Submitted May 20, 1895. Decided June 3, 1895. 0 IN CERTIFICATE from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit certifying questions to this court for its decision as to the jurisdiction of the circuit court in an action brought by a receiver in a creditor's suit against a corporation, to recover debts due to it. Question answered in the affirmative. Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: This case arose upon a certificate of the court of appeals for the sixth circuit, based upon the following facts: The Cardiff Coal & Iron Company, a corporation of Tennessee, becoming insolvent, a creditor's bill was filed in the circuit court for the eastern district of Tennessee by George F. Bosworth, a citizen of Massachusetts and a judgment creditor of the company, setting forth the insolvency of the company, the wasting of its assets, etc., and praying for a sale of the property, the collection of its choses in action, the appointment of a receiver, and for an injunction. In pursuance of the prayer of this bill the appellee, Ewing, was appointed receiver of the company, ordered to take possession of its assets, and to manage and protect the same for the benefit of the creditors under orders from the court. All creditors were ordered to file their claims. Subsequently the receiver filed a petition stating that a large proportion of the company's assets consisted of promissory notes, amounting to about $225,000, given for land purchased from the company, upon which liens had been retained to secure their payment. These notes were executed by 130 different persons and were for various amounts, many of them for less than $2000. The receiver petitioned for authority from the court to institute suits for the collection of such notes, stating that, in order to save costs and 37] expense, he had been advised that it was proper, if it might be done, to bring in all the debtors by bill or petition and join them as defendants in one suit; that he was requested by the creditors to proceed in this manner; and NOTE-As to jurisdiction of United States circuit court dependent on residence of parties; proper place of suit, see note to Roberts v. Lewis, 36: 579. As to amount necessary to give jurisdiction in circuit court cases prior to act of 1875; amount necessary since 1875; amount in dispute, see note to Schunk v. Moline, M. & S. Co. 37: 256. As to power and duties of receivers, see note to Davis v. Gray, 21: 447. that to sue the debtors separately would require more than one hundred suits with the enormous expense incident thereto. In compliance with this petition, the court made an order that the receiver be directed to institute suit by proper bill or petition in the pending case against all persons indebted to the defendant company (the Cardiff Coal & Iron Company) by note or account, as set forth in his petition. In pursuance of this order, the receiver filed his bill in the circuit court against 130 persons, of whom thirty were alleged to be citizens of Tennessee, and the remainder citizens of other states, all of whom were joined as defendants, and the amounts alleged to be due from them, respectively, were in most cases less than $2000. It was also alleged that special liens were retained in each case in the deed to the purchaser, to secure the deferred payments of the purchase money, and the court was asked to enforce such liens by sale of the lands, for the satisfaction of the balance of the purchase money due separately from each and all said defendants, upon their respective notes. The resident defendants were personally served with subpœna, and an order of publication made against the nonresident defendants. No exception was taken to the form of the bill by demurrer or otherwise; and the defendants nearly all answered, denying their liability. The case was referred to a master, and on his report decrees were entered against those found to be indebted; such decrees being in a majority of instances for sums less than $2000. The lots were ordered to be sold to pay the amounts so found due. Appeals from these decrees were duly taken to the circuit court of appeals, and per perfected by the appellants in this case. Upon this statement of facts, the circuit court of appeals certified the following question to this court for its determination: "Had the circuit court of the United States in a general *creditor's suit properly pending [38 therein for the collection, administration, and distribution of the assets of an insolvent cor poration, the jurisdiction to hear and determine an ancillary suit instituted in the same cause by its receiver in accordance with its order, against debtors of such corporation, sc far as in said suit, the receiver claimed the right to recover from any one debtor a sum not exceeding $2000." Messrs. Heber J. May, Tully R. Cor. nick, John F. McNutt, and John W. Yoe for appellants. Messrs. Robert Pritchard, Foster V. Brown, and Frank Spurlock for appellee. Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court: While the receiver prayed in his petition to bring in all the debtors by bill or petition in one suit, alleging that it was so requested by creditors, in order to avoid the expense of a separate suit against each; and the bill was brought in that form against 130 defendants, who were charged to be severally indebted upon notes given for lots of land purchased from the company. No exception was taken to the form of the bill by demurrer or otherwise, but the defendants answered, denying their Mability. The question certified does not, as we understand it, demand the opinion of this court as to whether a single bill against all these defendants would lie for the amounts severally due by them (upon which point we do not feel called upon to express an opinion); but whether, so far as in said suit the receiver claimed the right to recover from any one debtor a sum not exceeding $2000, the court had jurisdiction to render a judgment against them. This question must be answered in the affirmative. As was observed by this court in Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 479 [37:815, 818]: "When a court exercising a jurisdiction in equity appoints a receiver to hold the property of a corporation, that court assumes the administration of the estate; the possession of 39] the receiver is the possession of the court; and the courtitself holds and administers the estate, through the receiver as its officer, for the benefit of those whom the court shall ultimately adjudge to be entitled to it." which attaches to such indorsee, but he takes title by operation of law, and as an instrament of the court which appointed him. The cases upon which the appellant relies, of New Orleans Pac. R. Co. v. Parker, 143 U. S. 42 [36:66], and Walter v. Northeastern R. Ca. 147 U. S. 370 [37: 206], were both original bills, over which jurisdiction could only be acquired upon proper allegations of citizenship and amount. In this case, however, the court proceeds upon its own authority to collect the assets of an estate, with the administration of which it is charged; and, if the receiver in such cases appears as a party to the suit, it is only because he represents the court in its inherent power to wind up the estate of an insolvent corporation over which it has by an original bill obtained jurisdiction. In this particular, the jurisdiction of the circuit court does not materially differ from that of the district court in bankruptcy, the right of which to collect the assets of a bankrupt estate we do not understand ever to have been doubted. There is just as much reason for questioning the jurisdiction of the court in this case upon the ground of the want of diverse citizenship, as upon the ground that the requisite amount is not involved. Two cases decided by justices of this court are directly in point: Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506; Armstrong v. Trautman, 36. Fed. Rep. 275. The question certified will therefore be an swered in the affirmative. The circuit court obtained jurisdiction over the Cardiff Coal & Iron Company by the filing of the original creditor's bill by Bosworth, a citizen of Massachusetts, and by the appointment of a receiver; and any suit by or against such receiver, in the course of the winding up of such corporation, whether for the collection of its assets or for the defense of its property rights, must be regarded as ancillary to the main suit, and as cognizable in the circuit court, regardless either of the citizenship of the parties or of the amount in controversy. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U. S. 24 How. 450, 460 [16:749, 752]; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. §. 276 [28:1451; Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co. 123 U. S. 329 [31: 179]; Re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 181 [37: 689, 694]; Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401, 413 [37: 1123, 1126]; Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47, 49 [39:341, 342]. Indeed, it was conceded that, where an insolvent corporation is placed in the hands of a receiver of the circuit court, such appointment draws to the jurisdiction of that court 1. Where the meander line of a government sur the control of its assets, so far as persons having claims to participate in the distribution of such assets are concerned, and that parties must go into that court in order to assert their rights, prove their demands, and receive whatever may be due them, or their share or interest in the estate. But it is insisted that there is a distinction between cases where parties are brought before the court for the purpose of the payment to them of claims they may hold against the estate, and cases where it is sought to recover of them claims which the receiver insists they owe the estate; that the receiver stands in the shoes of the company, and has no higher rights than the corporation, and having sued for less than the jurisdictional amounts, that as to them the cases must be dismissed. CHARLES W. HORNE, Plf. in Err., 0. C. A. SMITH ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 40-46.) Meander line-government survey. vey was really a mile or more from the main waters of a river, and the water line of a bayou opening into the river, was evidently intended as the real boundary, the patent, describing the land by the numbers of the sections and its quantity as 170 acres, will not convey a strip of unsurveyed land of a mile or more in width containing six hundred acres between the bayou and the river, although the official plat names the river as the boundary of the survey. 