« ForrigeFortsett »
anticipation of the assessments or on the lien the city. A resolution of a city council procreated by the assessments for benefits.
viding for a street improvement provided that 2. PLEADING COMPLAINT - UNCERTAINTY
bids for the work would be received up to 6 REMEDY.
o'clock October 30th, and ordered the clerk to Where it is uncertain whether a complaint give notice of the letting of the contract for in an action by a contractor constructing a
three weeks before October 6th. The clerk gave street improvement bases the action on the notice by publication, the first of which was on bonds issued by the city in anticipation of the October 1st, and the last on October 22d. The assessment for the improvement or on the lien notice stated that bids would be received up to created by the assessment, the remedy is by a
5 o'clock October 30th. Held, that the notice motion to make the complaint more specific. was sufficient.
[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 39, Cent. Dig. Pleading, $ 1174.]
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cass County;
David S. Fickle, Judge. 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS STREET IMPROVEMENTS-ACTION FOR COST_STATUTORY
Action by William Hupp against Elbert W. REMEDY.
Shirk, trustee. From a judgment for plainA contractor constructing a street improve tiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. ment may choose between the remedies given by Acts 1901, p. 537, c. 231, § 6, providing that de G. E. Ross, for appellant. Nelson, Myers linquent assessments for benefits shall be col & Yarlott, for appellee. lected in the same manner that delinquent taxes are collected, or by a foreclosure of the lien, though the council in its order of assessment
HADLEY, J. Appellee, as the contractor, provided that it should be collected as taxes instituted this suit to foreclose a lien against are collected.
the real estate of appellant for the improve4. SAME-RESOLUTION FOR STREET IMPROVE
ment of a street in the city of Logansport, MENT-COMPLIANCE. A resolution by the council of a city, declar
under the act of 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 534, ing generally the existence of the necessity for C. 231). A demurrer to the complaint for inthe improvement of a street by grading and sufficiency of facts was overruled, and the graveling the roadway and curbing the gutters
issue closed by a general denial. There was in accordance with specifications, is satisfied if, when the improvement is completed, every
a trial by the court, special finding of facts, part of the street is in the condition prescribed and conclusions of law in favor of appellee. in the specificatons.
Appellant's motions for a new trial and to [Ed. Note.--For cases in point, see vol. 36,
modify the judgment were overruled. ErCent. Dig. Municipal Corporations, 88 888901.]
ror is assigned on all adverse rulings.
Appellant's first objection to the complaint 5. SAME.
A resolution for a street improvement de- is that it is so drawn as to admit of two clared the existence of the necessity for the im
theories; and that it is uncertain whether the provement of a street by grading and curbing plaintiff bases his action on the bonds issued the roadway and curbing the gutters in accord
by the city in anticipation of the assessments ance with specifications. The improvement was accomplished by a contractor under the di
for the improvement, or on the lien creatrection of the city engineer and in accordance ed by the assessment of benefits against the with the contract, by improving the east half defendant's property. It is entirely immaof the street, as before the commencement of the proceedings the west half of the street had been
terial whether one theory or the other is inimproved in accordance with the specifications.
tended by the plaintiff. He may sue upon Held, that the improvement was a substantial the assessment and rely upon his statutory compliance with the resolution.
lien, or he may sue upon his bonds, which [Ed. Note. -For cases in point, see vol. 36,
are nothing more nor less than evidence of Cent. Dig. Municipal Corporations, 88 888901.]
the indebtedness, and pursue the same statu
tory lien Acts 1901, p. 537, C. 231, § 6; 6. SAME — ASSESSMENT FOR BENEFITS-STATUTES.
Scott v. Hayes, 162 Ind. 548, 70 N. E. 879. Acts 1901, p. 536, c. 231, § 3, provides that Besides, if appellant was in doubt about how the cost of a street improvement shall be paid to answer, or how to present his defense, that for by assessments on the property benefited in proportion to the benefits. Pursuant to a
doubt might have been removed by a timely resolution of the council of a city providing for
motion to make more specific. A further obthe improvement of a street, the east half of the jection to the complaint is that it shows upon street was improved, as the west half had been its face that the common council in its orimproved, in accordance with the specifications
der of assessment provided that it should be at the cost of the property owners on the west side. Held, that assessment against the collected as taxes are collected, and, having property on the east side of the street for the
so provided, collection by foreclosure is concost of the improvement was valid.
