declarations, contained in their letter to the Governor General of the 8th July, and I promised that I would withdraw the British troops, as soon as I should find that they had commenced to withdraw their troops. In answer to this letter, after much delay and evasion, they made an impudent proposition that I should withdraw first, and fix the day on which the British troops should arrive at Seringapatam, Madras, and Bombay; and they promised that they would arrive at Burhampoor, 40 miles from their stations, on the same day. I then commenced hostilities.

Their object throughout the negotiation was to gain time to negotiate the peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and to pass over the rainy season, which was the least favorable for the commencement of their operations. Our object ought to have been to press them to a decision, whether they would retire or not, at a period when they had not had time to make peace with Holkar, and in the commencement of the rainy season, in the course of which we should have made ourselves masters of almost all their valuable

posts. A perusal of the correspondence will show you which party succeeded best in the negotiation, and I now proceed to give you an account of our military operations.

On the 4th June, I marched from Poonah towards the Nizam's frontier; on the same day Colonel Stevenson crossed the Godavery, and proceeded towards Aurungabad. I remained on the Nizam's frontier, south of the Godavery, waiting the result of Colonel Collins's negotiations, till the beginning of August. On the 8th I attacked and carried by storm the pettah of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fort of Ahmednuggur. On the 9th, at night, I broke ground before the fort, and on the 12th got possession of it by capitulation. This is a place of great note, had been frequently attacked, but never taken. It is, in fact, the strongest country fort I have ever seen, excepting Vellore in the Carnatic, has an excellent ditch, and cannot be surprised. It covers Poonah and the Nizam's western frontier south of the Godavery: the possession of it gives us an excellent depôt, cuts Scindiah off from all connexion with the southern chiefs, and has given us all his territories south of the Godavery.

Colonel Stevenson prevented Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from entering the Nizam's territories till the 24th August; they entered on that day, however, with large bodies of horse, and marched to the south eastward, apparently with an intention of crossing the Godavery, and of proceeding towards Hyderabad. I crossed the Godavery on the 24th, after taking possession of the Ahmednuggur territories, and stopped their progress to the southward; and since that they have retired gradually towards the ghauts by which they entered. They have kept at a distance from me, but Colonel Stevenson has had two or three skirmishes with them. I shall move forward to attack them in a day or two, as soon as I have been joined by my supplies of money and provisions coming from the southward.

The troops in Guzeṛat took the fort of Baroach, on the 29th August. A detachment marched against Cuttack from Ganjam on the 1st September; and General Lake was likely to attack M. Peron, at Coel, about the end of August. I have made a treaty with Amrut Rao, by which I have engaged that he shall have 7 lacs of rupees per annum from the Peshwah, provided he joins

me.

I also think it possible that Holkar will not join the other confederates,

as it is certain that he has no confidence in Scindiah; and since he has known that Colonel Collins has withdrawn from Scindiah's camp, he has sent for an agent of mine, who had been waiting in Amrut Rao's camp for passports to go to him. This man had not joined him a week ago. None of his troops had joined Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar.

I have not with me any of the great southern Marhatta chiefs, and only about 4000 of the Peshwah's troops, under two sirdars of no very great note. But the greater chiefs are neutral in the contest, and if we continue to be as successful as we have been hitherto, they will continue neutral, if they do. not join me.

The weakness of the Peshwah's character, and of his government, are partly the causes through which I have not been supported by the southern Chiefs. But I think I may attribute the want of their services in some degree also to their desire to see which party will be the strongest, before they join either. They have a high idea of Scindiah's strength, and they will hardly believe that we are equal to him. If they should remain quiet, if General Lake should be tolerably successful, or if I can bring the enemy opposed to me to a general action, the war will be of short duration. The rains have been very severe, and I have lost large numbers of cattle; but I am well equipped at present, and the troops are in high health and spirits.'

To Major General Campbell.

91.

Golah Pangree, 20th Sept. 1803.

'8. All the southern Chiefs have written me friendly letters in answer to those that I wrote, in which I informed them of the commencement of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of its causes. Their situation in relation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah is much altered since the fall of Ahmednuggur, and at all events, I believe they are aware that they have no chance of retaining their possessions, excepting under the English protection. Their actions have hitherto been in conformity with their professions, as supplies for my camp have been suffered to pass through their countries since the commencement of the war.

9. These Chiefs, however, are all either declared or concealed enemies of the Peshwah. I know, also, that they have been strongly urged by the confederates to join in the contest. We cannot conceal from ourselves that our cause in this war is very unpopular among those who generally guide the councils and conduct of these Chiefs; and that each individual of them is strongly urged by every motive of national and family pride to oppose the British Government in a war which will certainly destroy the national power of the Marhattas.

10. These facts and arguments are laid before them upon all occasions; and although they see that their personal interests depend in a great measure upon the success of the British Government, and they are aware that there is every reason to believe that the British Government will be successful in this contest, I doubt much whether they would not enter into the war, if they did not see your corps encamped at their gates ready to fall upon and destroy them the moment they should appear as enemies; at all events, supposing that their hatred of the Peshwah, the solicitations of the confederates,

G

and their notions of family and national honor, which I have above noticed, should have no effect upon their minds, and that they are sensible that their interests are involved in the success of the British Government, the position of your corps at least affords them a plausible excuse for declining to join their countrymen in the war.

11. The greatest difficulties with which we shall have to contend throughout this war, will be the want of power and authority by the allied governments of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan. Every killadar, and the head of almost every village and district, acts as he thinks proper, and this conduct may have very unpleasant consequences: your division, the position of which is well known, tends to check this disposition.

12. Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion, that a body of troops in the position occupied by the division under your command is absolutely necessary for the security of the Company's territories; that they render probable the continuance of the neutrality of a class of people who might do us much mischief, and that they check the dispositions of the officers of the government of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan to assume independence.'

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

92.

Camp at Saalgaum, 21st Sept. 1803.

1. I have perused the papers sent from the Resident, enclosed with your letter of the 14th instant, and I beg leave to offer the following suggestions upon the subject of Futty Sing Rao and his mother, to which they relate. They may be of service, if not received at too late a period. If the question should be decided before this letter should be received, they will not be worthy the consideration of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

2. It is my decided opinion, that the offer of Futty Sing Rao and his mother to come to Baroda, provided a ransom is paid for their release, is sincere. I formed this opinion upon the fact that they have entered the Company's territories attended but by a small party of horse. If their intentions were hostile, or if they had any intention excepting that of being released from the hands of the Patans, they would have brought with them a much larger body of troops; and the conduct of this body of troops would have been very different from that observed by those troops at present with Futty Sing Rao.

3. Upon a perusal of the papers transmitted by Major Walker, I do not see the slightest ground for a belief that the intentions of Futty Sing and his mother are different from those which they have declared that they entertain.

4. But whether it be true or not that Futty Sing Rao and his mother have evil intentions, in my opinion, it is necessary first to determine whether it is worth 50,000 rupees to have possession of their persons. If that should be determined in the negative, those persons and the Patans ought to be desired forthwith to withdraw from the Company's territories; and they ought to be driven out, if they should refuse to comply with this desire.

5. If it should be determined that the ransom ought to be paid, respecting which, in my opinion, there can be no doubt, the money ought to be prepared without loss of time, and sent in charge of a sufficient body of troops to meet the latans. Futty Sing Rao and his mother should then be called

upon to deliver themselves over to the British troops, and the money ought to be paid upon their arrival in the British camp. If they should decline to deliver themselves over, or there should be any difficulties on the part of the Patans, or if they should refuse to retire after having delivered over the persons of Futty Sing Rao and his mother, they ought to be attacked and driven

out.

6. In my opinion, however, every attempt to procure the release of Futty Sing Rao and his mother, without paying the demanded ransom, or after paying a part of it, is inconsistent with the scrupulous good faith which ought to direct all our transactions with the natives. It is true that the Guickwar government did not consent in terms to pay the 50,000 rupees for the release of Futty Sing Rao and his mother: but when that ransom was demanded, and the government were informed that these persons were coming down the ghauts with 500 Patans, and the government admitted them into the country, they virtually consented to pay the ransom for which they came; and every attempt to get possession of the persons of Futty Sing Rao and his mother, without paying any ransom, or after paying only a part, is a direct breach of faith. If the government did not intend to pay the ransom, they ought not to have admitted the Patans into the country.

7. While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid expressing my approbation of the prudent conduct of Lieut. Colonel Watson at Barreah.'

G. O.

Pangree, 22nd Sept. 1803.

'Major General Wellesley requests that officers and heads of departments will cause their servants to load their baggage and departments, so as to have the whole in motion before assembly beating.'

G. M. O.

Camp uear Assye, 24th Sept. 1803. 'Returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the battle of the 23rd, to be sent to the Dep. Adj. General, by corps as soon as the commanding officers can conveniently do so. As the enemy's gun bullocks taken yesterday are absolutely necessary for the public service, Major General Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will have an account taken immediately of the numbers received by the people belonging to the corps respectively, and send a report thereof to the Dep. Adj. General. The people in whose possession they are at present, to be directed to take care of them till tomorrow, when orders will be issued respecting them, and they will be paid for every bullock which may be found fit for the service, and taken from them.'

G. O.

24th Sept., 1803.

Major General Wellesley returns his thanks to the troops for their conduct in the action of yesterday, the result of which is so honorable to them, and likely to be so advantageous to the public interest. He requests Lieut. Colonel Harness and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, in particular, will accept his acknowledgments for the manner in which they conducted their respective brigades.

Major General Wellesley has also every reason to applaud the conduct of the cavalry, particularly that of the 19th dragoons, and to express the deep regret he feels at the loss of Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, who led them on.

The whole of the 1st batt. of the 2nd regt., with a proportion of European and native officers, to parade as a working party in front of the park at 6 o'clock tomorrow morning, to be employed under Captain Beauman's directions in bringing the captured guns into the lines.'

G. A. O.

The field officer of the day will order such details of the native inlying piquets to occupy parts in rear of the camp this evening as he may think proper, in lieu of the companies of the outlying piquets usually detached on that duty.'

Memorandum.

Fifty bags of rice to be issued at the Moodee Khana tonight, at 5 seers per rupee, which will be divided as follows: 2 bags to each regimental bazaar, and the remainder to the head-quarter bazaar; the 74th cutwahl receives for that regiment and the 78th; this rice must be retailed at 44 seers per rupee.'

93.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Assye, 21th Sept. 1803.

'I was joined by Major Hill with the last of the convoys expected from the river Kistna on the 18th; and on the 20th was enabled to move forwards towards the enemy, who had been joined in the course of the last 7 or 8 days by the infantry under Colonel Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander* I have not ascertained. The enemy's army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad.

I was near Colonel Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy's army with the divisions under our command on the 24th in the morning; and we marched on the 22nd, Colonel Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna. On the 23rd I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of about 6 miles from the ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed; and, having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed that they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual; accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Marhatta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river and a nullah running parallel to it. The Marhatta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack; it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna; but extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The piquets of the infantry and the 74th regt., which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly, from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regt. at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that

* M. Dupont.