tion of freight of a whole cargo be made, the underwriter will not be liable beyond the extent of the freight of the goods put on board. This doctrine applies equally to an insurance upon cargo; and the insured, on a valued policy on cargo, will not recover beyond the interest he had at risk. There must be a total loss of the whole subject matter of insurance to which the valuation applied, whether the insurance was on goods, or upon freight. The valuation fixes the price of the whole subject at risk, but it does not admit that the property on which the valuation was made was on board the vessel. If, therefore, certain articles be comprised in a valuation, and part are safely landed before the ship is lost, the valuation must be opened, and the claim of the insured reduced in the proportion which the articles actually lost bore to the valuation of the whole at the commencement of the risk.c (6.) Of wager policies. A mere hope or expectation, without some interest in the subject matter, is a wager policy, and all such marine policies are, by statute, in England, declared void." But the English courts have refined greatly, in considering what is an interest sufficient to sustain a policy, and to place it out of the reach of the prohibition. If a person be directly liable to loss in the happening of Forbes v. Aspinall, 13 East's Rep. 323. Parker, Ch. J., Haven v. Gray, 12 Mass. Rep. 71. Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Company, 4 Pick. Rep. 429. Brooke v. Louis. Ins. Company, 4 Martin, N. S. 640. 681. If much less property was shipped than was expected to be on board, the assured, though it be a valued policy, can recover only, in case of loss, a proportion pro rata. Alsop v. The Comm. Ins. Company, 1 Sum451. ner, • Benecke on Indemnity, 146. d 19 Geo. II. c. 37. с any particular event, as if he be an insurer, or *be answerable as owner for the negligence of the master, he has an insurable interest. A creditor, to whom property is assigned as collateral security, has an insurable interest to the amount of his debt. In the case of Lucena v. Craufurd, the distinction between a reasonable expectation of gain in the shape of freight, commissions or profits, founded on some interest in the subject matter which was to produce them, and a mere shadowy hope or expectation, was fully and very ably investigated in the Court of Common Pleas, and in the House of Lords, and great talents were displayed and exhausted upon that litigated point. The decision was, that commissions to become due to public agents, and all reasonable expectation of profits, were insurable interests. The interest need not be a property in the subject insured. It is sufficient if a loss of the subject would bring upon the insured a pecuniary loss, or intercept a profit. Interest does not necessarily imply a right to, or property in, the subject insured. It may consist in having some relation to, or concern in, the subject of the insurance, and which relation or concern may be so affected by the peril as to produce damage. Where a person is so circumstanced, he is interested in the safety of the thing, for he receives a benefit from its existence, and a prejudice from its destruction, and that interest is, in the view of the English law, a lawful subject of insurance.d • Walker v. Maitland, 5 Barnw. & Ald. 171. Wells v. Philadelphia Ins. Company, 9 Serg. & Rawle, 103. Alien, or an interest in the nature of a lien, is an insurable interest. Hancox v. Fishing Ins. Company, 3 Sumner, 132. 3 Bos. & Pull. 75. 5 ibid. 269. Lawrence, J., in 5 Bos. & Pull. 302, 303, 304. Hughes on Insurance, 30. An equitable, as well as a legal interest, and an interest held under an *277 It was admitted by the judges of the Court of K. B., in Craufurd v. Hunter, that, at common law, prior to the statute of Geo. II., wager policies were not illegal; and the courts have been very much embarrassed in their endeavours to draw the line of distinction between wagers that were and were not admissible in courts of justice. The law has been *thought to descend from its dignity when it lends its aid to recover the fruits of an idle and frivolous wager. In Good v. Elliot, Mr. J. Buller made a vigorous, but unsuccessful stand, against suits upon wagers in any case; and nothing could have been more impertinent than the wager in that case, which was, whether one third person had purchased a wagon of another. Many of the cases stated by Mr. J. Buller, were of a nature to draw into discussion, and unnecessarily affect, the character or feelings of third persons; and to sustain suits upon such wanton wagers, would be a disgrace to any administration of justice. The case of Jones v. Randall,c went quite far enough, when it sustained