trary to the terms of the order, and therefore 7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION
forbidden. If the council did so provide OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OF ASSESSMENTS-ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY'S FEE.
in the order, it was surplusage and without The provision of the statute providing for legal significance. The duty of the council an allowance of a reasonable attorney's fee in ended with the making of the assessment. a suit for the foreclosure of a lien against real
That body had nothing to do with the collecestate for an assessment for street improvement is valid.
tion, or with the providing of a mode of collec8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS STREET IM
tion. The Legislature (section 6) specifically PROVEMENTS-NOTICE OF LETTING OF CON points out how collection of such assessments TRACT-SUFFICIENCY.
may be accomplished as follows: "Such deActs 1901, p. 534, c. 231, § 1, provides that
linquent installments shall be collected in the the court shall give notice of the letting of a contract for a street improvement by three
same manner that delinquent taxes are col. weeks' publication in a newspaper published in lected, or may be collected by foreclosure of
the lien thereof, in any court of competent ed the basis of the contract. The law does jurisdiction, as a mortgage is foreclosed." not indulge in such folly as would demand The owner of the lien was entitled to choose a destruction of a part of the street that between these remedies. · We perceive no in might be found in the condition required, firmity in the complaint and the demurrer without more substantial reason than that thereto was properly overruled.
of imposing upon the contract or the burden of 2. The initial resolution adopted by the restoring it. The bids were received and common council declared generally that there contract let for so much per cubic yard for existed a necessity for the improvement of gravel, and so much per lineal foot for bowldNorth Fifth street between Linden and Miami ering the gutter, and if, under the guidance streets, by grading and graveling the road. of the city engineer, as provided by the conway 46 feet wide and curbing the gutters tract, it was found that the west half of the 442 feet wide with bowlders, the street to be street was already satisfactorily improved, brought to a proper subgrade and graveled and that its condition in all ways met the to a depth of 18 inches in the center and slop requirements of the improvement order, we ed to 6 inches at the gutters, all to be done see no reason why an improvement of the in accordance with specifications and draw east half, and the bringing of it to the same ings on file in the office of the city engineer, condition as the west half, did not accomplish in conformity to the established city grade, an improvement of the whole street, and a and under the supervision of the city en substantial compliance with the resolution. gineer. It is shown by the findings that said Second. In considering the fact that the improvement was accomplished by appellee cost of the improvement was all assessed as under the direction of the city engineer and benefits against property on the east side of in accordance with the order and contract, the street, it should be borne in mind that and that in the performance all the work ac this proceeding is under the act of 1901 and tually done by appellee, a contractor, was on the assessment of the cost is not made by the the east half of North Fifth street between old front-foot rule, but upon the principle Linden avenue and Miami street; and the of actual special benefits received. The act west half of said street had been, before the of 1901 applies only to cities “not operating commencement of these proceedings, improv under a special charter.” Logansport is a ed in accordance with said specifications, and city of this class. The act provides (section paid for in full by the property owners on 3) that after the improvement has been comthe west side. And the total assessment un pleted, and the costs thereof ascertained, the der these proceedings was laid against the city engineer shall report these facts to the property on the east side. Under these find common council, which shall refer the report ings appellant insists that the court's con to the city commissioners, who "shall meet at clusions of law in favor of appellee were the time and place fixed by the common counerroneous (1) because the work done and cil and shall proceed to view the lots, lands sued for was not the work provided for by and parcels of ground affected by said imthe ordinance or declaratory resolution, and provement for * * and assess the cost of said (2) because the common council had no pow improvement upon the property benefited er to assess the total cost of the improvement, thereby in proportion to the benefits derived as benefits, to abutters on the east side. therefrom, but not in excess of such benefits."
