Nor is a protest of an inland bill or promissory note generally deemed necessary in this country, though the practice is to have bills drawn in one state on persons in another, protested by a notary, and the act of the state of Kentucky of 1798, c. 57, seemed to require it." It is also necessary in Virginia, and the omission to

seem to be in use, if not required by statute. Bullard & Curry's Digest, vol. i. 40. In Georgia, the notarial protest of inland bills for non-accept. ance or non-payment is required, if the amount of the bill be £20 ster. or upwards. Hotchkiss's Code of Statute Law, pp. 437, 438.

a

Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters' U. S. Rep. 170. Nicholls v. Webb, 8 Wheaton, 326. But in Rice v. Hogan, 8 Dana, 135, it was held, that a protest was not necessary, even in the case of a foreign bill, as between the drawer and acceptor, under the act of Kentucky, of 1837. Miller v. Hackley, 5 Johns. Rep. 375. In this last case it was said, that a bill drawn in NewYork on Charleston, or any other place within the United States, was an inland bill. A protest is not necessary in Connecticut, in the case of a bill drawn in one state and payable in another. Bay v. Church, 15 Conn. R. 15 ; nor in New-Jersey on inland bills. Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harr. 487. But in South Carolina and in Pennsylvania, a bill drawn in one state, upon a person residing in another, is considered in the light of a foreign bill, requiring a protest. (Duncan v. Course, 1 S. C. Const. Rep. 100. Cape Fear Bank v. Stinemetz, 1 Hill, 44. Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. Cir. Rep. 148.) The opinion in New-York was not given on the point on which the decision rested; and it was rather the opinion of Mr. Justice Van Ness, than that of the court; but he was supported by Mr. Tucker, (see Tucker's Blackstone, vol. ii. 467, note 22,) and also by Marius on Bills, 2, who held that bills between England and Scotland were inland bills. The decision in South Carolina was a solemn adjudication, after argument, on the very question; and the weight of American authority is, therefore, on that side. In Buckner v. Finley & Van Lear, 2 Peters' U. S. Rep. 586, it was decided, that bills of exchange drawn in one state, on persons living in another, were to be treated as foreign bills; and this decision, I apprehend, puts the point at rest. See, also, Phoenix Bank v. Hussey, 12 Pick. 483. Brown v. Ferguson, 4 Leigh's Rep. 37. Dickens v. Beal, 10 Peters' U. S. Rep. 573. Bank of U. S. v. Daniel, 12 Peters' Rep. 54. Rice v. Hogan, 8 Dana, 134. Halliday v. M'Dougall, 20 Wendell, 81. Carter v. Burley, 9 N. H. Rep. 558. This is also the rule as between England and Scotland, and England and Ireland. Mahoney v. Ashlin, 2 B. & Adolp. 478. Every bill, says Mr. Justice Story, (Comm. on Bills of Exchange, 28,) ought to be treated as a foreign bill, which is drawn in one country upon another country, not gov. erned throughout by the same homogeneous or municipal laws.

give notice of the protest of an inland bill, causes the loss of interest and damages. After the protest for non-acceptance, immediate notice must be given to the drawer and endorser, in order to fix them, and the omission would not be cured by the bill being presented for payment, and subsequent notice of the non-payment, as well as non-acceptance. The drawer or endorser may be sued forthwith upon the protest for non-acceptance, without waiting until the bill is also presented *for payment, and refused, and the holder will be #95 entitled to his interest and costs, and like damages, as in case of non-payment. The English law requiring protest and notice of non-acceptance of foreign bills, has been adopted and followed as the true rule of mercantile law in the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New-York, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina. But the Supreme Court of the

• Willock v. Riddle, 5 Call. 358.

Roscow v. Hardy, 3 Campb. Rep. 458. United States v. Barker, 4 Wash. Cir. Rep. 464. Thompson v. Cumming, 2 Leigh's Rep. 321.

• Milford v. Mayor, Doug. Rep. 55. Ballingalls v. Gloster, 3 East's Rep. 481. Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 336. Evans v. Gee, 11 Peters' Rep. 80. Evans v. Bridges, 4 Porter's Ala. Rep. 348. Whitehead v. Walker, 9 Meeson Welsby, 506. Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johnson's R. 202. Story on Bills, 367, 368. In Mississippi, by statute, no suit lies on protest for non-acceptance merely, before the maturity of the bill. Sadler v. Murrah, 3 Howard, 195. So, by the French law, the holder of a bill is bound to present it for payment at its maturity, though already protested for non-acceptance. The protest for non-acceptance only obliges the drawer and endorsers, on due notice, to give security for payment of the bill when due, if not then paid. Code de Com. art. 120. Pothier, de Change, n. 133. But if a bill be drawn on France and endorsed in New-York, the endorser is liable forthwith on protest for non-acceptance, though never presented for payment in France. The law of the place of the endorsement governs the liability of the endorser. Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wendell's R. 439. Pardessus, Droit Com. tome v. art. 1488-1499. Chitty on Bills, 505, 506. Story on Promissory Notes, 404-408. This is the true rule, though the case of Rothschild v. Currie, 1 Adolp. & Ellis, N. S. 43, is to the contrary.

• Watson v. Loring, 3 Mass. Rep. 557. Sterry v. Robinson, 1 Day's Rep.

United States, in Brown v. Barry, and in Clarke v. Russel,b held, that in an action on a protest for non-payment on a foreign bill, protest for non-acceptance, or a notice of the non-acceptance, need not be shown, inasmuch as they were not required by the customs of merchants in this country, and those decisions have been followed in Pennsylvania; protest for non-payment is sufficient.c It becomes, therefore, a little difficult to know what is. the true rule of the law merchant in the United States on this point, after such contradictory decisions. The Scotch law is the same as the English ;d and it appears to me, that the English rule is the better doctrine, and the most consistent with commercial policy.