an action upon a wager, whether a decree in Chancery would be reversed on appeal to the House of Lords. If wagers are to be allowed in any case, as valid ground for a suit, the betting on the return of a ship, in the shape of a policy without interest, is as harmless as any that could be devised. In Egerton v. Furzeman,d it was ruled in the English courts, that a wager on a battle between two dogs was illegal, and not the ground of action. In New-York, the courts had formerly assumed it to be a clear and settled principle of the common law, executory contract, are valid subjects of insurance. Columbian Insurance Company v. Lawrence, 2 Peters' Sup. C. Rep. 25. Cowp. Rep. 37. a1 Carr. & Payne, 613. that a policy in which the insured had no interest, and which was, in fact, nothing more than a wager or bet between the parties to the contract, whether such a voyage would be performed, or such a ship arrive safe, was a valid contract. It was only required that the wager should concern an innocent transaction, and not be contrary to good morals or sound policy.b But now, by statute, all wagers, bets or stakes, *278 made to depend upon any lot, chance, casualty, or unknown, or contingent event whatever, are declared to be unlawful, with the exception of contracts on bottomry or respondentia, and all insurances made in good faith for the security or indemnity of the party insured. The statute has effectually destroyed wager policies; for they are not within the exception. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court expressed a strong opinion against the validity of a wager policy, and the doctrine there is, that all gaming is unlawful according to the general policy and laws of the commonwealth. In Pennsylvania, every species of gambling policy, and all actions upon a wager or bet, are reprobated, and they follow the principles, while they do not acknowledge the authority, of the English statute in the reign of George II. Wager policies, without any real inter Juhel v. Church, 2 Johns. Cas. 333. dening v. Church, 3 Caines' Rep. 141. 6 Cowen's Rep. 318. Abbot v. Sebor, 3 ibid. 39. Clen- Mount & Wardell v. Waites, 7 ibid. 406. 662. sec. 8, 9, 10. Bunn v. Riker, 4 Johns. Rep. 426. 434. Campbell v. Richardson, 10 ibid. New-York Revised Statutes, vol. i. Amory v. Gilman, 2 Mass. Rep. 1. Babcock v. Thompson, 3 Pick. Rep. 446. Pritchett v. Insurance Co. of North America, 3 Yeates' Rep. 464. Craig v. Murgatroyd, 4 ibid. 168. Adams v. Pennsylvania Ins. Company, 1 Rawle, 107. In Vermont it is held, that no suit will lie to recover property won of another by a bet or wager. Collamer v. Day, 2 Vermont Rep. 144. Wager contracts, or bets on elections, are void. Lloyd v. Leisenring, 7 ests to support them, are condemned also by positive ordinances in France, and in most of the commercial nations of Europe.a (4.) Of reassurance and double insurance. After an insurance has been made, the insurer may have the entire sum he hath insured, reassured to *279 him by some *other insurer. The object of this is indemnity against his own act; and if he gives a less premium for the reassurance, all his gain is the difference between what he receives as a premium for the original insurance, and what he gives for the indemnity against his own policy. If he gives as much for reassurance, he gains nothing by the transaction; and if he gives a higher premium, as insurers will sometimes do to cover a dangerous risk, he becomes a loser by his original insurance. These reassurances are prohibited in England, except in special cases, by the statute of 19 Geo. II. c. 37; and also by every country in Europe, but they are allowed with us.b The contract of reassurance is totally distinct from, and unconnected with, the primitive insurance; and the reassured is obliged to prove the loading and value of the goods, and the existence and extent of the loss, in the same manner as if Watts, 294. No action upon any wager or bet can be sustained. Edgell v. M'Laughlin, 6 Wharton, 176. a Ord. de la Mar. liv. 3. tit. 6. Des Ass. art. 22. 1 Emerigon, 264. In Scotland, the rule of the civil law relative to Sponsiones ludicra was early adopted as common law, and no wager or gaming contract will support an action. 1 Bell's Com. 300. Code de Commerce, art. 357. Ord. of Genoa, of Middleburg, of Rotterdam, of Amsterdam, of Hamburg and Stockholm, collected in 2 Magens, 65. 68. 88. 132. 229.257. Roccus, de Assecur. n. 88. The latter refers to a decision of the Rota of Genoa, in which the principle is declared, si non adest risicum, assecuratio non valet ; nam non adest materia in qua forma posset fundari. Decisiones Rota Genua, 55. n. 9. b Hastie v. De Peyster, 3 Caines' Rep. 190. Merry v. Prince, 2 Mass. Rep. 176. |