By Acts 1901, p. 536, c. 231, § 4, when an (Italics ours.) If the total special benefits assessment is once made by the common coun thus ascertained are less than the cost of the cil its validity cannot be questioned, except improvement, the remainder shall be paid by a direct appeal to the circuit court. This from the general funds of the city. Under is quite a different action, but, since counsel the act of 1901 the taxing district is limited have earnestly argued the questions last only by accruing special benefits. All abutabove stated, we have deemed it proper to ting lots and lands are not necessarily assessconsider them.
able; neither are all assessments necessarily First. The resolution in general terms call confined to abutting property. The theory ed for the improvement of North Fifth street of this statute is to seek out the lots and between Linden and Miami streets. The lands that have received a particular and fair implication of the language is that the special benefit from the improvement, not full width and length of the street should be common to nor shared by the other inhabitarticially constructed in conformity to the ants of the city, and against such property "specifications and drawings for the doing of lodge assessments of cost to the extent of said improvement on file in the engineer's such peculiar benefits, when necessary. And office." It is not specified that every part if it turns out, for any reason, that the special of the street should be excavated and then benefits resulting from a street improvement, refilled with gravel 18 inches in the center all fall on one side of the street, that side and sloped to 6 inches at the gutter. The alone is assessable. The court did not, thereresolution was satisfied, if, when the improve fore, for this reason, err in holding the assessment was completed, every part of the street ment valid. to its full width and length was found to The statute provides for, and the court be in a condition strictly in accordance with allowed plaintiff's attorney, a reasonable fee the specifications referred to, and that form in the foreclosure decree. This appellant
claims was a violation of the Constitution. 2. MORTGAGES REDEMPTION ACTION FOL This court has decided to the contrary and
REDEMPTION COMPLAINT ALLEGATION
OF TENDER OF PAYMENT NECESSITY. we still adhere to the opinion heretofore
A complaint for equitable redemption from announced. Dowell V. Talbot Paving Co., a mortgage foreclosure sale which alleges that 138 Ind. 675, 688, 38 N. E. 389; Railroad Com- the mortgagee is holding certain credits to pany v. Fish, 158 Ind. 525, 529, 63 N. E. 454;
which the mortgagor is entitled in reduction of
the amount due to redeem which can only be Judy v. Thompson, 156 Ind. 533, 535, 60 N. E.
determined on an accounting which is demand270. Section 1 of the statute provides that ed, and that he be allowed to redeem from the the common council shall give notice of the sale by paying such sum as the court may find letting of such contracts by 3-weeks' publica
to be due, is sufficient as against the objection
that it fails to aver a tender to pay the amount tion in a newspaper of general circulation of the foreclosure judgment. published within the city. Appellant claims [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 35, that the notice given in this case was insuffi- Cent. Dig. Mortgages, 88 1837, 1838.] cient, and the letting of the contract illegal 3. SAME-TENDER OF AMOUNT DUE-NECESand void. In the declaratory resolution the
Where a lien holder has credits in his common council fixed, as matter of record,
hands which should be applied to the disthat it would receive bids for the work up to charge of the lien, it is not necessary to 6 o'clock, October 30, 1901. An order to the aver in a complaint for an equitable redempclerk directed him to cause notice to be pub- tion, a tender of the amount fixed by the lien,
or an offer to pay that amount, but an offer lished for the letting of the contract for three
to pay what sum shall be found due on takweeks before (as appears of record) the 6th ing the account is sufficient. day of October, 1901. The record further [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 35, discloses that the city clerk proceeded to and Cent. Dig. Mortgages, $$ 1837, 1838.] did give notice pursuant to the order; that 4. SAME -- FORECLOSURE PARTIES FAILbids would be received up to 5 o'clock, October
URE TO MAKE MORTGAGOR A PARTY EF
FECT. 30, 1901, the first of which publication was
A mortgagor conveyed the mortgaged premon the 1st, and the last on the 22d, day of ises to a third person and the mortgagee sued October, 1901. Appellant argues that the to foreclose without making the mortgagor a notice given by the city clerk under the di
party, though it knew that the mortgagor
claimed to be the owner and that his deed rection of the council is no notice at all by to the third person had been procured by fraud, the council, within the meaning of the statute, and without consideration. Held, that the forebecause not in accordance with the direction closure proceedings were, as to the mortgagor,
a nunntv. of the council. What instructions the clerk
[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 35, received from the council concerning notice
Cent. Dig. Mortgages, $8 1280, 1685, 168542.] is of little consequence. The essential things 5. SAME-NECESSARY PARTIES. for the council to do with respect to the time
Where, in a suit to foreclose a mortgage, for the letting of the contract were, first, to a personal judgment is sought against the mortfix the time, upon their record, for the letting gagor, the mortgagor must be made a party to
obtain judgment against him or foreclose his of the contract; and, second, to cause notice
rights. of the time and place of said letting to be
[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 35, given by publication for three weeks in a
Cent. Dig. Mortgages, $8 1272_1280.] newspaper of general circulation in the city. 6. VENDOR AND PURCHASER—BONA FIDE PURAs exhibited by the record, the time was fixed CHASER--FORM OF CONVEYANCE-STATUTES. and the notice actually given as required by declaring that a deed of quitclaim shall pass
Under Burns' Ann. St. 1901, $$ 3343, 3347, the statute, and the public thus afforded a
all the estate which the grantor could convey, fair and equal chance to bid, and in this
and prescribing the form of a nuitclaim deed, respect it must he held to be a substantial a quitclaim deed is a warning to the purchaser
as to the strength of title conveyed, and is sufficompliance with the statute.
