when

deeds not legally, but morally and politically they were questioned by congress or the people. The president is authorized to "require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." Art. II., sec. 2, § 1. The express grant of such a power in the fundamental law of the state means something only when thus interpreted. It is, therefore, certainly not in opposition to the spirit of the constitution if the secretaries have been more and more fused into a ministry which, as a whole, advises the presi dent, so that his personal policy expands into the policy of the administration. But even if this is regarded not simply as permissible, but also as self-evident and necessary, still the president can never shield himself by an appeal to a resolution of his so-called cabinet. It is not opposed to the spirit of the constitution, and it is an irrepressible demand of modern government that, while the president resolves upon many things in his cabinet, he alone not the cabinet-concludes, i. e., decides. The political responsibility of each secretary extends beyond the limits of his own department, because he has voluntarily incurred a moral responsibility for the general character of the president's policy by sitting as a member of the cabinet. But, as the president possesses the sole right of decision, he cannot throw upon his cabinet his legal or political responsibility. As he can seek support in the opinion of each secretary about that official's own department, so he can seek it, by getting the opinion of all the secretaries together, about his general policy; but he cannot put his cabinet in the place which the constitution reserves for him. Because his position in relation to the cabinet is completely free, while as to the single minister it is limited by law, it is so much the more

his duty to maintain with zealous care the constitutional relation-one which utterly excludes, according to its fundamental idea, a cabinet in the sense of those of the constitutional states of Europe. The constitution presupposes the existence of different "executive departments." These were, however, first created by law, and by law the duties and rights of all the secretaries have been accurately defined. The president decides for himself what he shall propose to his cabinet, how he shall count and weigh its votes, and to what degree he shall permit its counsels to influence his own decision. The secretaries are not (as executive officers) unconditionally subject to the will of the president. They are actual heads of departments, and that not because it has so pleased the president, or by force of circumstances, but because the law has made them such. The cabinet is, so to speak, only an inner chamber of the administration. Circumstances and the character of the president may permit it to attain great practical importance, but an official action of any kind whatever by the cabinet, as a body, seems impossible, as long as the whole political structure of the executive power is not subjected to a change in its principles such as could be effected only by a constitutional amendment. The fundamental character of the present relation between the president and congress is that they stand side by side. A cabinet, in the European sense of the term, would be justified, and its existence rendered possible, only when, in place of this relation, a far more intimate and organic union of the executive and legislature had been brought about. The introduction of a parliamentary government must not be thought of. That would put the entire constitution upon perfectly new bases. The administration could not be conducted in the name of a president and under the name

of a cabinet by a committee of the law-making power. As before stated, the executive must be an independent and co-ordinate factor of government, and the bearer of this executive power must be president, not merely in form but in fact. The constitution grants the senate a right of control over the appointment of the secretaries, inasmuch as it requires the senate's confirmation of the president's nominations. But it would be a grievous sin against the spirit of the constitution if the senate were to misuse this right of confirmation so as to compel the president to appoint a particular person, or even a man in political accord with the majority of the senate. The provisions of the constitution as to the time of election, the method thereof, and the terms of office, of president, senators and representatives, leave no doubt that the framers of the constitution did not consider political harmony between the president and congress, or between the president and one of the two houses, as a matter of necessity. As the president is responsible for the administration, it is self-evident that, so far as political views do and must come into consideration in choosing the cabinet, those of the president must prevail. In theoretical discussions, as well as in political struggles between the executive and the legislative powers, the view has always obtained that the constitution gave the president full liberty to remove the secretaries. The political school

1 The conflict between Andrew Johnson and congress led to the enactment of the tenure-of-office act of March 2, 1867, which related to all the civil officials appointed by the president with the consent of the senate. But its main object was to compel the president to retain in office the secretaries who, in full accord with the majority of congress, were the bitterest opponents of his policy towards the rebel states. In my opinion, party passion alone dare dispute that congress, by the passage of this law, became guilty of the boldest usurpation and of gross violation of the true intent of the constitution. Barely

which treats constitutional and parliamentary government as identical ideas will not find, in the constitution. of the greatest and freest republic of all time, the slightest support for its doctrine. But although a parliamentary government is absolutely excluded by the fundamental ideas of the constitution, yet for several years past the question has been discussed with increasing interest, whether the executive power, by law or constitutional amendment, should not be brought into closer communication with the legislative, so that its measures and views could be openly and directly represented in both houses of congress by the secretary of the department concerned. That the development of affairs is tending in this direction, congress has frequently been compelled to acknowledge, at least indirectly, for the secretaries furnish it the materials for many of its legislative labors. Its committees are not satisfied with the written information obtained, and so summon the secretaries, in order to obtain the desired information by oral discussions. Thus, finally, had Grant become president than the most objectionable provisions were repealed by a new act of April 5, 1869. This is so framed that it can scarcely be declared to be unconstitutional. But the tendency to extend the constitutional authority of the senate glimmers even through this. Congress is unquestionably authorized to regulate by law the right of dismissal. Such a regulation in regard to administrative officials is urgently needed. An unqualified right of dismissal, conditioned only upon the senate's assent, should certainly not be accepted as such a legal regulation. As for the offices of a political character, the nature of things forbids bringing them into such a scheme. If the constitution had intended to confer on the senate a right of control over dismissals from them, it would have declared it as expressly as it does the senate's control over appointments. But, as to all other offices, the welfare of the state demands a limitation of the arbitrary power of dismissal exercised by the constantly changing political chiefs. The clause just mentioned of the act of April 5, 1869, simply couples the arbitrary will of the president and the arbitrary will of the senate.

many proposed laws, which officially have an entirely dif ferent paternity, are prepared in some bureau of the administration. But congress is too well aware of how very much the position of the executive would be strengthened, as against itself, if the secretaries received the right of debate in senate and house, and its tendency is too decided to elevate its own dignity and enlarge its own sphere of action at the cost of the executive, to permit those who perceive in such a change one of the most urgent and significant reforms to hope that their views. may soon come to pass. But while the relation of the executive to the legislative power constitutes one of the greatest differences between the political institutions of the United States and those of all European constitutional nations, and probably will do so for a long time, the organization of the "administration" in America, and of the "government" in Europe, is in the main similar, and will become more so with the progressive development of the United States. Originally there were only four departments: that of state (foreign affairs), of the treasury (finances), of war, and of justice (attorney-general). In 1794 the postoffice department (postmaster general) was added; in 1798 the navy department, and in 1849 the department of the interior.1

1 By act of May 15, 1862, an agricultural department was also created. But its head is only a "commissioner." He is subject to none of the secretaries, but is not a member of the "cabinet."

By act of March 2, 1867, there was created within the department of the interior an "office of education," also administered by a "commissioner." The suggestion has already been made to change this bureau into an independent department, but there is no immediate prospect of this and possibly no necessity for it, since the schoolsystem is a matter for the states.

Only the most important points of the organization and work of the departiments can be sketched here.

The state department is not simply the ministry of foreign affairs. The secretary of state is also keeper of the great seal, and in the