does not need the aid or delay of drudgery; but one is forced to think that where a change is readily made in any composite instrumentality the change is not the prompting or product of invention. Indeed, it is a common experience in patent cases that mere mechanical facility can alter or change the form in which originality and merit expressed themselves and assert for it the claim of invention. This case is an example of such pretension. We may repeat counsels' question and ask, What did Henderson do that Murray did not do? He made the U-frame which supported the hoisting device of continuous metal instead, as Murray did, of several pieces riveted together, and' in the stirrup which it formed he rested the putlogs or beams loosely making a hinged joint connection between the stirrup and the hoisting machines with a resulting flexibility. This consequence and its advantage, if it have such, it is admitted, he did not discern, and naturally. His purpose was evasion. To evasion he was prompted. Beyond what was necessary to that, he exerted no vision or conception. He had had no experience in the art, and what knowledge of the Murray scaffolding he had was obtained by a thirty minutes' observation of it in operation. We yield to the assertion of counsel that he cannot be deprived of an advantage because he did not discern it, but the same concession must be given to Murray. He was entitled to all of the benefit that he claimed for his device, or that can be given to it by formal changes.

It will be observed that the Circuit Court of Appeals and the District Court disagreed in their views of the re

1 There is a denial of advantage, and it was admitted at the argument that rigidity of the putlog and frame was sometimes resorted to. Counsel tried to minimize the necessity or practice by saying that it was accomplished by a ten-penny nail. Manifestly it was the effect and its necessity or advantage which were important, not the means of their accomplishment, and the necessity or advantage cannot be estimated by the size of the nail.

Statement of the Case.

254 U. S.

lation of the Little Wonder machine to the Henderson device, the latter considering it an infringement, the former determining otherwise, and to that extent reversing the decree of the District Court. Both courts, however, concurred in ascribing invention to the Henderson device. In this both courts erred, and the decree of the District Court is therefore reversed and the case remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint on the ground that the Henderson patent is invalid, it exhibiting no invention.

Reversed.

UNITED STATES v. BUTT, ALIAS WONG SING.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 275. Submitted October 18, 1920.-Decided November 8, 1920.

An indictment for unlawfully bringing Chinese aliens into the United States will lie under § 8 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, where the acts charged do not go far enough to amount to a landing in violation of § 11 of the Chinese Exclusion Act of July 5, 1884. P. 41.

Reversed.

WRIT of error under the Criminal Appeals Act (c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246), to review a judgment sustaining a motion to quash an indictment charging defendant with bringing certain Chinese aliens into the United States, viz., into the bay and port of San Francisco by vessel, in violation of § 8 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 880, which reads as follows: "That any person, including the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any vessel, who shall bring into or land in the United States,

38.

Argument for the United States.

by vessel or otherwise, or shall attempt, by himself or through another, to bring into or land in the United States, by vessel or otherwise, or shall conceal or harbor, or attempt to conceal or harbor, or assist or abet another to conceal or harbor in any place, including any building, vessel, railway car, conveyance, or vehicle, any alien not duly admitted by an immigrant inspector or not lawfully entitled to enter or to reside within the United States under the terms of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 and by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, for each and every alien so landed or brought in or attempted to be landed or brought in." The Chinese Exclusion Act of July 5, 1884, c. 220, § 11, 23 Stat. 117, provides: "That any person who shall knowingly bring into or cause to be brought into the United States by land, or who shall aid or abet the same, or aid or abet the landing in the United States from any vessel, of any Chinese person not lawfully entitled to enter the United States, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction thereof, be fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year.'

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Stewart and Mr. H. S. Ridgely for the United States:

Chinese aliens are embraced within the scope of § 8 of the Immigration Act. United States v. Wong You, 223 U. S. 67; United States v. Woo Jan, 245 U. S. 552, 557. These decisions established the following propositions:

1. That the Chinese exclusion laws and the immigration laws each stand in their own integrity.

2. That Chinese persons are aliens within the meaning of the immigration laws.

3. That if Chinese aliens offend against the immigration

Argument for the United States.

254 U.S.

laws they may be dealt with under those laws even though they might also be dealt with under the Chinese exclusion laws.

It therefore follows that one who brings Chinese aliens into the United States does not escape amenability to the applicable criminal provisions of the immigration laws merely because the aliens are of Chinese origin. Obviously, if the immigration laws embrace Chinese aliens, as ruled by this court, supra, it would be difficult to find a legal theory which would except from the reach of those laws one who aids the entry of Chinese aliens, as here charged.

The contrary theory necessarily asserts that while Wong You, to use that case as an illustration, violated the immigration act by the surreptitious manner in which he entered, and could be dealt with under those laws, yet if the facts had further shown that he had been brought in by another, e. g., Butt, the defendant here, the party bringing him in would escape prosecution solely because the alien was of Chinese origin, although that mere fact did not protect the Chinaman himself from the penalties of the immigration act. Such an illogical result furnishes additional demonstration of the error into which the court below fell.

Stoneberg v. Morgan, 246 Fed. Rep. 98, manifests the view that the Chinese exclusion laws furnish the sole guide for dealing with cases involving Chinese aliens, and the immigration laws are a similar guide for all other aliens. Obviously, as above pointed out, that view must fail when tested by the principles of construction announced by this court in United States v. Wong You, supra. Cf. Ex parte Li Dick, 176 Fed. Rep. 998; In re Lee Sher Wing, 164 Fed. Rep. 506; Looe Shee v. North, 170 Fed. Rep. 566.

No brief filed for defendant in error.

38.

Opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

Error to review a judgment of the District Court quashing an indictment against defendant in error, Butt, which charged him with feloniously bringing four Chinese aliens into the United States, in violation of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 880.

The legality of the ruling depends upon the coexistence of that act with the Chinese Exclusion Act of July 5, 1884, c. 220, 23 Stat. 115, 117.

We may use in exposition of the case the memorandum of the District Court (Judge Rudkin). It appears therefrom that an earlier indictment was presented against Butt charging him in three counts with having brought the same four Chinese aliens into the United States. The first two counts were based on § 8 of the Immigration Act of February, 1917, and the third count on § 11 of the Chinese Exclusion Act. All of the counts were based on the unlawful landing of four Chinese laborers into the United States. A motion to quash the first and second counts on the ground of misjoinder, and on the further ground that the several acts did not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime, was granted. The ruling was based on a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 246 Fed. Rep. 98.

Upon the trial of the third count a verdict of not guilty was directed by the court (Judge Farrington), the Government having failed to prove that the Chinese were actually landed in the United States.

On June 11, 1919, the indictment in controversy was found. As we have said, it charged Butt with bringing the same Chinese aliens into the United States, and all of its counts were based on the Immigration Act. A motion to quash was made, accompanied by the record in the former case, in the nature of a plea of former jeopardy.