to his work; will increase both the number of its readers, and the degree of attention with which it is read. When such men as he take up a subject, it is also a proof that the interest excited by it is high; and that the men of his class are affected as he is. If we are but enabled to indulge in this hope, the reforms which we long to see realized in our own colonies, and of which the demand is so unspeakably great, may after all receive even their acceleration from France-from that country which insisted upon the faculty of dragging slaves during five years from the African coast.

The grand object of de Sismondi's discourse is, to produce a conviction in the people of France, that the persuasion in which they have been nurtured with respect to their personal interests is altogether a mistake ;-that it really is not for the advantage of France or of the French people to embark in the African slavetrade, setting the interests of humanity altogether out of the question; that France will have less riches and fewer people; will be less happy and less powerful by embarking in that trade than by standing disengaged from it. The course of argument which he pursues is rather addressed to the thinking few, than the ignorant and precipitate many. But the principles on which he grounds his conclusions have long been established in political science; and there are persons of influence in the government of France, upon whose minds they cannot fail to produce their natural effect. Another advantage attends the scientific arguments of de Sismondi. They are unanswerable; and the pretexts by which the slave-trade may still be maintained, will now, to the reflecting part of the French nation, stand exposed in their true colours, as the odious offspring either of contemptible ignorance or disgusting hypocrisy. The classes of men whose cry is understood to have had the principal efficacy in working upon the government to demand a temporary enjoyment of the slave-trade are two: 1st, the emigrant nobles now restored to their country, many of whom possessed estates in the colonies; and 2dly, the merchants, including the planters. The influence of the last class we cannot regard as very formidable. That of the former is, we strongly dread, a great deal too powerful for the interest both of France and of Europe. If the people of France, however, were made to understand that the interest of that country really is at variance on this important ground, with that of these two narrow classes of men, or at least what they understand by their interest, it is impossible to tell beforehand what would be the extent of its effects. The infu

ence of the public mind upon the government of France is unfortunately small; but in the present case other powers would not be wanting to contribute their influence.

The sort of argument which Sismondi pursues is this: To reestablish the French colonies, to renew the stock of slaves, of buildings, of cattle, of machinery, and other requisites for the culture of sugar and other colonial produce, a vast capital is required; a capital much greater than, previous to calculation, any body would easily suppose. The black population, the slaves of St. Domingo, he says, were in the time of its prosperity estimated at 450,000. To purchase these, even at the current price, and without making any allowance for the extraordinary enhancement which so great a demand would tend to produce, there would be required, at the rate of one hundred louis per head, forty-five millions of louis; a sum, he says, equal perhaps to all the disposable riches of France. Besides, five years only are allowed, by the terms of the treaty, to supply St. Domingo with her complement of slaves. Whole nations, at this rate, must be swept out of Africa, and poured forth upon the coasts of St. Domingo: a project, he says, equally revolting to the intellectual and moral principles of our nature. Supposing the conquest of the island to cost two years: three years only will remain to transport from Africa 450,000 slaves. Before 1789, that is, before the troubles which subverted the ancient state of St. Domingo, 18,000 slaves used to be imported into that island in what was called a good year. Supposing that no more than one-tenth of the number of slaves who formerly constituted the labouring population of St. Domingo are imported, the purchase to France will cost four million five hundred thousand louis. But according to the calculation of all the planters, the purchase of the slaves constitutes not one-half of the expense of the establishment. It constitutes only about three-eighths of that expense. Three more are requisite for the expenses of culture, and two for those of buildings, animals, and commodities. According to these particulars, it appears that the manufacturing establishment alone, without at all reckoning the expenses of the government, and the charges of war, would require from France a disbursement of two hundred and eightyeight millions of francs; that is, twelve millions sterling.

Such then would be the outgoing. Let us next contemplate the representation which he produces of what may be expected to be the incomings. Two years, he says, must elapse before any returns whatsoever can be expected from these advances. For an estimate of the produce which may be obtained at the end

of these two years he takes as a standard, the experience of the colony in the most flourishing of its former days. The plantations, he says, produced only about eight per cent. upon the capital which they absorbed.

This then, according to our author, is the rate of gain upon the employment of capital in the colonies. To know in what degree it affects the interest of France, we have to compare it with the rate of profit in the other employments to which this capital, if not expatriated to St. Domingo, might by Frenchmen be applied. The result of the comparison is somewhat remarkable. The profit of stock in St. Domingo, says our author, can be expected, even if circumstances should be highly favourable, to amount to only 8 per cent. But the current rate of profit on the ordinary employments of stock in France is 16 per cent.

