issued an Edict which is identical in the principal points.

The Reform of the Provincial Administration received not less attention. It was at first intended to be applied, like so many of Stein's reforms, only to the Province of Prussia, but after such a measure had been prepared the resolution was taken to extend it to the whole Monarchy. The work of revision thus made necessary was not completed till November 19th, and accordingly this measure also did not become law until Stein had ceased to be Minister. The Ordinance for an improved arrangement of the Provincial Police and Finance Boards bears date December 26th, 1808. These two Ordinances are the basis of the existing Administration of Prussia, and it will be seen that they are both substantially the work of Stein. In details, of course, the system which they created has undergone much alteration both in the time of Hardenberg and since.

The first of these Ordinances (in the form which Stein gave it) offers a striking contrast in its length to the Emancipating Edict, the few and short. paragraphs of which I was able to give nearly in full. It occupies fifty very closely printed pages in Pertz. I must endeavour to select the principal points. Here is the introduction.

It is decreed that a new arrangement of the administrative system, improved and adapted to the progress made by the spirit of the time, to the altered situation which external circumstances have brought about, and to the new requirements of the State, be introduced.

All arrangements up to this time existing in respect to the administration of affairs are entirely abolished.

The principal object of the new constitution is to give to the

administration of affairs the greatest possible unity, energy and activity, to cause it to converge to a highest point, and in the simplest and most convenient manner to place at its disposal all the powers of the whole nation and of the individual. To this end the direction of the Government will henceforth proceed from a single higher point immediately subordinate to the Head of the State.

From this point not only will the whole be overseen but a powerful direct influence will at the same time be brought to bear on the administration. The smallest possible number of highest officials will stand at the head of Departments simply and naturally assigned to the principal branches of administration; in closest connexion with the Ruler they will guide the Departments according to his commands communicated to them directly, combining independence and free initiative with complete responsibility, and in this way they will work upon the administration of the lower organs, which will be formed in the same way.

The nation will receive a share corresponding to its true interest and to the end aimed at in the conduct of the Government, inasmuch as opportunity will be given to distinguished talent in every rank and situation to display itself for the benefit of the administration, and inasmuch as newly organised Estates of the Kingdom and their representatives will be summoned to deliberation alone or in conjunction with State officials, the former in Assemblies of Estates constitutionally formed, the latter in the subordinate organs of the State. In this way the developement of the nation will be promoted, public spirit awakened, and the whole conduct of affairs made simpler, stronger and less costly.

A comprehensive programme!

The chief means of restoring unity to the administration is the creation or, we might say, the revival of the Council of State."

It

This is to be under the presidency of the King or some Representative named for the purpose. is to consist of (a) the Princes of the Royal Family who have attained the age of 18 years, (6) all the Ministers, (c) certain Privy Councillors; these are

to be of various classes, for instance, any persons in whom the King may have confidence, past Ministers, heads of sub-divisions of the Ministerial Departments, particularly the Interior and Finance, Referendaries without vote, selected from the provincial governments, to form a political seminary (Pepinière).

This Council, like the General Directory, is to conduct ordinary business in Divisions, a Minister presiding. The Ministries are five in number, (1) the Interior, (2) Finance, (3) Foreign Affairs, (4) War, (5) Justice. But there is also to be a Cabinet composed almost solely of Ministers and presided over by any Member of the Council whom the King may nominate for that purpose.

But the Council also assembles as a whole (Plenum) under the presidency of the King or Member of the Council named by him. All legislation, all matters affecting more than one Department or questions in dispute between Departments, with a general control of the administration, as well as appointments to certain higher posts, and the accounts of the Ministers, are to be brought before the Plenum.

Then follows the organisation of the different Departments.

The Department of the Interior is sub-divided into (a) the Department of general Police, (6) the Department of Trade, (c) the Department of Cultus and Public Instruction, (d) the Department of General Legislation for Finance and the Interior, (e) the Department of Health, (f) the Department of Mining, Coinage, Salt and Porcelain Manufacture.

S. II.

14

The Department of Finance is sub-divided into (a) the Department of Treasury, Bank and Lottery, (6) the Department of Domains and Forests, (c) the Department of Direct and Indirect Taxes.

The Heads of these sub-divisions are in most cases also to be Members of the Council.

Such is the outline of Stein's scheme as contained in the Ordinance which received the royal assent but was not published. The Ministry which succeeded him however recommended the King to postpone the creation of the Council of State until his return to Berlin; it seemed to them a cumbrous machine. Accordingly in the actual law of December 18th, particular regulations as to the Council of State were reserved, though it was still spoken of as the great organ of administration. When Hardenberg in October 1810 legislated on this subject, the Council of State took a somewhat new character. In this scheme it retains the legislative powers which Stein gave to the Plenum of his Council, but loses its function of controlling the administration. In this new character it was realised, though not till 1817, and still nominally subsists, but has now little practical importance since the work of legislation now naturally belongs to the Parliament. Meanwhile a new body, the Ministry of State or collective assembly of Ministers, was created. Such an assembly is vaguely referred to in the Ordinance of December 18th, 1808. In Hardenberg's time it began its effective existence, and is now, in Mr Morier's words, the real centre of the entire mechanism.

In this point then there has been a serious

departure from Stein's idea. The administration gained no doubt as much unity as he intended, but not so much steadiness. Relieved from all control, the Ministerial system acquired a growing omnipotence unknown alike to the French and English administrative system1,' and Prussia became 'the country of Europe in which the Ministerial system was most decisively developed2.' Even the introduction of a Parliament, a generation later, has, according to the same authority, in some respects increased instead of diminishing this cen-. tralisation.

It may be well to warn the reader at the same time against the notion which is likely to occur to him, that this departure from Stein's plan was in the direction of the English system. Even now the Ministry of State is widely different from the English Cabinet.

The Prussian Minister President is functionally only the chairman of a Board. It is the Board which decides, by a majority of votes. Whenever therefore an important question, such as a new law or any other matter for which the Constitution requires the sanction of the Ministry of State in its corporate capacity, is brought before it, the Minister President runs the risk in common with each of his colleagues of being outvoted, without this in any way constitutionally altering his position or requiring his resignation'.

But in the absence of Parliaments such a Ministry of State, being utterly uncontrolled, would have scarcely any resemblance to an English Cabinet, which is only too rigidly and vexatiously controlled,