separateness of the two aggregates would in some respects have been even sharper than it is. Note the differences as they would then have existed.

The procession of the vivid states, rigidly bound in order of coexistence and succession, would, as now, have been absolutely unaffected by anything in the procession of the faint states; and the procession of the faint states, no longer to the same degree dragged along by the procession of the vivid, would have been still more manifestly independent. In that case, the two aggregates would have demonstrated their separateness by sliding by one another still more readily than at present. Each would also, as now, show itself to be without break. Evidently then the primary differentiation of each from the other, and integration of each with itself, precede all those experiences given by my motion, and all the deliberate comparisons which my mo tion makes possible.

The secondary antitheses (such as that the vivid are the originals and the faint the copies; that the vivid are unchangeable in quality and order by volition, while the faint are changeable by it in quality and order; that the laws of each aggregate lie within itself; that antecedents are always ascertainable in the one case and not always in the other; and that there are limits to the one aggregate and no known limits to the other) are antitheses which I perceive can be established only by conscious comparisons-some of them, however, being so obvious as to be recognized almost automatically. But be the deliberation much or little, the secondary antitheses it establishes serve to strengthen the primary antithesis that is self-established.

Finally, I observe that the differentiation thus anteceding thought, and afterwards verified and increased by thought, is imperative in the sense that there is no possibility of arresting the process by which it is from instant to instant reproduced. When dealing with the " Associability of Feelings" and the "Associability of Relations between

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Feelings," it became manifest that in the act of cognition each feeling aggregates primarily with the great class it belongs to-falling more or less promptly into its particular order, genus, species, variety; that the like happens with relations between feelings; and that Intelligence is made possible only by such classings. Here we see that at the same time each feeling, and each relaticn, in being known, joins itself to one or other of these two great aggregates. There is no intermediate position possible for it-it gravitates instantly to the vivid or the faint. In cases where a momentary doubt occurs whether a certain slight sound is, as we say, real or ideal, or whether in the dusk a thing is actually seen or only fancied, an unpleasant tension accompanies the state of uncertainty. Even during the doubt it cannot be kept balanced between the two, but oscillates from the one to the other. And when, under optical or other illusions, this automatic segregation is to any considerable extent prevented, there arises a painful state of confusion—a feeling of impending chaos caused by shaking this foundation of our intelligence.

CHAPTER XVII.

COMPLETED DIFFERENTIATION OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT.

§ 460. On continuing, as I sit, the analysis which has disclosed the broad contrast set forth in the last chapter, I observe certain states not included in either of the aggregates there defined. When the sea-fog drifted away and the Sun reappeared, there arose in me a state additional to those states directly produced by the more vivid light and the restored view a state which I distinguish as agreeable. The sea-weed smell when it brought back memories of places and persons, brought back also a phase of what I call emotion. Such components of consciousness, pleasurable and painful, divisible into classes and subclasses, differ greatly from the components thus far described: being extremely vague, being unlocalizable in space, and being but indefinitely localizable in time. That is to say, considered as members of the entire assemblage, they differ from other members in this, that I cannot perceive whereabouts they are in that assemblage, or how they are limited by its other members, coexistent and successive.

Do these peculiar states belong to either of the two aggregates already distinguished? and if so, to which? If I try to class them with the vivid or the faint, I am met by the difficulty that while each kind of them furnishes examples of both the vivid and the faint; and while, as before,

the vivid are the originals and the faint the copies; there are numerous gradations uniting the vivid with the faint. Certain ideas of occurrences may excite a slight feeling of what I call vexation, which reflection may increase to an anger like that which the occurrences themselves would produce. And the occurrences themselves will at one time arouse a less vivid feeling of anger than the representation of them will at another time. So that the classification by intensity here fails.

There are, however, other tests which suffice. Take first that of cohesion. In a few cases, an emotion seems immediately coherent to a member of the vivid aggregate, as to a beautiful colour or a sweet sound. But in the great mass of cases the cohesion of an emotion is not to any vivid states, but to certain faint states combined in particular ways. Fear is not directly joined to the visual impressions produced by the mouth of a pistol turned towards me; but it is joined to certain intermediate faint states, or ideas, called up by these vivid states. Again, an emotion has,

in common with the faint states, the trait that its antecedent is always traceable. Instead of being liable to occur, as a member of the vivid series is, without previous presentation of some state with which it is habitually connected, it never occurs without my being able to perceive something to which it is attached, that is like something to which it had been before attached. Further, I find that

the laws to which these states conform, exist in the faint series and not in the vivid series. Among the faint states I can trace the particular groups which cause particular emotions; and can perceive relations between the varying characters of these and the varying quantities of the emotions caused. As a corollary, I note the further fact, that while the vivid aggregate may slide by and produce little or no effect on the emotions, the faint aggregate irresistibly carries with it the special emotions belonging to its passing combinations. A feeling of grief

or of joy cannot persist if the sets of ideas to which it is related pass away, and are replaced by sets of other kinds. And once more, these elements of consciousness have, in common with the aggregate of faint states, the character that there are limits which they do not exceed. I am familiar with all these feelings up to their bounds; and continued exploration does not disclose endless new regions and new combinations.

Thus the classification of them is clear. Though there are both vivid and faint emotions-actual emotions and the ideas of them-these all belong to the faint aggregate.

§ 461. These peculiar members of the faint aggregate have a general character of great significance-they tend to set up changes in a certain combination belonging to the vivid aggregate. I refer to the fact that the emotions initiate what are known as bodily movements. Not, indeed, that they alone possess this power; for the vivid aggregate has components of sundry kinds which, reaching great intensities, also do this, though in a different way. Passing over the effects of these, as here of no concern, it is to be noted that each emotion excites muscular contraction, great in proportion as it is strong.

Thus on hearing at my back a voice which I recognize as the voice of a friend, the particular sounds, unlike the many other vivid states of all kinds present to me, excite a wave of pleasurable feeling which puts an end to my quiescence. What is this which happens, considered from our present stand-point? While I sat still,

the sets of vivid states known to me as hand and knee were not manifestly distinguished from the rest of the vivid aggregate: they apparently belonged to it in just the same way as the seat and the shingle before me. But now the transformation caused by this emotion, makes me aware that the set of vivid states I call my hand has some connexion