The greatness of this disproportion, we confess, surprises us. It is the smallness of the profits on stock employed in the plantations which startles us the most; for even the high rate of 16 per cent. under the great scarcity of capital which prevails in France, is perhaps not more than it generally produces. If, however, the proportions are correctly given, we may take comfort to ourselves. The number of slaves whom the clause in the treaty will condemn to be torn from Africa, will not, in these eircumstances, be remarkably great. The ill-founded hopes of exorbitant gain which always delude a certain number of persons on the opening of new channels of trade, will no doubt draw a portion of capital to the colonies. But the current soon will run itself dry, if the produce is only half as great as that which may be obtained in the ordinary commerce of the mother country.

Such then is one department of the picture; and it is only one department. The capital which will be demanded to re-establish the French West India plantations appears to be of a certain amount; that is a great amount, and the return which may be expected from it is extremely moderate.

But this capital, with which the French plantations must be re-established, whence is it to be drawn? From the capital of what country must it be deducted? From that of France. But how is France situated in regard to capital? Only one sentiment, we conclude, can possibly be entertained upon that subject. France is to an extraordinary degree exhausted of capital; and can spare no portion of that which, after so many dilapidations, she has saved, without the greatest possible inconvenience and detriment. At no period, says Mons. de Sismondi, had France a capital adequate to her extensive demands; and the revolution, with the frequent and abrupt changes in her system of

political economy, have destroyed, by repeated operations, the funds which she had slowly accumulated. Never was there a nation which had more cause than France has, at the present moment, to watch over, to husband and cherish the remains of her capital; that she may revive with it the industry of her people, and the internal commerce of the country. And yet it is at this extraordinary moment that it is proposed by certain of her people, and some of them it is to be feared of great influence in her governing councils, to expose her to a drain of her capital such as no nation could, without material inconvenience, sustain.

The irresistible force of this argument, drawn from the nature and operations of capital, cannot fail to carry the most perfect conviction to the mind of every man who is acquainted with the science of political economy. To others, at first sight, it may appear somewhat obscure; but a very few words, we think, will suffice to place it in a clear light to every body.

Capital is, in reality, neither more nor less than the means of setting people to work. France has already too little means to set her own people to work. And in this situation some of her politicians propose, that a great proportion of these means shall be taken away, to buy Africans and set them to work. What is the consequence? Plainly this,-that a great proportion of the people of France must remain without employment; while it is provided for men of another country, in another quarter of the globe.

That it is a true account of capital, to say that it is the means of setting people to work, every one may easily understand. In order to set people to work, somebody must afford them the means of subsistence while they are at work; and must afford those means of subsistence without re-imbursement, for such a length of time as suffices to complete the commodity in the production of which he employs them, to carry it to the market, sell it, and get payment. Thus, for example, the farmer is obliged to find the means of subsistence for his servants for a year; that is, till he has ploughed his ground, sowed his corn, and till the corn has had time to grow, to be sold and paid for. It is evident that he must have money sufficient for all this, before he can begin to farm; and this money, necessary in this manner to set people to work in agriculture, is the capital necessary for agriculture. A previous stock of money, is also necessary to purchase all the materials and instruments with which the work is to be done; to purchase the ploughs, and carts, and animals, with which a farm needs to be supplied. All this accumulation of

money, or of money's worth, which must previously exist, in order to set people to work, whether in agriculture or in manufaetures, is capital. And without this, it is evident, people cannot be set to work. Suppose any number of men; but nobody with food to maintain them while employed, or money to purchase any of the materials or instruments necessary to their work, they must remain idle; and as there is nothing with which to support them, they must starve. Capital, therefore, is a matter infinitely precious. The well being of the population of every country, and the prosperity or misery of the country itself, altogether depend upon it. When capital in any country increases, then the people and the country are prosperous; when it decreases, then they are unprosperous.

Now, then, after this explanation, we presume there is nobody who will not understand what is the misfortnne which is about to be inflicted upon France. That country, as every body will allow, is greatly deficient in point of capital. War is the grand destroyer of that great instrument of human happiness and prosperity-capital. France has long been wasted by that dreadful Scourge. And there exists a vast deficiency in the means of setting her people to work; that is, of yielding them employment and subsistence. Of these means, already so deficient, a very large proportion, if she persists in the resolution of re-establishing her colonies, must be carried off for that distant employment; and in that same proportion must her own people, at home, be left devoid of the means of employment, that is, of the means of subsistence; and must consequently perish for want.

Nor is it only the enormous capital, requisite to replace the stock of slaves and other instruments of cultivation in the West Indies, that must be withdrawn from France. To conquer St. Domingo, an expensive war will be required; and every farthing which that war will cost must be withdrawn from the capital of France, that is, from the means of giving employment and subsistence to the people.

What Mons. de Sismondi, therefore, recommends, is this: that France should forbear engaging in the colonial trade altogether; because she has not sufficient capital for the home trade of France, and the colonial trade both together; and it is of much greater importance for her to have a good home trade, than a colonial trade.

Another consideration which he urges we must also mention ; but shall endeavour to explain it in few words. The sanguine expectation of great returns from the capital which may be employed in the West Indies, a sanguine expectation which is in so