hesitancy in holding that there was testimony before the commission to support its findings, both that the applicant (petitioner) was injured in the course of his. employment, and that such injury was the immediate cause of the paralytic stroke following shortly after the accident or injury. The following authorities support the conclusion reached: Honnold, Workmen's Comp. § 98; La Veck v. Parke, Davis Co., 190 Mich. 604, 157 N. W. 72, L. R. A. 19'6D, 1277; Crowley v. City of Lowell, 223 Mass. 288, 111 N. E. 786. Other phases of the Industrial Commission Act have been considered by this court in two cases, namely Industrial Co. v. Evans, 174 Pac. 825; Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Com., 178 Pac. 57. It follows from the foregoing that the district court erred in entering judgment setting aside the award of the commission. The judgment of the lower court is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court of Salt Lake county, with directions to set aside its order and judgment and to dismiss the complaint. Appellant to recover costs. Corfman, C. J., and Frick, Weber, and Thurman, JJ., concur. SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. BIGLAN INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMMISSION OF STATE OF MASTER AND man SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION— AGGREGATE AWARDS. Under Workmen's Compensation Act 1911, § 5, subds. b, f, g, a workwas not entitled to recover, for injuries classified as permanent partial disabilities awards aggregating more than the $1,500 maximum provided for permanent partial disability, notwithstanding such injuries, one of which was to the eye and the other to the arm, were received at different times, where the combined injuries did not come within the classification of permanent total disabilities enumerated in the act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[11].) Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; D. F. Wright, Judge. Proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, by Owen Biglan, employee, against the Industrial Insurance Commission of the State of Washington. From an award for less than amount claimed, affirmed by the superior court, claimant appeals. Affirmed. Gordon & Easterday, of Tacoma, for appellant. Lindsay L. Thompson and D. E. Twitchell, both of Olympia, for respondent. MACKINTOSH, J. For an injury sustained to the right eye in haz*Decision rendered, July 30, 1919. 182 Pac. Rep. 934. ardous employment in 1913, the Workmen's Compensation Act, in the sum of $625; his injury being classified as a permanent partial disability. While still engaged in a hazardous employment, in 1916, he sustained an injury to the right arm, also classified as a permanent partial disability, and the commission administering the Workmen's Compensation Act allowed him compensation in the sum of $1,250, but, upon discovering that the appellant had theretofore received an injury classified as a permanent partial disability, canceled the award of $1,250 and made an award of $875, being the difference between the $1,500 maximum which the statute provided for permanent partial disability and the $625 already received under the first classification. Appellant being dissatisfied with the award as finally made, appealed to the superior court, and from an unfavorable decision there appealed to this court, urging that under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911 there could be more than one permanent partial disability which would entitle the workman to receive awards aggregating in excess of $1,500. Both injuries to the appellant having occurred prior to 1917, the question in this case is to be answered by a consideration of the compensation law as enacted in 1911; the particular portions of that act applicable to the situation being chapter 74, § 5, subds, b, f, and g. Subdivision b declares: "Permanent total disability means the loss of both legs, or both arms, or one leg and one arm, total loss of eyesight, paralysis or other condidition permanently incapacitating the workman from performing any work at any gainful occupation." Subdivision f: "Permanent partial disability means the loss of either one foot, one leg, one hand, one arm, one eye, one or more fingers, one or more toes. "Should a further accident occur to a workman already receiving a monthly payment under this section for a temporary disability, or who has been previously the recipient of a lump sum payment under this act, his future compensation shall be adjudged according to the other provisions of this section and with regard to the combined effect of his injuries, and his past receipt of money under this act." Under this latter subsection, where reference is made to an accident occurring to a workman who has been previously the recipient of a lump sum payment and providing that in the event of a further accident the additional compensation shall be adjudged according to the combined effect of his injuries and his past receipt of money, there are but two classes of injuries, for the reason that the act provides the lump sum payments in two instances only: First, when the workman has suffered a permanent partial disability; or, second, where he has suffered a permanent total disability. Reference to subsection b will show that the Legislature failed to classify an injury to the eye and an injury to the arm as permanent total disabilities. This was probably by oversight. After the receipt of the first injury, the appellant was a workman permanently partially disabled, and the second injury left him permanently partially disabled according to the classification of the act as it existed at that time, contemplating that a workman permanently `partially disabled should receive compensation not in excess of $1,500. It would have been well to have provided that the suffering of two permanent partial disabilities should be classified as a permanent total disabilty. But the Legislature not having made this classification, we are not empowered to raise the maximum recoverable by the appellant because we feel that the act did not place it high enough. To attempt to do so would be to disregard what seems to be the plain language of the act, which if it works unscientifically or unjustly is a matter for legislative correction. "The industrial insurance act is not one designed to award full compensation to each individual for all such damages as such individual would be entitled to in his peculiar circumstances, but is only a system of limited insurance whereby all industrial employees within the statute are paid definite but limited amounts for injuries without regard, as we have said, to the particular individual circumstances or needs of the injured employee. The injury alone is the subject which can be considered by the commission under the statute, and applies to and covers all classes of injuries alike." Foster v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 181 Pac. 912. The compensation provided by the act is based and fixed upon certain schedules, and where the act, as it does in subsection g, provides that one suffering a second permanent partial disability is to have his compensation adjusted according to the combined effect of his injuries and that combined effect is to still leave him classified as permanently partially disabled, his second award must be made in view of "his past receipt of money under this act," and the appellant in this case, having received $625 for his first injury, was entitled to no more than the difference between that and the maximum of $1,500 for his second injury. The decisions of the commission and the lower court are affirmed. Holcomb, C. J., and Main, Mitchell, and Tolman, JJ., concur. SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. FREYMAN V. DAY ET AL. (No. 15326.)