cient to put him on inquiry regarding it. There are a number of other unimportant
[Ed. Note.For cases in point, see vol. 48, questions, chiefly relating to the sufficiency Cent. Dig. Vendor and Purchaser, 's8 469-473.] of the evidence to sustain particular findings, 7. APPEAL-FINDINGS-PRESUMPTIONS. and to the admission and exclusion of evi Plaintiff sued to quiet title to land, makdence, each of which we have examined, and ing his grantee and his mortgagee defendants. find no reversible error.
The suit was commenced before the mortgagee,
who had foreclosed, had received his deed and Judgment affirmed.
recorded his lis pendens. Pending the suit a third person purchased from the mortgagee after the latter had received his deed. Subse
quently plaintiff withdrew the suit as against (38 Ind. A. 312)
the mortgagee and obtained a judgment against ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO. et al. v. STRYKER.
the grantee, and thereafter sued to recover from
the mortgagee and the third person. The court, (No. 5,171.)
finding in favor of plaintiff, found that the (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1. mortgagee conveyed the land by deed to the June 19, 1906.)
third person without stating whether the deed
was quitclaim or a warranty deed. Held, that 1. APPEAL PLEADINGS SUFFICIENCY as all reasonable presumptions are to be inREVIEW.
dulged in favor of the proceedings of the trial Where error is assigned to the conclusions court, it would be presumed that the deed exof law on special findings exhibiting the same ecuted by the mortgagee was a quitclaim deed facts as those alleged in the complaint, the suffi so that the grantee therein was put on inquiry ciency of the complaint will not be determined. regarding the mortgagee's title.
8. MORTGAGES REDEMPTION TIME TO RE sions of law. Ray y. Baker, 165 Ind. 74, 74 DEEM.
N. E. 619; Ross v. Van Natta, 164 Ind. 557, Where a mortgagor was not a party to a foreclosure suit and was the owner of the
74 N. E. 10. A reference to our former opinland or the equity of redemption, his right to ion will show that the particular defects in redeem was not limited to the statutory period the complaint most earnestly insisted upony of one year.
by appellants, namely, failure to aver dis[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 35,
affirmance by appellee of his deed to Skinner, Cent. Dig. Mortgages, $$ 1733–1737.]
and facts showing that Alvey was not a 9. SAME-ALLOWANCE OF RENTS AND PROFITS.
good faith purchaser, are therein referred In a suit by a mortgagor against his mortgagee, who foreclosed the mortgage, and a third to and decided, and upon a re-examination person, who obtained a deed from the mort of these questions we find no
no reason to gagee, to redeem from the mortgage, the mort
change our former conclusion. gagor is entitled to have the court determine the issue of taxes, rents, and improvements as
Appellants also insist that the complaint is between himself and the mortgagee and the not sufficient to withstand a demurrer for third person.
want of facts, as a complaint for equitable [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol 35, redemption, because there is no averment of Cent. Dig. Mortgages, $$ 1778-1782.]
a tender or offer to pay the amount of the 10. APPEAL-WAIVER OF ERRORS ON ORIGINAL
Ætna judgment, together with interest thereHEARING-CONSIDERATION OF ERRORS ON REHEARING.
on. While the complaint contains no direct An appellant failing to present a question averment of this fact, yet the facts averred in his original presentation of the case is not show an excuse for not offering to pay the entitled to raise it on a petition for a re
sum then due by averring facts showing hearing.
