Argument for Appellant. 254 U. S. enforcement through supplementary legislation. The presence of § 6, as shown by the history of the legislation, is due to the fact that it was thought desirable to put at rest the contentions of some that the mere existence of labor unions for legitimate purposes was forbidden by the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Section 20 has no application to the case. It is obvious that none of the defendants is or has been or probably ever will be an employee of the complainant, whose factories are situated a thousand miles away from the State where the defendants reside. The limitation with which this section commences therefore excludes its application to the case at bar. As a general proposition even workmen on strike are not "employees." Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. Rep. 582; Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. Rep. 636; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. Rep. 102; Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co, 166 Fed. Rep. 45 (Judge Grosscup's opinion). It would seem that the word "employee" implies the existence of a continuing employment relation. Louisville &c. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501. The various acts specified in § 20, as acts not to be enjoined, have some reasonable significance when considered as the acts of employees carried on incidentally with the calling of a strike, but are not acts which can be lawfully and properly carried on by outsiders. The defendants' contention and the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals lead to the conclusion that a "dispute concerning conditions of employment" between the complainant and any one of its employees justifies all of the other so-called employees in the United States, including the 3,000,000 members of the American Federation of Labor, engaging in a conspiracy to prevent the sale of articles made by 99.9 per cent. of the contented employees of the complainant. If, as in this case, the union can create a necessary dispute. 443. Argument for Appellant. to legalize its attack by ordering 5 per cent of the workmen to quit, it may likewise open the flood gates of destruction against the joint products of the employer and his 99 per cent. contented employees by merely showing that 1 per cent. has responded to its orders. And it is, of course, obvious that § 20 refers to a dispute between the employers and employees and does not extend any immunity to outsiders or sympathizers. Certainly the word "employer" or "employee" or "dispute' should not be extended beyond its natural meaning when to do so will make it operate in derogation of common rights of the particular class of litigants specified. The intent of § 20 was to forbid the issuance of injunctions in those cases, only, where the acts enumerated in its several clauses would not be "unlawful in the absence of such dispute," referring, of course, to a "dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment" between the several classes of persons enumerated in the first sentence of the section. Acts which were unlawful before the passage of the Clayton Act are still unlawful under it, because they are unlawful independently of and in the absence of a trade dispute. In other words, in trade dispute cases the presence of a trade dispute shall not itself taint the specified acts with illegality if they are otherwise legal. Since the secondary boycott is still unlawful in the absence of a trade dispute, Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, it must likewise be unlawful when connected with a trade dispute. This whole section of the law, as shown by its history, was only intended to put at rest the contentions of labor, fallacious though they were, that the courts discriminated unfairly against lawful acts in trade dispute cases. The secondary boycott therefore remains as unlawful as ever. It is further obvious that the various acts mentioned Argument for Appellant. 254 U.S. in § 20 against which injunctions shall not issue in this limited class of cases are most of them acts which in and of themselves are ordinarily lawful as between an employer and his employees, and that this section accomplishes no other purpose than to declare the previously existing law on this subject. It merely declares that the acts specified of themselves and by themselves shall not be held to violate any federal law, but it does not mean that jurisprudence shall be revolutionized by declaring that such acts may be done with impunity to accomplish criminal purposes. If, as stated by this court, not even the recognition of a right by the Constitution can justify its exercise in furtherance of a criminal plot (Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194), and the constitutional privilege of free speech cannot be used as a defense to an injunction which restrains speech or writing, in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy (Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 439), then it certainly follows that the recognition of a right by a statute such as the Clayton Act will not justify the exercise of that right in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, which is expressly recognized by the same statute. When these acts are used in furtherance of a criminal plot they become acts of an entirely different character from those described by this section, for they are colored, and their character determined, by the illegal plot. Defendants' contention, besides requiring a repeal by implication, renders § 20 unconstitutional as class legislation, especially as it would exempt laborers, not as such but in their attempts to control sale and distribution of commodities. Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Nebraska, 252; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540. From these well-reasoned decisions it would seem to follow that an exemption from the anti-trust laws extended to any class of people, purely as a class, is unconstitutional, if the exemption extends to that class 443. Argument for Appellant. under the identical circumstances where other classes are bound by the law. A statute forbidding the federal courts to issue any restraining order or injunction to prohibit the doing of enumerated acts, however unlawful they may be, and however necessary such order or injunction may be to preserve the subject-matter of the litigation, would conflict with the statutes creating those courts and with the general law giving them equitable jurisdiction over such cases when the matter involved exceeds $5,000 in amount. Such a law would violate not only the due process clause of the Constitution, but that other clause which declares that the judicial power of federal courts of equity shall extend to all cases and controversies over which, by the statutes of their creation, they are given jurisdiction. The right to injunction under the Clayton Act is established by Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459; and Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229. The act applies to a suit pending. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 431; Montgomery v. Pacific Ry. Co., 258 Fed. Rep. 382. And our construction of the act is sustained by United States v. Rintelen, 233 Fed. Rep. 793, 799; Lamar v. United States, 260 Fed. Rep. 561; Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's Assn, 236 Fed. Rep. 964; Tri-City Central Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, 238 Fed. Rep. 728; United States v. King, 250 Fed. Rep. 908; 229 Fed. Rep. 275; Stephens v. Ohio State Telephone Co., 240 Fed. Rep. 759; Dowd v. United Mine Workers, 235 Fed. Rep. 1; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 258 Fed. Rep. 829; and it is confirmed by its legislative history. The combination is unlawful at common law. [Citing numerous decisions, including: Shine v. Fox Bros. Mfg. Co., 156 Fed. Rep. 357; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1; Irving v. Joint District Council, 180 Fed. Argument for Appellees. 254 U.S. Rep. 896; Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. Rep. 363; Purvis v. United Brotherhood, 214 Pa. St. 348; Purington v. Hinchliff, 219 Illinois, 159; Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Missouri, 421; Moores v. Bricklayers (Ohio), 23 Law Bull. 665; Thomas v. Cincinnati &c. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 818; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730; Thomson Machine Co. v. Brown, 89 N. J. Eq. 326; Employing Printers Club v. Blosser Co., 122 Georgia, 509; Seubert v. Reiff, 98 Misc. 402; 164 N. Y. S. 522; Schlang v. Ladies' Waist Makers' Union, 124 N. Y. S. 289; 67 Misc. 221; Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Massachusetts, 351; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 288; Martell v. White, 185 Massachusetts, 255]. The question of the applicability of the common law is for the independent decision of the federal courts, not controlled by the decisions of the New York courts. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 33; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Rocky Mountain Telephone Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 156 Fed. Rep. 809; Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. Rep. 71. Mr. Frank X. Sullivan, with whom Mr. Frank L. Mulholland was on the brief, for appellees: The means employed by the defendants to secure an eight-hour day and minimum rate of wage throughout the trade are authorized by the Clayton Amendment. Prior to this amendment the factor of "economic sympathies" referred to in Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. Rep. 111, 120, note, placed the legality of the acts of labor unions in such doubt that it was not possible safely to direct the action of a combination of working men during a period of industrial dispute. Now this amendment clearly states what may be done; and whether it amplifies or merely clarifies what was the law, is im |