* 1. EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION-FOREIGN LAW. In the absence of pleading and proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that the laws of Idaho are the same as those of this state. (For other cases, see Evidence, Dec. Dig. § 80[1].) 2. EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS-LAWS OF OTHER STATES —WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY IN FOREIGN STATE. An employee injured in another state under circumstances which would have confined his recovery to workmen's compensation proceedings if the accident had happened in this state cannot maintain a damage action without pleading the foreign law, since it will be presumed the foreign law corresponds with that of this state in the absence of a contrary showing. (For other cases, see Evidence, Dec. Dig. § 80[1].) Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; D. W. Hurn, Judge. Action by August Freyman against Harry L. Day and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Eugene R. Childe, of Seattle, for appellant. *Decision rendered, Aug. 5, 1919. 182 Pac. Rep. 940. John H. Wourms, of Wallace, Idaho, and Plummer & Lavin, of Spokane, for respondents. MAIN, J. The purpose of this action was to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to be due to the negligence of the defendant. The cause was tried to the court and a jury, and resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was sustained, and a judgment was entered dismissing the action. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals. [1] The respondents are copartners operating a mine near the town of Burke in the state of Idaho. On the 3d day of July, 1917, the appellant, while employed in the mine, sustained the injuries on account of which he instituted this action. The action was brought in the superior court of Spokane county in this state. There was no pleading or proof as to what the laws of Idaho were relative to accidents of this character. In the absence of such pleading and proof it will be presumed that the laws of Idaho are the same as the laws of this state. [2] In this state there is a law known as the Workmen's Compensation Act (3 Rem. & Bal. Code, c. 7), wherein it is provided that relief to workmen for injuries occurring in extrahazardous work are withdrawn from private controversy. In section 2 of the act work in mines is specified as extrahazardous. In section 8 of the act, as originally passed, there was preserved a right of action against an employer who had defaulted in any payment that he was required to make under the act, to the accident fund. In 1917 (Laws of 1917, c. 120, § 5), the section of the original act giving a right of action against a defaulting employer was amended. In the amended section the right of action against a defaulting employer by the injured employee was not preserved. Other means were provided by which compulsory payment could be made to the accident fund. This amendment was in full force and effect at the time the appellant's accident occurred. It thus appears that had the appellant sustained the injuries for which he complains, in this state, he would have no right to wage a law action for the recovery of damages, but would be required to take compensation provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act. It follows therefore that since there was no pleading or proof as to the laws of Idaho, in the absence of which the law of that state will be presumed to be the same as this, the appellant could not maintain this action for the recovery of damages. It must be remembered that the accident in this case did not happen in interstate commerce, and consequently would not come within the provisions of the statute covering that subject-matter. The judgment will be affirmed. Holcomb, C. J., and Tolman, Mackintosh, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. LUND V. GRIFFITHS & SPRAGUE STEVEDORING CO. (No. 15318.)* 1. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION-MARITIME INJURIES WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Amendment to Judiciary Act Oct. 6, 1917 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, §§ 991[3],1233) giving federal courts jurisdiction over all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state, does not abolish admiralty or common-law remedies, for maritime injuries, but merely gives injured employe additional remedy of state compensation act, where it affords a remedy. (For other cases, see Insurance Dec. Dig. § 20). 12. ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION-TORTS-INJURIES TO STEVE DORE-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Stevedore injured in hold of steamship may sue employer at common law notwithstanding amendment to federal Judiciary Act of Oct. 6, 1917 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, §§ 991[3], 1233), giving federal courts jurisdiction over all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and saving to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Act of any state, the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state being inapplicable to such injury. (For other cases, see Admiralty, Dec. Dig. § 20.) Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald, Judge. Action by John A. Lund against the Coastwise Steamship & Barge Company, Incorporated, and the Griffiths & Sprague Stevedoring Company. Judgment for plaintiff against last-named defendant, and last named defendant appeals. Affirmed. Grinstead & Laube and Trefethen & Findley, all of Seattle, for appellant. Walter S. Fulton, of Seattle, for respondent. FULLERTON, J. The respondent was injured while in the employ of the appellant working as a stevedore in the hold of the Steamship Anyox. The vessel named was the property of the defendant Coastwise Steamship & Barge Company, Incorporated, who was using it in the lumber trade. Being desirous of taking on a cargo of lumber at Seattle, it engaged the appellant, a stevedoring company, to load the vessel. A part of the equipment of the vessel consisted of two steam winches, sufficiently close together to be operated by a single winch driver. The winches were controlled by levers, so arranged that the winch driver could stand between them and operate a winch with each hand. When on center the ends of the levers intended to be gripped by the hands reached to the height of the hands of an ordinary man while standing, and the movement of a partcular lever up or down caused the winch which it controlled to haul in or play out the line to which the *Decision rendered, Aug. 12, 1919. 183 Pac. Rep. 123. |