If the bill has been accepted, demand of payment must be made on the day when the bill falls due; and it must be made by the holder or his agent upon the acceptor, at the place appointed for payment, or at his house or residence, or regular known place of his monied business, or upon him personally if no particular place be appointed, and it cannot be made by letter through the post office. In default of payment, in

11. Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns. Rep. 202. Weldon v. Buck, 4 ibid. 144. Winthrop v. Pepoon, 1 Bay's Rep. 468. Philips v. M'Curdy, 1 Harr. & Johns. 187. Thompson v. Cumming, 2 Leigh's Rep. 321. 1 Hawk. Rep. 195. The French and German law is the same. Heineccius and Pardessus,

cited in Story on Bills, 300.

3 Dallas' Rep. 365.

Cited in 6 Serg. & Rawle, 358.

Read v. Adams, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 356. Mr. Justice Story (Story on Bills, 299) says, that the early decisions of the Supreme Court, if now held to be law, would be so held only on the ground of the local law of Pennsylvania, as to bills drawn or payable there.

d 1 Bell's Comm. 408.

• Saunderson v. Judge, 2 H. Blacks. Rep. 509. Stedman v. Gooch, 1 Esp. N. P. Rep. 3. Berkshire Bank v. Jones, 6 Mass. Rep. 524. State Bank v. Hurd, 12 ibid. 172. Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns. Rep. 202. Whittier v. Graffam, 3 Greenleaf, 82. Stuckert v. Anderson, 3 Wharton, 116. Lenox v. Roberts, 2 Wheaton, 373. Mills v. Bank U. S. 11 Id. 431. Chitty

whole or in part, protest must be forthwith made by a notary at the place of payment, and under the formalities prescribed at that place, as in the case of protest for non-acceptance, and it must be made on the last day of grace.a But there is a great deal *of perplexity and confusion in the cases on this #96 subject, arising from refined distinctions and dis

cordant opinions; and it becomes very difficult to know what is precisely the law of the land, as to the sufficiency of the demand upon the maker of the note, or the acceptor of the bill. If there be no particular and certain place identified and appointed, other than the city at large, and the party has no residence there, the bill may be protested in the city on the day without inquiry, for that would be an idle attempt. The general principle is, that due diligence must be used to find out the party, and make the demand; and the inquiry will always be, whether, under the circumstances of the case, due diligence has been used. The agent of the holder in one case used the utmost diligence for several weeks, to find the residence of the endorser, in order to give him notice of the dishonour of the bill, and then took a day to consult his principal before he gave the notice, and it was held sufficient. If the party has

on Bills, 402. Code de Comm. art. 161. Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison's N. J. Rep. 487. The rule in general is, unless otherwise required by statute, that the place of payment need not be expressly stated in the bill; and it will be implied in the absence of all controlling circumstances, to be by law the place of residence of the drawee, or where his address is on the face of the bill. Story on Bills, 62. He says again, at p. 259, the general rule is, that presentment of a bill must be made at the place of the domicil of the drawce, without any regard to its being drawn payable generally, or payable at a particular place specified.

• Union Bank v. Hyde, 6 Wheaton, 572. Bank of Rochester v. Gray, 2 Hill, 297. 1 Bell's Comm. 415. Story on Bills, 447, 448.

Boot v. Franklin, 3 Johns. Rep. 207.

Firth v. Thrush, 8 Barnw. & Cress. 387. Delay in presentment or

absconded, that will, as a general rule, excuse the demand. If he has changed his residence to some other place, within the same state or jurisdiction, the holder must make endeavours to find it, and make the demand there; though if he has removed out of the state, subsequent to the making of the note or accepting the bill, it is sufficient to present the same at his former place of residence. If there be no other evidence of the maker's residence than the date of the paper, the holder must make inquiry at the place of the date; and the presumption is, that the maker resides where the note

is dated, and that he contemplated payment at *97 that place. But it is presumption *only; and if the maker resides elsewhere within the state. when the note falls due, and that be known to the holder, demand must be made at the maker's place of residence.e

The rule in the English law is, that if a bill or pro

giving notice will be excused, if produced by inevitable accident or obstruction. Story on Bills, 256. 258.

a 1 Ld. Raymond, anon. 743. Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. Rep. 45. 4 Serg. & Rawle, 480. Leghman v. Jones, 1 Watts & Serg. 129.

Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns. Rep. 114. M'Gruder v. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheat. Rep. 598. Bayley on Bills, edit. Boston, 126. Gillespie v. Hannahan, 4 M'Cord, 503. Reid v. Morrison, 2 Watts & Serg. 401. Story on Bills, 403. 412. Wheeler v. Field, 6 Metcalf, 290.

• Fisher v. Evans, 5 Binney, 541. Lowery v. Scott, 24 Wendell, 358. And if the domicil of the maker be in one state, and he dates and makes the note in another, payment may be demanded at the place of date, if the maker has no known place of business in the state. Story on Promissory Notes, 282. sec. 236. Taylor v. Snyder, New-York Legal Observer for January, 1846. d Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines' Rep. 127. Duncan v. M'Cullough, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 480. Lowery v. Scott, 24 Wendell, 358.

Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns. Rep. 114. Galpin v. Hard, 3 M'Cord, 394. In North Carolina, endorsers of promissory notes are held liable as sureties, and no previous demand on the maker is requisite. But this provision does not apply to inland or foreign bills of exchange. Revised Statutes of N. C., 1837, vol. i. 95.