however, that the circuit court did not quash the entire record, but did so only in so far as that record related to the matter of the evidence before the Industrial Board which was treated in the stipulation as a deposition. The order of that court directing the taking of further proceedings by said board makes it evident that the court did not quash the entire record, and the use of those terms in the written order is not controlling, where it is evident from the entire order that something else was intended. The order of the circuit court, in effect, sustained the objection of the plaintiff in error to the competency of the evidence offered and found there was no legal evidence of dependency. The cause was thereupon in and by said order remanded for further proceedings by said board. This was the only remanding order authorized by the statute. Paragraph (f) of section 19 of the Compensation Act, as amended in 1915 (Laws 1915, p. 410), provides, in part as follows: "The court [circuit court] may confirm or set aside the decision of the arbitrator or committee or arbitration or Industrial Board. If the decision is set aside and the facts found in the poceedings before the board are sufficient, the court may enter such decision as is justified by law, or may remand the cause to the Industrial Board for further proceedings, and may state the questions requiring further hearing, and give such other instructions as may be proper. Judgments, orders and decrees of the circuit court under this act shall be reviewed only by the Supreme Court upon writ of error." [2] Under the statute the circuit court had two courses open to it on review of the proceedings by certiorari: Either to set aside the decision and enter such decision upon the facts as is justified and required by law, or to remand the cause to the commission for further proceedings. If the finding of the board is "founded on hearsay or other improper or insufficient evidence, it is the duty of the circuit court, on certiorari, to remand the proceeding to the Industrial Board for proper proceedings." Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 III. 11, 113 N. E. 173, Ann. Cas 1918B, 627. Section 91 of the Practice Act Provides that appeals to and writs of error from this court are allowed to review the final judgments, orders or decrees of any of the circuit courts in any suit or proceeding in law or chancery. Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 2248. A judgment or decree is final and appealable only when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, so that, when affirmed, the court below has only to proceed with the execution of the judgment or decree. Rosenthal v. Board of Education, 239 Ill. 29, 87 N. E. 878; Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 Hl. 141, 35 N. E. 881; Gray v. Ames, 220 Ill. 251, 77 N. E. 219, 5 Ann. Cas. 174; Brodhead v. Minges, 198 Ill. 513, 64 N. E. 998; Gunn v. Donoghue, 135 Ill. 479, 25 N. E. 750. [3, 4] As the order of the circuit court did not in any manner attempt to fix the rights of the parties to said proceeding, it was not a final order, and this court is without jurisdiction to review any other question. The certificate of the judge of the circuit court that the cause is one proper to be reviewed by this court cannot give this court jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order. The writ of error will therefore be dismissed. Writ dismissed. SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. ROCK ISLAND BRIDGE & IRON WORKS V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. (No. 12282.)* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT "DEPENDENT." In law, a "dependent" is one who is sustained by another, or relies for support upon the aid of another, who looks to another for support, and relies on another for reasonable necessaries consistent with the dependent's position in life. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 388.) (For other definitions; see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Dependent.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-QUESTIONS OF DEPENDENCY-FINDINGS OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. Questions of dependency, within the Workmen's Compensation Act, and its extent, are questions of fact, with decision of which by the Industrial Commission the courts cannot interfere, if there is evidence tending to sustain its findings. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-PARTIAL DEPENDENCY-FINDING OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION-EVIDENCE. In proceeding for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act for death of employee, finding of Industrial Commission that employee's mother was partially dependent upon him, a question of fact, held supported by evidence, and not reviewable. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S ACT "DEPENDENCY" OF MOTHER. COMPENSATION Dependency of mother on her son killed in service, which justifies award of compensation to her under Workmen's Compensation Act, is a personal dependency for support and maintenance, an actual dependency and support consistent with her position in life, not including maintenance of others, as her children, whom son was under no legal obligation `to maintain, or contributions which merely enabled mother to accumulate money. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 388.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Dependency.) COMPENSATION 5. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S ACT-EXTENT OF PARTIAL DEPENDENCY-FINDING OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION—EVIDENCE. Finding of the Industrial Commission that deceased employee's mother, to whom he had contributed $50 a month for use by her in the main*Decision rendered, April 15, 1919. 122 N. E. Rep. 830. Vol. IV-Comp. 3. tenance of the household, was partially dependent upon him to the extent of 56 per cent. of total dependency, held unsupported by evidence. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[5].) 6. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-MINIMUM AWARD TO PARTIAL DEPENDENT. By the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917, one partially dependent on the deceased employee, whatever the degree of dependency, was entitledto the minimum award provided of $1,650. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 388.) Error to Circuit Court Rock Island County; F. D. Ramsay, Judge. Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act by James McQuaid, administrator, for compensation for the death of John McQuaid, employee, opposed by the Rock Island Bridge & Iron Works, the employer. Compensation was awarded to Mary McQuaid, decedent's mother, by the Industrial Accident Board, the circuit court quashed a writ of certiorari to review the award, and the employer brings error. Reversed and remanded. J. C. M. Clow, of Chicago, and C. J. Searle, of Rock Island, for plaintiff in error. Kenworthy, Dietz, Shallberg, Harper & Sinnett, of Moline, for defendant in error. DUNN, J. This writ of error was sued out by the Rock Island Bridge & Iron Works to reverse a judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County quashing a writ of certiorari to review an award made by the Industrial Commission against the plaintiff in error in favor of James McQuaid, administrator of the estate of his son, John McQuaid, an employee of the plaintiff in error, who died on August 12, 1917, from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The commission found that the deceased's wages were $1,400 a year; that his mother, Mary McQuaid, was his sole beneficiary and was partially