impossibility of complying with the statute, that is, of utilizing the heat of natural gas to the extent of the words of the statute. We say to the extent of the words of the statute because we think the statute must be construed with reference to the facts of nature and their possibilities, and that all that was intended by the words employed was to require a practical and possible use of the heat, as in other fuels and by the existing instrumentalities, and if this should be done it was a legal use of the gas-was an application and utilization of the heat contained in it. The statute was only intended to prevent the selection of a product whose production tended, and according to some of the affidavits, whose inevitable effect was, to exhaust the supply of gas in a very little while. The decree granting the interlocutory injunction is reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion. Reversed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER and MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS, dissent. GILBERT v. STATE OF MINNESOTA. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA. No. 79. Argued November 10, 1920.-Decided December 13, 1920. 1. The law of Minnesota declaring it a misdemeanor for any person to teach or advocate by any written or printed matter or by oral speech that citizens of the State should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States, is valid under the Federal Constitution. P. 327. 2. Such an enactment may be upheld both as a legitimate measure of Opinion of the Court. 254 U.S. coöperation by the State with the United States, not in conflict with the federal war power, p. 328; and also as an exercise of the police power to preserve the peace of the State. P. 331. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252. 3. The right of free speech does not cover false and malicious misrepresentations of the objects and motives of this country in entering upon a war, made in a public speech for the purpose of discouraging the recruiting of troops, while the war is flagrant and armies are being raised. P. 332. 141 Minnesota, 263, affirmed. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. George Nordlin and Mr. Frederic A. Pike for plaintiff in error. Mr. James E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, with whom Mr. Clifford L. Hilton, Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, was on the briefs, for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court. A statute of Minnesota makes it unlawful "to interfere with or discourage the enlistment of men in the military or naval forces of the United States or of the State of Minnesota." Its second and third sections are as follows: "Sec. 2. Speaking by word of mouth against enlistment unlawful.-It shall be unlawful for any person in any public place, or at any meeting where more than five persons are assembled, to advocate or teach by word of mouth or otherwise that men should not enlist in the military or naval forces of the United States or the state of Minnesota. "Sec. 3. Teaching or advocating by written or printed matters against enlistment unlawful. It shall be un 325. Opinion of the Court. lawful for any person to teach or advocate by any written or printed matter whatsoever, or by oral speech, that the citizens of this state should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States." Section 4 defines a citizen to be "any person within the confines of the state," and § 5 declares violations of the act to be gross misdemeanors and punishable by fine and imprisonment. The indictment charged that Gilbert at a time and place designated in the State, and under the conditions prohibited by § 2, the United States being then and there at war with the Kingdom and Imperial Government of Germany, used the following language: "We are going over to Europe to make the world safe for democracy, but I tell you we had better make America safe for democracy first. You say, what is the matter with our democracy. I tell you what is the matter with it: Have you had anything to say as to who should be president? Have you had anything to say as to who should be Governor of this state? Have you had anything to say as to whether we would go into this war? You know you have not. If this is such a great democracy, for Heaven's sake why should we not vote on conscription of men. We were stampeded into this war by newspaper rot to pull England's chestnuts out of the fire for her. I tell you if they conscripted wealth like they have conscripted men, this war would not last over forty-eight hours. A demurrer to the indictment was overruled, and Gilbert was tried and convicted. The judgment was that he pay a fine of $500 and be imprisoned in the county jail of the County of Goodhue for one year, and pay the costs of the prosecution. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. The statute, it is contended, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States in that, (1) "all power of legis lation regarding the subject matter contained in the statute is conferred upon Congress and withheld from the States." (2) And that the statute is obnoxious to the "inherent right of free speech respecting the concerns, activities and interests of the United States of America and its Government." We shall consider the objections in their order. It is said in support of the exclusive power in Congress, that Congress alone can under the Constitution "provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,' 'declare war,' 'raise and support armies,' 'make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."" To these affirmative delegations of power to Congress, there is added, it is said, a prohibition to the States to "engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." And, "that the State of Minnesota is not a party to the war now [then] being waged. And if it has not engaged in any war, and until it does so engage, legislation such as a belligerent sovereign might enact, is beyond its province." These specific grounds of objection to the statute are attempted to be reinforced by analogy to the power of Congress over interstate commerce to the exclusion of the interference of the States. The bases of the objections seem to be that plaintiff in error had an accountability as a citizen of the United States different from that which he had as a citizen of the State, and that, therefore, he was not subject to the power or jurisdiction of the State exercised in the act under review. Manifestly, to support the contention something more is necessary than the letter of the cited constitutional provisions. The broader proposition must be established that a State has no interest or concern in the United States or its armies or power of protecting them from public enemies. Undoubtedly, the United States can declare war and it, not the States, has the power to raise and maintain armies. But there are other considerations. The United States is composed of the States, the States are constituted of the citizens of the United States, who also are citizens of the States, and it is from these citizens that armies are raised and wars waged, and whether to victory and its benefits, or to defeat and its calamities, the States as well as the United States are intimately concerned. And whether to victory or defeat depends upon their morale, the spirit and determination that animates them-whether it is repellent and adverse or eager and militant; and to maintain it eager and militant against attempts at its debasement in aid of the enemies of the United States, is a service of patriotism; and from the contention that it encroaches upon or usurps any power of Congress, there is an instinctive and immediate revolt. Cold and technical reasoning in its minute consideration may indeed insist on a separation of the sovereignties and resistance in each to any cooperation from the other, but there is opposing demonstration in the fact that this country is one composed of many and must on occasions be animated as one and that the constituted and constituting sovereignties must have power of coöperation against the enemies of all. Of such instance, we think, is the statute of Minnesota and it goes no farther. It, therefore, has none of the character of the illustrations adduced against it, nor the possibility of conflict of powers which they condemn. This was the view of the Supreme Court of the State, and the court expressed it with detail and force of reasoning. The same view of the statute was expressed in State v. Holm, 139 Minnesota, 267, where, after a full discussion, the contention was rejected that the Espionage Law of June 15, 1917, abrogated or superseded the statute, the court declaring that the fact that the citizens of the State are also citizens of the United States and owe a duty to the Nation, does not absolve them from duty to the State nor preclude a State from |