2. Although official surveys are not open to attack in an action at law, yet it may be shown that the meander line of land conveyed by a patent is the water line of a bayou, and not the water line of the main channel of a river into which the bayou empties, although the official plat showed the land as bordering on the river. [No. 341.] Submitted May 2, 1895. Decided June 3, 1895. NOTE. As to errors in survey and descriptions in v. Lindsey, 5: 423. This position is entirely correct so far as the right of the receiver to recover upon the merits is concerned; but it has no bearing patents for lands, how construed, see note to Watts whatever upon the question of the jurisdiction of the court to pass upon such merits. The receiver does not take his authority as an or40] dinary indorsee of the paper, and *subject to the disability to sue in the Federal court, As to right of the United States and the states to shore lands and accretions against piers, see note to Hallett v. Beebe, 14: 35. As to what is seashore; how far lands bounded on extend, see note to United States v. Pacheco, 17: 865, 1894. HORNE V. SMITH. to the Circuit Court of the United of a mile or a mile and a quarter, and amount- to review a judgment in favor of defendants, C. A. Smith et al., in an action brought by Charles W. Horne, plaintiff, to recover possession of land in the county of Brevard, Florida. Afirmed. Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: On September 27, 1890, plaintiff in error, as plaintiff, commenced an action to recover possession of lot 7, section 23 (except thirty acres on the north side), and lots 1 and 2, section 26, all in township 29 south, range 38 east, in the county of Brevard, state of Florida. The defendants answered, denying possession of the property described in the plaintiff's complaint. A trial was had, which resulted, on January 14, 1891, in a verdict for the defendants, upon which verdict, on June 30, 1891, judgment was entered. Thereupon plaintiff brought this writ of error. Mr. H. Bisbee for plaintiff in error. The contention of the plaintiff is that, inasmuch as this body of land is not shown upon the official plat, and although the boundaries and areas of the three lots are given, the latter aggregating only 170 acres, the patent for the lots conveys all the land to the main body of the river. In other words, a patent for 170 acres conveys over 700. The basis of this contention is the familiar rule that a meander line is not a line of boundary, and that a patent for a tract of land bordering on a river conveys the land, not simply to the meander line, but to the water line, and hence, as claimed in this case, carries it to the water line of the main body of the river. The testimony is apparently not all in the record, nor are all the instructions, but this presents the ruling of the Mr. Geo. M. Robbins for defendant in court: "It is the rule that the meander line is error. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: But a single question needs consideration. The title of the plaintiff to the property described in his complaint is not challenged, but the contention of the defendants is that the land which confessedly they occupy is not a part of the land so described. In other words, the only question involved is one of description and boundary. Plaintiff's title rests on a patent from the United States, dated March 20, 1885, convey not the boundary line; they are run, not as boundaries of the tract, but for the purpose of finding the sinuosities of the bank of the stream. Fractional divisions made so by the water are designated and sold by the numbers attached to and reference is always had to the notes and maps of the survey. The water in the notes is the boundary, and when there ex ists a difference between the meanderline as run and the actual margin of the stream or lake, the water is *the true boundary; but the [43 rule has its limitations, as, for instance, a case in Polk county, with which I am familiar,. where there are fifteen miles intervening be ing "lot numbered seven of section twenty-tween the meander line and the margin of a three, and the lots numbered one and two of lake. This breaks the rule, and I charge you section twenty-six, in township twenty-nine that when, as in this case, there is from three south, of range thirty-eight east of Tallahassee fourths of a mile to a mile and a quarter be meridian in Florida, containing one hundred and seventy acres and forty-two hundredths of an acre, according to the official plat of the survey of the said lands, returned to the General Land Office by the surveyor general." The official plat of township 29 was in evidence, which showed that sections 23 and 26 were fractional sections bordering on the Indian river. On this plat a meander line runs through the sections from north to south, the Indian river being on the west thereof. The east line of the sections is, so far as these lots are concerned, the ordinary straight line of government surveys. In the south half of the south 42] east *quarter of section 23 is lot 7. The area of that lot is given as 73.06 acres. The 5 tween the meander line and the actual margin of the river, and when for half a mile in width this land has upon it oak trees, some of which are from three to four feet in diameter, especially where the waters of the river make up, forming a bayou which conforms substantially to the meander line of the government survey, this is not within the rule." Whatever criticisms may be placed upon this instruction, we think that, as applied to the facts of this case, the ruling of the court was substantially correct. It is undoubtedly true that official surveys are not open to collateral attack in an action at law. Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 240 [39:966]; Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Co. 158 U. S. 253 [39:971]. It is also true that the meander line is not a line of boundary, but one designed to point out the sinuosities of the bank of the stream, and as a means of ascertaining the quantity of land in the fraction which is to be paid for by the purchaser. St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 272 [19: 74]; Hardin v. Jor. dan, 140 U. S. 371, 380 [35: 428]. It is also true that metes and bounds in the description of premises control distance and quantities when there is any inconsistency between them. Morrow v. Whitney, 95 U. S. 551, 555 [24: 456, 457]. But the question in this case is whether the 69 boundary of these lots is the bayou or the tract surveyed terminated at a particular body main body of the river. That a water line of water, the patent carries no land beyond it. runs along the course of the meander line can- Cases of this nature are naturally few in numnot, of course, in the face of the plat and sur- ber. Lammers v. Nissen, 4 Neb. 245, is some vey, be questioned, but that the meander line of the plat is the water line of the bayou rather than that of the main body of the river, is evident from these facts. In the first place, the area of the lots is given, and when that area is stated to be 170 acres, it is obvious that no survey was intended of over 700 acres. In the second place, the meander line, as shown on the plat, is, so far as these lots are concerned, 44] wholly within the east half *of sections 23 and 26, while the water line of the main body of the river is a mile or a mile and a quarter west thereof, in sections 22 and 27. Again, the distance from the east line of the section to the meander line is given, which is less than a quarter of a mile, while the dis tance from such east line to the main bod body of the river must be in the neighborhood of mile and a half. Further, the description in the patent is of certain lots in sections 23 and 26, and, manifestly, that was not intended to include land in sections 22 and 27. a These considerations are conclusive that the water line which was surveyed, and made the boundary of the lots, was the water line of the bayou or savannah, and there has been simply an omission to make any survey of the tract west of the bayou, and between it and the main body of the Indian river. It is un necessary to speculate why it was that it was not surveyed. It may have been a mere over sight, or it may have been because the surveyors thought that the action of the water would soon wash the low land away; but, whatever the reason, the fact is obvious that no survey was made of that body of land, and the boundary line fixed was the water line of the bayou. The rule of public surveys, as prescribed by chap. 9, title 32, Rev. Stats. page 438, and fol. lowing pages, requires that they be surveyed into townships of six miles square, with subsequent subdivisions into thirty-six sections of a mile square, except where the line of an Indian reservation or of tracts of land theretofore surveyed or patented, or the course of navigable rivers, renders this impracticable, with a proviso that "in that case this rule must be departed from no further than such particular circumstances require." Now, if this tract west of the bayou and between it and the Indian river was intended to be surveyed, obviously all the lines of sections 23 and 26 would have been what in point. In that case it appeared that between the meander line as run and the Missouri river was a tract of several hundred acres, and the court held that as that body of land had not been surveyed it did not pass by a patent of a lot which on the government plat extended to the meander line. A similar ruling was made in Glenn v. Jeffrey, 75 Iowa, 20. Whitney v. Detroit Lumber Co. 78 Wis. 240, was a case in which the meander line shown in government surveys was a half mile or more from the real borders of a lake, and the court, in a very careful opinion, discusses the law of official surveys and holds that as the meander line was a mistake, the patent did not carry the land to the actual boundary of the lake, but only to the straight line which would have been the boundary of the quarter section if accurately surveyed. And the same doctrine is reaffirmed in Lally v. Rossman, 82 Wis. 147. But it is said that because the water mentioned on the plat is called Indian river, the boundary must be taken as the water line of the river, and cannot be that of any intermediate bayou. Bates v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 66 U. S. 1 Black, 204 [17:158], is instructive upon this. In that case a patent had been granted for 102.29 acres lying north of the Chicago river, bounded by it on the south and by lake Michigan on the east. The contention was that the main channel of the river entered the lake much below the line shown on the plat, and so the patent carried a larger tract than that described therein. It appeared that there were two channels of the river, and the court said in reference to this: "The mouth of the river, being found, establishes the southeast corner of the tract. The plat of the survey, and a call *for the [46 mouth of the river in the field notes, show that the survey made in 1821 recognized the entrance of the river into the lake through the sand bar in an almost direct line easterly, disregarding the channel west of the sand bar, where the river most usually flowed before the piers were erected. It is immaterial where the most usual mouth of the river was in 1821: nor whether this northern mouth was occasional, or the flow of the water only temporary at particular times, and this flow produced to some extent by artificial means, by a cut through the bar, leaving the water to wash out run along straight lines, and so as to make an enlarged channel in seasons of freshets. 