question in the case at bar. It was a case in bankruptcy. The Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 544, provided that "any natural person, except a wage-earner or a person engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil" might "be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default or an impartial trial" and should "be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits" of the act. A petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed against Klug and a trial was had upon the issue, whether he was 'engaged chiefly in farming" within the meaning of the act, and the jury having found accordingly, the District Court entered a judgment dismissing the petition. The question of the jurisdiction was certified to this court and it was held that the "District Court had and exercised jurisdiction." This further was said, "The conclusion was, it is true, that Klug could not be adjudged a bankrupt, but the court had jurisdiction to so determine, and its jurisdiction over the subject-matter was not and could not be questioned." Citing Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 15; Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U. S. 18, 25; Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355. It will be observed, therefore, that the Act of 1898 made jurisdiction depend upon an inquiry of fact and necessarily jurisdiction was conferred to make the inquiry, and pronounce judgment according to its result. The case, therefore, is not pertinent to, or authority upon the case at bar. The Act of June 25, 1910, which covers the present proceeding is peremptory in its prohibition. It excludes, by 4-a, insurance corporations from the benefits of voluntary bankruptcy, and by sub-division b prohibits them from being adjudged involuntary bankrupts. The effect of these provisions is that there is no statute of bankruptcy as to the excepted corporations, and necessarily there is no power in the District Court to include them. In other words, the policy of the law is to leave the relation and remedies of "municipal, railroad, insur Opinion of the Court. 254 U.S. ance, or banking" corporations to their creditors and their creditors to them, to other provisions of law. It is easy to see in what disorder a different policy would result. We may use for illustration a municipal corporation. Its creditors may be enterprising, its officers acquiescent or indifferent; can, therefore, the allegations of the former and the default of the latter confer jurisdiction on the District Court to entertain a petition in bankruptcy against the corporation and render a decree therein, and if not, why not? If consent can confirm jurisdiction, why not initially confer jurisdiction? It is not necessary to point out the disorder that would hence result and the difficulties that the officers of a bankruptcy court would encounter in such situation. The legislative power thought care against the possibility of it was necessary, and in that care associated insurance corporations. For a court to extend the act to corporations of either kind is to enact a law, not to execute one. The first question concerns procedure only, and should be answered in the affirmative. Denver First National Bank v. Klug, supra; Matter of Loving, 224 U. S. 183. The second and third questions concern the merits and are respectively answered in the affirmative and negative. So ordered. Opinion of the Court. GALVESTON, HARRISBURG & SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY v. WOODBURY ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, EIGHTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT, OF THE STATE OF TEXAS. No. 100. Submitted November 15, 1920-Decided December 13, 1920. 1. The declaration of the Act to Regulate Commerce (§ 1) that it shall apply to any common carrier engaged in the transportation of persons or property from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country,contemplates its application also to the transportation by such a carrier from the adjacent foreign country into the United States, since the test of the application of the act is the field of the carrier's operation and not the direction of the movement. P. 359. 2. Where a passenger traveling from Canada to Texas and return without any express stipulation as to the liability of the carrier for loss of baggage, through the fault of the carrier lost her trunk in Texas on the journey out, held, that the amount of her recovery was limited under the Carmack Amendment by the carrier's published tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. 3. The right of a carrier, under the Carmack Amendment, to limit by tariff the amount of its liability for the baggage of a passenger, was not altered by the Act of March 4, 1915, known as the Cummins Amendment, as amended August 9, 1916. Id. 209 S. W. Rep. 432, reversed. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. T. J. Beall for petitioner. Mr. Rufus B. Daniel for respondents. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court. On March 14, 1917, Mrs. Woodbury took the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway at San Antonio, Texas, for El Paso, Texas, and checked her trunk, which she took with her. It was lost and she sued the company in a state district court for the value of trunk and contents, which the jury found to be $500. Mrs. Woodbury was traveling on a coupon ticket purchased at Timmins, Ontario, from a Canadian railroad, entitling her to travel over it and connecting lines, from Timmins to El Paso and return, apparently with stop-over privileges. When the trunk was lost she was on her journey out. She was not told when she purchased her ticket or when she checked her trunk that there was any limitation upon the amount of the carrier's liability. It did not appear whether the ticket purchased contained notice of any such limitation, nor did it appear what was the law of Canada in this respect. The company insisted that Mrs. Woodbury was on an interstate journey; and that under the Act to Regulate Commerce, February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, it was not liable for more than $100; since it had duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and published a tariff limiting liability to that amount unless the passenger declared a higher value and paid excess charges, which Mrs. Woodbury had not done. She insisted that her transportation was not subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce, because it began in a foreign country; and that the liability was governed by the law of Canada, which should in the absence of evidence be assumed to be like the law of Texas, the forum; and that by the law of Texas the limitation of liability was invalid. The trial court held that she was entitled to recover only $100, and entered judgment for that amount. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, which entered judgment for Mrs. Woodbury in the sum of $500. 209 S. W. Rep. 432. The case came here on writ of certiorari, 250 U. S. 637. The only question before us is the amount of damages recoverable. If Mrs. Woodbury's journey had started in New York 357. Opinion of the Court. instead of across the border in Canada, the provision in the published tariff would clearly have limited the liability of the carrier to $100. For her journey would have been interstate although the particular stage of it on which the trunk was lost lay wholly within the State of Texas. Compare Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111. And the Carmack Amendment under which carriers may limit liability by published tariff applies to the baggage of a passenger carried in interstate commerce, Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97; although it does not deal with liability for personal injuries suffered by the passenger. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Maucher, 248 U. S. 359. The subsequent legislation, the Cummins Amendment, Act of March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196, as amended by the Act of August 9, 1916, c. 301, 39 Stat. 441, has not altered the rule regarding liability for baggage. But counsel for Mrs. Woodbury insists that solely because her journey originated in Canada the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce do not apply. The contention is that § 1 of the Act of 1887 does not apply to the transportation of passengers from a foreign country to a point in the United States. To this there are two answers. The first is that the transportation here in question is not that of a passenger but of property. Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Hooker, supra. The second is that the act does apply to the transportation of both passengers and property from an adjacent foreign country, such as Canada. Section 1 declares that the act applies to "any common carrier engaged in the transportation of passengers or property from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country." A carrier engaged in transportation by rail to an adjacent foreign country is, at least ordinarily, engaged in transportation also from that country to the United States. The test of the application of the act is not the direction of the movement, but |