that appellant, Ætna, is holding certain On petition for rehearing. Overruled. credits to which appellee is entitled, in re
For former opinion, see 73 N. E. 953. See, duction of the amount due to redeem, which also, 76 N. E. 822.
can only be determined upon an accounting
which is demanded, and that he "be allowed MYERS, J. In this case (reported in 73 to redeem from the sale, as aforesaid, made N. E. 953) appellants have filed a petition by the sheriff by paying said defendants, or for a rehearing, assigning many reasons either of them, as the court may determine, therefor, and supporting the same by a vigor such sum as the court may find to be due.” ous brief. In view of their apparent'earnest In our opinion the facts pleaded are sufficiness in this matter, we have taken the time ent to bring the case within the equitable doc-: to again thoroughly consider the record and trine, that where a lienholder has credits arguments of counsel. From this investiga in his hands which should be applied to the tipn we are led to believe that appellants' discharge of the lien, it is not necessary to trouble comes from a mistaken idea of the aver in a complaint for an equitable redemptheory of this action. They admit they "were tion, a tender of the amount fixed by the lien, misled to directing a defense of a complaint or an offer to pay that amount, but an offer to quiet title upon the grounds of undue to pay whatever sum shall be found due upon fraudulent practices upon appellee during taking the account. Kemp v. Mitchell, 36 mental incapacity, whereby he was prevent Ind. 249, 255, and cases cited; Horn v. ed from a hearing in court on the foreclosure Indianapolis National Bank, 125 Ind. 381, suit.” The complaint does contain a number 25 N. E. 558, 9 L. R. A. 676, 21 Am. St. Rep. of averments relative to appellee's mental 231; Coombs v. Carr, 55 Ind. 303, 309; condition prior to and about the time the Nesbit v. Hanway, 87 Ind. 400. Appellee foreclosure proceedings were had. What may was the mortgagor and was claiming to be have been the pleader's object in pleading the owner of the land, and that his deed to these facts is not clear, unless it was for the Skinner had been procured by fraud and purpose of showing an excuse for not sooner without consideration. Appellant Ætna had offering to redeem, but these facts are not the notice of these claims upon the part of apleading and controlling facts in the pleading, pellee while it was still a lien holder. These and upon an examination of the whole rec claims it could have put at rest by a suit to ord, evidence, and briefs of counsel (Carmel, foreclose appellee's equity of redemption.. etc. Imp. Co. V. Small, 150 Ind. 527, 435, 47 Curtis v. Gooding, 99 Ind. 45, 48. This it N. E. 11, 50 N. E. 476) it is apparent that the did not do, and as appellee was not a party cause was tried upon the theory of an equi to the foreclosure proceedings, such protable proceeding to redeem the land from the ceedings as to him were a nullity. Watts. foreclosure sale, as well as to quiet the title v. Julian, 122 Ind. 124, 23 N. E. 698; Petry thereto.
v. Ambrosher, 100 Ind. 510; Curtis v. GoodAppellants' petition is largely predicated ing, supra; Scates v. King, 110 Ill. 456; upon the fact that we did not, in our original Gage v. Brewster, 31 N. Y. 218. opinion, take up each pleading separately But appellants say that because appellee and pass on it. There is no reason for ex conveyed the land to Skinner prior to the tending the opinion for such purpose, where beginning of the proceeding to foreclose its the special findings exhibit the same facts mortgage, he was therefore not a necessary as those found in the pleadings, and error party. As a general proposition, this stateis assigned on an exception to the conclu ment is correct where the mortgagee is simply
insisting upon the benefit of his lien, but where a personal judgment is sought against the mortgagor or grantor, as was done in that case, “then he must be made a party to the action in order to obtain a judgment against him, bar his equity of redemption or foreclose his rights,” Petry v. Ambrosher, 100 Ind. 512, and in any event he was a proper party, and the better practice required that he be made a party. Curtis v. Gooding, 99 Ind. 46. The exception to the general rule in this regard is well illustrated in the case at bar, as future developments proved the truth of appellee's contention, and therefore the controversy arising upon such a state of facts is. properly submitted to a court of equity, that the interest of the parties may be considered and determined purely from merit, freed from formality, to the end that neither shall have an unconscionable advantage of the other.
