, he directed the re- mainder of his estate to be divided between
A., the children of I., the son of another de- ceased daughter, and his sons. Held, That the residuary legatees took per stirpes and not per capita.—Ferrer et al. v. Pyne et al., 334.
4. Testator by his will bequeathed a sum of money to "the Presbyterian cemetery." There was a cemetery known by that name, but no corporation in the town known to the law by that name. Held, That the bequest must fail for want of a beneficiary capable of taking, and that it was not such a charitable bequest as the court could execute - The First Presbyterian Soc. v. Bowen et al., 400. 5. An executor who drew the will is a compe- tent witness to prove its execution.-Rugg et al. v. Rugg et al., 401.
Mere failure of memory on the part of the
witnesses will not defeat a will if the attesta- tion clause and other circumstances are satis- factory to prove its execution.-Id.
An alien devisee, upon acceptance of the de- vise, takes a conditional title, absolute against the heirs of the testator, but defeasible by the state until he makes and files the depo- sition required by statute; this he may do at any time before the state recovers the lands, upon paying the costs of any proceeding for escheat which may have been instituted.- Hall et al. v. Hall et al., 414.
Under chap. 115, Laws of 1845, where a de- vise is made to aliens, and one of the devisees files the requisite deposition, the estate vests in such devisee.-Id.
See EVIDENCE, 3; TRUSTS, 1.
See EVIDENCE, 3, 14, 17; NEGOTIABLE PAPER, 7; WILL, 5.
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