renounced the complex apparatus of ministers and ministries. The number of the officials who with the governor constitute the executive department, viz., . e., advisers of the executive and executive organs, is different in the different states. Even in their names there is variety. Besides, or in place of, those already mentioned, some states have a comptroller-general, a solicitor-general and a surveyor-general.

$94. THE COURTS. The organization of the judicial system presents so many differences, and even where these are slight, the names of the courts are often so different, that a general characterization in a few sentences is impossible, unless the discussion is restricted to that which is common to the judicial systems of all civilized states in modern times. Two points must, however, be presented, because in them the judicial system of the several states is substantially different from that of the United States. Although it has never yet been thought that the provision of the federal constitution, for the appointment of all federal judges "during good behavior," should be complained of as unwise, yet nearly all the states have wholly abandoned this principle. The judicial term is only for a fixed number of years, and often by no means for many years. The term of office varies very much in the different states. The general rule,

their former character of party booty - spoils. Whether the United States will ever have as firm an official tenure as prevails in Europe is nevertheless, to say the least, very doubtful. They are still very far from it. How deep the roots of the conviction that "rotation in office" is a democratic principle, or, indeed, a necessary requirement of a free state, have penetrated, can be inferred from, for example, the facts that the Mississippi constitution of 1868 provided that no official should be elected or appointed to serve "during good behavior," and that the Oregon constitution of 1857 actually forbade the creation by law of an office with a term of more than four years.

however, is, that it is longer as the court is higher. When several judges sit in a court, as a rule no integral renewal of the court takes place. In addition to the limitation last noted, the principle of irremovability is generally recognized. But the judges, like other officials, are subject to impeachment. But it is evident that Americans have not been blind to the dangers involved in yielding too much, on this very point, to the democratic tendency to make everything fluid and nothing fixed. In another direction, in turn, the "democratic principle" has made a wide breach in the old traditions. and steadily widened it. True, the judges are still appointed, in several states, by the governor, but election has become the rule. In some states the legislature elects, but in a much greater number, the people. The constitutions place no express restrictions upon eligibility to the judicial office, and in spite of some unfortunate experiences the states in which judges are elected by the people believe that they have no less capable or less pure judges than the others. There are no signs of a reaction. The attacks of the opposition have become, moreover, much less frequent and much less fierce.

95. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. With the unexampled external development of the United States, there has gone hand in hand a progressive democratization of their institutions. Nevertheless, the conservative basis of the character of the American people, derived from England, has remained in force; - how much so appears clearly in the provisions which, in a certain sense, must be designated as the most important of every constitution,— the provisions for amending the constitution. Amendments are not made easily in any state. And in some states they are rendered so difficult, that it may be said that it is almost absolutely certain that a constitution can

be amended only when the people, after mature reflection, have become convinced that they wish the change. and why they wish it. But this is noticeably true only when isolated amendments are in question. The guaranties provided are much weaker when a general revision is undertaken. The reason for this is that such a general revision is always made by a convention elected ad hoc, and such a convention, as has been already shown, represents in a much greater degree than the legislature, according to the prevalent opinion, the sovereign will of the people, and thus the unspoken argument proceedsconsequently also reflects much more the wisdom of the people. And this opinion is not entirely incorrect, indeed, even on the latter point, for the people are wont to lay much more stress on the election of a convention than on the frequent and ever recurring legislative elections, so that men of fitting character, ability and judg ment obtain decisive influence and not persons who have won a position in politics simply by their dexterity in guiding and using the party machine. Moreover, a general revision of the constitution is such an important undertaking, that it will not be attempted if there are not actually urgent decisive reasons for it. And if this be the case, then all the important questions have long beforehand been thoroughly discussed, so that on the one hand the convention knows what public opinion is, and on the other the people cannot come to vote upon the propositions of the convention without a full consideration of their nature and extent. In the constitutions of some of the states, indeed, the democratic fundamental principle, that the constitution must correspond to the will of the people, reaches rather a drastic expression in the provision that at fixed periods (every twenty years) the question must be submitted to the peo

ple, whether or no there shall be a convention. As a rule the people must always decide this, although it is left to the legislature to determine whether and when the question shall be submitted. The certainty, indeed, of a decision by the people, after the expiration of a fixed space of time, and quite independent of the will of the legislature, as to whether a general revision of the fundamental law shall take place, may also tend to make the people more inclined to give the constitution an "honest trial" for a sufficient time, and to turn coldly from demagogic agitation for constant criticism and change. The provisions of all the constitutions as to general revisions1 admit of the expectation that, if no extraordinary state of affairs exists, no convention will be called without urgent occasion, in a lightsome spirit of innovation; that a convention will undertake its work in the full consciousness of its exalted responsibilities with great carefulness, cool reflection and sound judgment; and, finally, that the people in its decision upon the results of this work will be guided, not by momentary impulse, but by calm consideration of facts. Experience has sufficiently proven this, but it has also sometimes shown that, under certain circumstances, passion and demagogic agitation can triumph over sober thought and justice. Without

It has already been mentioned that all the constitutions do not contain detailed provisions as to the holding of conventions.

2 I recall the California constitution of 1879, sometimes called the "sand-lot constitution." This name was given it, because it was formed and adopted under the influence of an agitation which an ignorant demagogue of very ordinary kind brought about by his popular assemblages on the sand lots of San Francisco. It was a campaign of the lower classes of society, in the first place against the Chinese, and to a certain degree also against capital. And even though the programme of the more radical leaders was not carried out, they nevertheless bore away no insignificant victory.

wishing to decide whether the holding of conventions for a general revision of the constitution or the adoption of their propositions by the people should be made more difficult and how this can best be brought about, I must note with praise the fact that many constitutions in their provisions about single amendments take double and treble precautions against all dangers of this kind. On the other hand, it is unquestionably a disadvantage if as, for example, the constitutions of Kentucky of 1850, and of Nebraska of 1867, provide an amendment can be made only by a convention.'

The initiative as to isolated changes and additional articles belongs to the legislature. The proposed amendment must, however, not only be agreed to by both houses, but in nearly half the states, a simple majority of the members-elect is not sufficient; a majority of three-fifths or two-thirds is required. In a minority of the states the proposal is then at once submitted to the people by its publication for a certain time in a fixed number of papers, and at the next general election the people vote for or against it. In most of the states, however, an opportunity is given to the people to express an indirect opinion, because they can let the proposal influence, so far as they see fit, their choice of members of the next legislature. The latter must also vote on the proposition, and only when it has adopted it by the required majority is the matter submitted to the people. In popular votes, almost without exception, a simple majority suffices for adoption. Exceedingly odd are the

1Of the obligation of submitting to the people the conclusions of the convention, nothing is said in these constitutions. The new Nebraska constitution of 1875 allows an amendment by a three-fifths vote in each house of the legislature and a majority of the popular vote. It also requires a constitutional convention to submit its work to the people.