kind or another to individuals at the expense of all. Special attention is therefore given in the constitutions to the chapter on "corporations." In relation to these the course of legislation is as precisely defined as the nature of the subject will permit. For inasmuch as this involves moneyed interests, often of vast proportions, the most powerful levers may be applied to break a wide gap for corruption. The power to pledge the means or credit of a state in any wise whatsoever for a corporation is either strictly limited or entirely denied. Some constitutions go still further. They seek generally to keep the state aloof from all matters in which considerable sums are to be spent in a manner which might offer people with easy consciences and dexterous as well as covetous hands a good opportunity to fill their own pockets out of the public purse. Several constitutions absolutely prohibit the state's undertaking such works of general utility as are called in the United States "internal improvements." Others refuse the power to contract debts in this behalf,— a policy that certainly has two sides to it. To show this I need only refer to the history of the Erie canal, which New York must in a large measure thank for her dominant position in the economic life of the Union. This example points to the second motive, that, besides the reasons assigned, lies at the foundation of these provisions. The American people is almost unanimous in the opinion that the state should undertake no tasks which private efforts can compass. This opinion has been strengthened of late by the history of the land. grants to railroads, since the completion of the great transcontinental railroads, which without such assistance could not have been built.1

1 These roads, however, are not the only ones which have received land grants from congress. The first grants were made September 20, 1850, for the benefit of the Illinois Central, Mobile & Chicago,

Among the most intelligent and cultured Americans the admission is, however, not infrequently made that the state's sphere of activity at present cannot be extended beyond what is barely necessary, because the government is in such hands that increased activity by it in the direction indicated might be expected to add new and greater evils to the evils now due to private control of large public interests, such as the greater part of the public channels of commerce. It is evident not only from the formal precautions already mentioned, but also from many other constitutional provisions, that the idea prevails that a legislature must be approached with a certain amount of distrust. In this respect, the constitutions are a faithful expression of public opinion. This is, indeed, one of the most characteristic differences between the constitutions of the separate states of the Union on the one hand, and on the other hand the constitutions of European states, and also that of the United States. On an important question this distrust sometimes assumes a shape which lets it appear more in the light of a guardianship, but it is none the less overwhelming. As a rule, so

and Mobile & Ohio River roads.

From the date mentioned until

March 3, 1873,- since then, so far as I know, no grants have been made, there were one hundred grants to seventy-two railroads, making a total of about one hundred and ninety million acres. The last figure is calculated from those given in the report of the commissioner of the general land office, but the government itself declares that these figures are unreliable. The Union and Central Pacific received, besides the land grants, a subsidy of about $55,000,000 in the form of a government guarantee of their bonds. The government has as security a second mortgage on the railroads. The land grants are so made that a certain number of sections on both sides of the line of road is granted for each mile built. The number of sections varies.

The following utterances of the Nation of January 29, 1885, are very noteworthy: "The assembling of the legislatures of the various

far as financial legislation is concerned, the legislatures are subject to very precise rules. These are intended to prevent a disordered and lax management of the finances, and as they attain their aim as far as constitutional provisions can do so, they present no occasion for unfavorable criticism. The unconditional obligation, when a public debt is contracted, to make arrangements at the same time for its redemption - sometimes the redemption must take place within a very limited time- unquestionably deserves all praise. A very peculiar impression is made, however, by the fact that the constitutions fix the maximum of the permissible state debt, and in fact fix it so low that even a small city could bear the burden without peril. The extraordinary instances of a war, of sedition or of an invasion are always excepted, indeed, and

states for their winter's work has attracted fresh attention to the machinery of legislation and produced many suggestions on the subject. All of these rest generally on the idea that most legislative work in the United States is defective and slipshod; that the laws are badly drawn; that they are passed without proper reference to and comparison with statutes already in force; that they are frequently jobs disguised as statutes. Governor Hill, of this state [New York], in his first message, recommended that a lawyer be appointed as permanent legislative counsel, to draft bills, to advise the members and committees with reference to proposed legislation, and to inspect the various bills before their final passage, so as to detect errors and imperfections and to suggest neccessary amendments. The necessity of taking some such step, he thinks, is shown very clearly by the fact that, during the session of 1883, in this state, some forty-five bills were recalled from the executive chamber after their final passage for necessary amendment and correction, while during the session of 1884 there were fifty such instances (!). The critics of the governor's recommendation can only say in reply to this that such work ought to be done by the legislative committees themselves; but the evil to be cured is the fact that the committees will not do it. The only machinery for preventing bad legislation at Albany is the veto of the governor, and the governor now has to do the work of legal adviser to the legislature, through the veto power, in a very clumsy way; i. e.,

the American states are rich enough to make their or dinary taxes meet their ordinary wants by honest and half-way reasonable economy without difficulty. But a refusal, except in the cases when the very existence of the state is more or less threatened, of the right to negotiate a loan,- for the right of borrowing a few hundred thousand dollars is but a nominal one,- such a refusal can be justified only on the supposition that certain tasks which are ordinarily performed by the civilized states of the old world ought not to be undertaken by the American states, if these tasks require the expenditure of more money than the current revenue can supply. In such matters, the states cannot go to work in a far-sighted way for future benefits. They must limit themselves to a policy of to-day and to-morrow. It is evident from the he has in most cases to correct defects by killing the bills, when, if the legislature could have been properly advised at the outset, amendments might have been made which would have enabled him to sign them." These circumstances are the more significant because in all legislatures lawyers form the most prominent element. These evils appear in their worst form in the so-called "private bills." Of these the article quoted says: "As soon as business begins, a great crop of bills is introduced, most of which are designed to give some person or corporation a special privilege under, or exemption from, the operation of laws binding on the community. These bills are drawn up, not by the legislators who introduce them, but by lawyers privately retained and paid by the special interests behind the bills, and who, naturally enough, as long as they get what their clients want, care very little what the effect on the general body of the law may be. When the bills, thus prepared, get into committee, there are no rules of any value governing the procedure with regard to them. Those interested adversely have not necessarily any notice to appear; there is no attempt to take proof judicially, but 'counsel' are permitted to make any statements they please." As a remedy the procedure is proposed, the introduction of which, more than half a century ago, put such an effective end to similar confusion in England. In Massachusetts this approved method has already been introduced to a certain extent.

provisions cited as to internal improvements that this was more or less consciously the intention of the framers of the state constitutions. In this they have found themselves on the whole in accord with the character of the actual development of the relations of life in the United States up to the present time. Americans viewed from the stand-point of the most highly civilized states of Europe - are still obliged to apply the greatest part of their strength in working out of the rough and in laying broad and deep the foundations of a civilized state of the highest order. They have not the surplus of time, of intellect and of capital needed to extend the state's activity as far and place it on as sure a footing as in the oldest civilized states of Europe. Hitherto, too, they have had no occasion to give up the fundamental idea of their policy, for the result has proved that the peculiar problems of civilization, with which they have been brought face to face, will be soonest and best solved by the state's retiring into the back-ground. In that event, the organization of society and its organic work result in the freest possible action; and in society the initiative and power of the individual is given the widest scope. The duties of the state are much more limited, and therefore general law has not only a different but a much smaller field; but the (strictly speaking) constitutionallaw side of general law is far more developed than in any nation on the European continent. Even the language shows this. It contains no word that fully corresponds to our German idea of general law. It is therefore scarcely surprising, that at least as far as my knowledge extends - there is no work which treats of general law as we would understand this in Europe. All the books worth consideration treat only of constitutional law or particular parts of it. They simply touch here