The Federalist PapersCosimo, Inc., 1. des. 2006 - 656 sider The Federalist papers -- 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison in support of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution -- began appearing in New York newspapers beginning in the autumn of 1787. And though controversy still swirls around authorship of certain individual essays, and the impact the papers had on the public opinion of the time remains open to debate, it's clear that the dramatic impact on global civilization of these spirited defenses of the nation's founding document cannot be exaggerated. As masterful examinations of the fundamental principals of the U.S. system of government, they are unrivaled -- as works of political philosophy, they have moved and influenced peoples and nations around the world in their battles toward freedom and democracy. This edition also includes The Articles of Confederation of the United States, and The Declaration of Independence. ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1757-1804), JOHN JAY (1745-1829), and JAMES MADISON (1751-1836) are among the most revered of America's Founding Fathers, men whose animated advocacy of the new nation continues to reverberate in political thought today. |
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Side xxx
... rule unequal and oppressive and will become ruinous - The remedy proposed - Advantages of taxes on articles of consumption , and of indirect taxation . NO . 22 - THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED No power to regulate commerce - Evils of this ...
... rule unequal and oppressive and will become ruinous - The remedy proposed - Advantages of taxes on articles of consumption , and of indirect taxation . NO . 22 - THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED No power to regulate commerce - Evils of this ...
Side xxxiv
... Rule for proving public acts - Post - roads and post - offices . and NO . 43 - THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED Miscellaneous powers - Copyrights and patents - The fed- eral city - Punishment of treason - Admission of new States -Government ...
... Rule for proving public acts - Post - roads and post - offices . and NO . 43 - THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED Miscellaneous powers - Copyrights and patents - The fed- eral city - Punishment of treason - Admission of new States -Government ...
Side xliv
... rule - Impropriety of such a general rule in certain cases - The proposition of Massachusetts- The provisions of the New York constitution - The proposi- tion that the jury system should be established in all cases whatever - Concluding ...
... rule - Impropriety of such a general rule in certain cases - The proposition of Massachusetts- The provisions of the New York constitution - The proposi- tion that the jury system should be established in all cases whatever - Concluding ...
Side 35
... rule of apportionment . Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose ; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties , they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment . In the ...
... rule of apportionment . Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose ; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties , they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment . In the ...
Side 38
... rule of apportionment satisfac- tory to all ? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections . These , as usual , would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties . There are even ...
... rule of apportionment satisfac- tory to all ? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections . These , as usual , would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties . There are even ...
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3 | |
13 | |
22 | |
34 | |
47 | |
53 | |
62 | |
70 | |
NO 47THE PARTICULAR STRUCTURE OF THE NEW GOV | 312 |
TWEEN THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS 335 | 317 |
No 48THESE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD NOT be so | 321 |
NO 49METHOD OF GUARDING AGAINST THE | 327 |
NO 52THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | 341 |
NO 53THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 347 |
NO 54THE APPORTIONMENT OF MEMBERS AMONG | 353 |
NO 55THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE | 359 |
76 | |
85 | |
86 | |
95 | |
101 | |
NO 19THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 113 |
NO 21 OTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERA | 125 |
NO 22THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 131 |
OF THE UNION | 141 |
NO 24THE POWERS NECESSARY TO THE COMMON | 147 |
NO 25THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 153 |
NO 26THE IDEA OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLATIVE | 159 |
NO 27THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 166 |
NO 29CONCERNING THE MILITIA | 175 |
NO 30CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXA | 182 |
NO 31THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 188 |
NO 33THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 198 |
NO 34THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 203 |
NO 36THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 216 |
MENT | 224 |
NO 38THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND THE | 242 |
NO 49THE POWERS OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM | 250 |
NO 41GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS CONFERRED | 259 |
NO 42THE POWERS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITU | 270 |
NO 43THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 278 |
NO 44RESTRICTIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF | 289 |
NO 45THE ALLEGED DANGER FROM THE POWERS | 298 |
NO 46THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL | 304 |
NO 56THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 365 |
MANY CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH REPRESEN | 370 |
NO 58OBJECTION THAT THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS | 377 |
NO 59CONCERNING THE POWER OF CONGRESS | 383 |
NO 60THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 389 |
no 61the SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED | 395 |
NO 63THE SENATE CONTINUED | 407 |
NO 64THE POWERS OF THE SENATE | 416 |
to 65THE POWERS OF THE SENATE CONTINUED | 423 |
No 66OBJECTIONS TO THE POWER OF THE SENATE | 429 |
NO 67THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT | 436 |
No 69THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE | 445 |
NO 70THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FURTHER CON | 454 |
NO 71THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE | 463 |
NO 73THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF | 474 |
NO 74THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL | 481 |
NO 76THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE | 491 |
NO 77THE APPOINTING POWER CONTINUED AND OTHER | 501 |
NO 79 THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED | 512 |
No 81THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED AND THE DISTRI | 528 |
NO 82THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED | 534 |
ANSWERED | 555 |
NO 85CONCLUDING REMARKS | 567 |
IIIRESOLUTION TRANSMITTING THE CONSTITUTION | 584 |
INDEX | 605 |
NO 50PERIODICAL APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE CONSID | 611 |
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE | 619 |
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The Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay,Lawrence Goldman Begrenset visning - 2008 |
Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
1788 THE FEDERALIST admit advantage America Amphictyonic appear appointment articles of Confederation assembly authority bill of attainder bill of rights branch Britain causes circumstances citizens common confederacy Confederation consideration considered convention council court of equity danger declare duties effect elected electors equal eral ernment established executive exercise experience extend favor federal government foreign former HAMILTON House of Representatives impeachment important independent influence instance interests judges judicial judiciary department jurisdiction lative latter lature laws legislative body legislature less letters of marque liberty Macedon magistrate ment militia mode national government nature necessary necessity objects particular party peace persons political possess President principle proper proportion proposed Constitution propriety provision PUBLIUS reason regulation render republic republican requisite respect SECT Senate South Carolina Sparta stitution Supreme Court tion tive treaties trial by jury Union United votes York Packet
Populære avsnitt
Side 579 - If any person guilty of, or charged with treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall upon demand of the Governor or Executive power, of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offence.
Side 579 - Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any Court, or place out of Congress...
Side 579 - For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the Legislature of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year.
Side 304 - The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce ; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powerj re-.