1894. complete sections and quarter sections. But such lines, at least those on the west side, were not run, and, whatever the reason, the survey stopped at the water line of the bayou, and left this body of land west thereof wholly unsurveyed. 45] *Although it was unsurveyed it does not follow that a patent for the surveyed tract adjoining carries with it the land which, perhaps, ought to have been, but which was not in fact, surveyed. The patent conveys only the land which is surveyed, and when it is clear from the plat and the surveys that the The public had the option to declare the true mouth of the river, for the purposes of a survey and sale of the public land." So, in the case before us, obviously the surveyors surveyed only to this bayou, and called that the river. The plaintiff has no right to challenge the correctness of their action, or claim that the bayou was not Indian river or a proper water line upon which to bound the lots. We are of the opinion, therefore, that no substantial error was committed by the circuit court, and the judgment is affirmed. WISCONSIN CENTRAL R. Co. v. FORSYTHE. THE WISCONSIN CENTRAL RAILROAD | first and fourth sections of the Act making the COMPANY, Plff. in Err., 0. WILLIAM O. FORSYTHE. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 46-62.) Act of Congress-lands withdrawn-enlargement of grant-construction of decision of land department-estoppel. 1. Every Act of Congress making a grant is to be treated both as a law and a grant, and the intent of Congress when ascertained is to control in the interpretation of the law. 2. The fact that lands are reserved from sale by the land department does not prevent a valid grant thereof from being expressly made by Act of Congress, although ordinary grants by Congress do not include such lands. & An enlargement of a grant of land made to the same grantee is not to be treated as an independent grant to a different party, but is in pari materia and is to be construed accordingly. ▲ Where six sections per mile were granted in aid of a railroad, and the lands between the six and fifteen mile limits were withdrawn and reserved, and afterwards ten alternate sections were grant are as follows: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there be, and is hereby, granted to the state of Wisconsin for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from Madison or Columbus, by the way of Portage city to the St. Croix river or lake between townships twenty-five and thirty-one, and from thence to the west end of Lake Superior, and to Bayfield, and also from Fond du Lac on Lake Winnebago, northerly to the state line, every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers for six sections in width on each side of said roads respectively. But in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the lines or routes of said roads are definitely fixed, sold any sections or parts thereof granted as aforesaid, or that the right of pre-emption *has attached to the same, [48 then it shall be lawful for any agent or agents, to be appointed by the governor of said state, to select, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, from the lands of the United States nearest to the tier of sections above specified, so much land in alternate sec granted in aid of the same road, the later grant tions, or parts of sections, as shall be equal to was merely an enlargement of the former one, and operated on the land reserved. 5. A construction of law by the land department 6. The delay of the plaintiff to commence an ac- such lands as the United States have sold or of pre-emption has attached, as aforesaid Argued March 28,29,1895. Decided June 3, 1895. construction of that road for which it was IN IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin to review a judgment in favor of defendant in an action of ejectment by the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company, plain tiff, against Wm. O. Forsythe, defendant, to recover possession of lands in the county of Ashland, Wisconsin, Reversed, and a new trial ordered. Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: This was an action of ejectment, commenced on April 5, 1890, by the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company against William O. Forsythe in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Wisconsin, to recover possession of the southwest quarter of section 11, township 47 north, of range 4 west, in the county of Ashland, Wisconsin. At the trial, on April 16, 1891, the court instructed the jury to render a verdict for the defendant. Judgment having been entered on such verdict, the railroad company brought the case here on this writ of error. The title of the plaintiff rested on these facts: On June 3, 1856, the United States made a grant of land to the state of Wisconsin. The granted and selected, and shall be disposed of "Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That the 71 ! |