dependent upon him to the extent of 56 per cent. of total dependency, and was entitled to receive 56 per cent. of four times his annual wages, being $3,136, and made an award of that amount. The only substantial objection made to the award is that there is no evidence in the record to sustain it. The evidence shows that John McQuaid was 26 years old, unmarried, and living in his father's house with his father, mother, two adult sisters and a 10 year old brother. His father was 63 years old, in bad health, and did not work. He owned some property and had an income of about $500 a year. He gave his wife $40 a month, the deceased gave her $50 a month, and she paid the household expenses of the family. The daughters worked, but contributed nothing to the household expenses and paid no board. [1] The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 493) provides that the amount of compensation for an injury resulting in death, if the deceased.leaves no widow, child, or totally dependent parent, but does leave a partially dependent parent, shall be such proportion of a sum equal to four times the annual earnings of the employee as such partial dependency bears to total dependency, but not less, in any event, than $1,650 or more than $3,500. In law a dependent is one who is sustained by another, or relies for support upon the aid of another; who looks to another for support, and relies on another for reasonable necessaries consistent with the dependent's position in life. Jackson v. Erie Railroad Co., 86 N. J. Law, 550, 91 Atl. 1035; Women's Catholic Order of Foresters v. Hefferman, 283 Ill. 429, 119 N. E. 426. [2-6] Questions of dependency, and the extent of it, are questions of fact, with the decision of which by the commission the courts cannot interfere if there is evidence tending to sustain its findings. The evidence tended to show that the mother's only means of support was $90 a month, which she received from her husband and her son. While her husband was under a legal duty to support her, the question whether she actually received all or a part of her support from her son and looked to him for such support is a question of fact, which upon this record is concluded by the finding of the commission that she was partially dependent upon him. There is, however, no evidence which tends to sustain the finding that her dependency was 56 per cent of total dependency. The evidence is that she received $90 a month, all of which was expended in paying the expenses of the family of six persons. The dependency which justifies an award is a personal dependency for support and maintenance-an actual dependency for support consistent with the dependent's position in life. It does not include the maintenance of others whom the dependent is un-der no legal obligation to maintain or contributions which merely enable the donee to accumulate money. The $50 a month contributed to his mother by the deceased was not given and was not used for her support and maintenance alone. There is no evidence from which it can be ascertained how much or what porportion either of the $50 or of the $90 was used for the support and maintenance of the mother. The $40 from the husband's income was at least a partial support. The additional $50 was a general benefit to the family, but there is no basis in the evidence for determining what proportion of it was used for the support of the mother and what proportion for general family expenses There is therefore no basis for the finding that her dependency was 56 per cent. of total dependency. The finding of partial dependency, whatever its degree, entitled the claimant to the minimum award of $1,650. The facts found were sufficient to constitute the basis for a proper decision, and the judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to enter an award for $1,650, payable in installments, if the claimant shall elect to accept such award; otherwise, to remand the cause to the Industrial Commission for another hearing. Reversed and remanded, with directions. SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. SWIFT & CO. V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (No. 12280.)* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -PRORCEEDINGS-BURDEN OF PROOF. In workmen's compensation proceeding applicant has burden of proving his case, but evidence sufficient to make a reasonable person conIclude that applicant was injured while performing his duites in the course of his employment or duties incidental to that employment is sufficient. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. §§ 403, 405[4].) *Decision rendered, April 15, 1919. 122 N. E. 796. 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -REVIEW. The finding of the Industrial Board will not be set aside by the Supreme Court if warranted by the evidence, although court might have reached a different conclusion on the evidence; the only question being whether the board was justified, on the facts proved, in drawing its conclusion. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) In proceedings for compensation for injuries to employee sustained in fight with another employee, facts as to who was the aggressor and as to the comparative size and strength of the two employees are not controlling on question whether injury rose out of and in the course of employment. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 373.) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT-FIGHT BETWEEN EMPLOYEES --COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In proceedings for compensation for injuries sustained in a fight, evidence held to sustain finding that the altercation grew out of matters connected with injured employee's work, and that it was not purely a personal one entirely outside of the scope of such employment. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405 [4].) Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge. Proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act by Frank Blum for compensation for injuries, opposed by Swift & Co., employer. Award of Industrial Board affirmed by circuit court, and employer brings error. Affirmed. Thomas M. Coen and John E. Kehoe, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. John A. Bloomingston, of Chicago, for defendant in error. CARTER, J. An application was filed with the Industrial Board on October 13, 1914, by Frank Blum, defendant in error, for adjustment of claim for injuries alleged to have been incurred by him while in the employ of Swift & Co. The arbitration committee decided that he was not entitled to compensation. On review the Industrial Board awarded compensation of $7.50 per week for a period of 416 weeks from April 10, 1914, and ordered that, if at the expiration of that time Blum were living, he should recover from the plaintiff in error a pension of $257.60 a year, payable semi-monthly, as long as he might live. The case was taken to the circuit court of Cook county by writ of certiorari, and the judgment of the Industrial Board was affirmed. The trial judge certified that the cause was one proper to be reviewed by this court, and it is here on writ of error. At the time of the injury, April 3, 1914, Frank Blum was employed by Swift & Co. at its packing plant at the Union Stockyards in Chicago. At and before the time of the injury it was his duty, together with other employees in the steam-fitting department, to look after water pipe leaks in the different buildings, including that occupied by the pork department. The custom was, throughout these buildings, in case of pipe leaks and other matters where repairs were needed, to blow a whistle, in response |