We find no reason for changing our former opinion as to the effect of the lis pendens notice. The doctrine of such notice originated in equity, and is recognized as an important factor in determining property rights. Being wholly equitable in character, its application must be made along the line of equitable principles, and the maxim, equity regards substance and intent rather than form. Therefore it cannot be said that the advantage of this notice, in the furtherance of exact justice, shall be rendered ineffectual by technical construction. In speaking of this notice, appellants confidently assert that there is great difference between ownership absolute, as stated in the lis pendens, and potice of a right to redeem. This is true, for a right to redeem does not necessarily imply ownership or title, while ownership or title does carry with it, as a matter of law, the right to redeem. It must be admitted that appellant Alvey was a purchaser pendente lite, and as such had notice of the then pending action and of every fact pertinent to that issue. The character of his deed would also be a material fact in this proceeding. By reference to the special findings it will be observed that, in 1895, appellant Ætna conveyed the land by deed to his coappellant Alvey. This finding is in accordance with Alvey's answer and the evidence. Therefore, the conveyance being by deed, and the kind of deed not found, we look to our statute, where we find two forms designated, quitclaim and warranty, and nothing to the contrary appearing, it may be inferred that one or the other of these forms was used. If the first, it served to pass only the present interest of the grantor. Sections 3343, 3347, Burns' Ann. St. 1901; Stephenson v. Boody, 139 Ind. 60, 38 N. E. 331. If the latter, it shall be deemed to convey a fee-simple title with covenants that the grantor “is lawfully seised of the premises, has good right to convey the same, and guarantees the quiet possession thereof;
that the same are free from all incumbrances, and that he will warrant and defend the title to the same against all lawful claims.” Section 3346, Burns' Ann. St. 1901. The force and effect of these deeds as a warning to the purchaser as to the strength or character of title or interest conveyed is widely different. The former is of itself notice to the purchaser that he is accepting a doubtful title, and is sufficient to put him upon inquiry regarding it. Meikel v. Borders, 129 Ind. 529, 533, 29 N. E. 29; Steele v. Bank, 79 Iowa, 339, 44 N. W. 564, 7 L. R. A. 524, 18 Am. St. Rep. 370; Arlington, etc., Elev. Co. v. Yates, 57 Neb. 286, 77 N. W. 677; Peters v. Cartier, 80 Mich. 124, 45 N. W. 73, 20 Am. St. Rep. 508; Condit v. Maxwell, 142 Mo. 266, 44 S. W. 467; Smith v. Rudd, 48 Kan. 296, 29 Pac, 310; Goddard v. Donaha, 42 Kan. 754, 22 Pac. 708; Gest v. Packwood (C. 0.) 34 Fed. 368; Clemmons v. Cox, 114 Ala. 350, 21 South. 426; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 753. While a "title by warranty, for like reason, the form of the latter deed furnishes sufficient assurance to justify confidence that upon inquiry the title" will be found good and unincumbered. Rinehardt v. Reifers, 158 Ind. 675, 677, 64 N. E. 459.
Applying the rule that all reasonable presumptions are to be indulged by this court in favor of the proceedings of the trial court, Campbell v. State, 148 Ind. 527, 47 N. E. 221; Center School Township v. State, ex rel. 20 Ind. App. 312, 50 N. E. 591, it might be said that the deed in this case, in the absence of a contrary showing, was a quitclaim, and that appellee is entitled to the benefit of this fact in support of his judgment. As bearing on the question of facts known to the purchaser, or which he might have known by making inquiry, this court in Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fenstemaker, 3 Ind. App. 151, 154, 29 N. E. 440, said "One cannot purchase property where there are facts known to him sufficient to put him on inquiry, and hold it free from prior claims or equities of which due inquiry would have given him information. A party in possession of certain information will be chargeable with knowledge of all facts which an inquiry suggested by such information would have disclosed to him.”
On the question of appellee's right to redeem after the year allowed by statute therefor, as we see this case, is beyond question. It might be inferred from appellant's argument that they question this proposition, for in substance they say, if appellee was the owner of the land at the time he filed his lis pendens, he has ever since been the owner, and might have redeemed at any time during the year allowed by our statute for redemption. This is true, but if he was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding, and was the owner of the land, or rather the equity of redemption, his right to redeem was not limited to the statutory period. Jewett v. Tomlinson, 137 Ind, 326, 329, 36