. 83.

Opinion of the Court.

to the contractor for any damages which may arise out of any delay caused by the United States."

Here is a plain and unrestricted covenant on the part of the contractor, comprehensive as words can make it, that it will not make any claim against the Government "for any damages which may arise out of any delay caused by the United States" in the performance of the contract, and this is emphasized by being immediately coupled with a declaration by the Government that if such a claim should be made it would not be allowed.

Such language, disassociated as it is from provisions relating to "omissions from," the making of "additions to, or changes in," the work to be done, or "materials" to be used, can not be treated as meaningless and futile and read out of the contract. Given its plain meaning it is fatal to the appellant's claim.

Men who take million-dollar contracts for Government buildings are neither unsophisticated nor careless. Inexperience and inattention are more likely to be found in other parties to such contracts than the contractors, and the presumption is obvious and strong that the men signing such a contract as we have here protected themselves against such delays as are complained of by the higher price exacted for the work.

We are dealing with a written contract, plain and comprehensive in its terms, and the case is clearly ruled in principle by Day v. United States, 245 U. S. 159, 161; Carnegie Steel Co. v. United States, 240 U. S. 156, 164, 165; Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1, 7, and Chouteau v. United States, 95 U. S. 61, 67, 68. The judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petition must be

Affirmed.

STREET v. LINCOLN SAFE DEPOSIT
COMPANY ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 278. Argued April 26, 1920.-Decided November 8, 1920.

The owner of intoxicating liquors, lawfully acquired, stored them prior to the effective date of the National Prohibition Act in a room leased in a public warehouse and so kept them thereafter with the intention of using them only for consumption by himself and his family or bona fide guests. It was admitted that they were in his "exclusive possession and control," and the functions of the warehouse owner were merely to protect against fire, theft, etc., and to afford access for lawful purposes. Held: (1) That the warehouse owner might lawfully permit such storage of the liquors to continue after the National Prohibition Act became effective; (2) that the warehouse owner did not "possess" the liquors, within the meaning of § 3 of the act, nor would it "deliver" them, in the sense of that section, if it permitted their owner to have access to them to take them to his dwelling for lawful use; (3) nor would it be unlawful under that section to transport the liquors from the place of storage to the home of their owner, under permit from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Pp. 90 et seq.

The act must be interpreted in the light of the Eighteenth Amendment, which indicates no purpose to confiscate liquors lawfully owned when it became effective and which the owner intended to use in a lawful manner. P. 90.

The declaration of § 25 of the act that it shall be unlawful "to have or possess any liquor intended for use in violating this title," does not apply to liquors held in storage by their lawful owner solely and in good faith for the purpose of preserving and protecting them until they shall be consumed by the owner and his family or bona fide guests; for that use is declared lawful by § 33. P. 91.

In § 21, denouncing as a nuisance, "any room, house, building, . or place where intoxicating liquor is manufactured, sold, kept," etc., the word "kept" means kept for sale or barter or other commercial purposes. Noscitur a sociis. P. 92.

An intention to confiscate private property, even in intoxicating liquors, will not be raised by inference and construction from provisions of law which have ample field for other operation in effecting a purpose clearly indicated and declared. P. 95.

267 Fed. Rep. 706, reversed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Joseph S. Auerbach and Mr. Charles H. Tuttle, with whom Mr. Martin A. Schenck was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, with whom The Solicitor General was on the brief, for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the court.

By the motion to dismiss the bill filed in this suit it is admitted: that the defendant Lincoln Safe Deposit Company is a corporation, organized under the laws of the State of New York, and authorized to engage in the warehousing business; that prior to the effective date of the National Prohibition (Volstead) Act [41 Stat. 305] the appellant was the lessee of a room in the warehouse of the defendant Deposit Company, in which he had stored wines and liquors lawfully acquired by him, which "are in his exclusive possession and control, and are intended, and will be used only for personal consumption by himself and the members of his family or his bona fide guests;" that the defendant Daniel L. Porter is an agent of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charged with the duty of enforcing the Volstead Act, who in his official capacity has publicly declared and threatened that such storage of liquor by the defendant Deposit Company would be unlawful after the Volstead Act became effective and would expose plaintiff and the Deposit Company to the penalties of that act, which would be enforced against them; that

the appellant desired to continue to store his liquors in said rented room after the Volstead Act should become effective and intended to report the same to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as therein required; and that the Deposit Company, moved wholly by the notices and threats of defendant Porter, had notified plaintiff that he must remove his liquors from its warehouse or that it would remove and deliver them to Porter as outlawed property, to be dealt with under the Volstead Act after it became effective.

Averring as a matter of law that such possession of liquors in a warehouse is not forbidden by the Eighteenth Amendment or the Volstead Act, the appellant prayed that an injunction should issue, restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession of the room in the warehouse and from removing or disposing of his liquors.

The motion to dismiss was sustained, and a constitutional question being involved, appellant brought the case by direct appeal to this court.

Thus is presented for decision the question:

May a warehousing corporation lawfully permit to be stored in its warehouse, after the effective date of the Volstead Act, liquors admitted to have been lawfully acquired before that date and which are so stored, solely and in good faith, for the purpose of preserving and protecting them until they shall be consumed by the owner and his family or bona fide guests?

Since the Volstead Act has been held by this court to be a valid law, the answer to this question must be found in its provisions, and the sections of it which it is argued sustain the negative answer to the question given by the court below, are 3, 21 and 25 of Title II.

Since here, as always, the purpose of Congress in enacting a law is of importance in determining the meaning of it, it is noteworthy that Title II of the Volstead Act was passed under the grant of power to enforce the first section

of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits the manufacture, sale and transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, but does not indicate any purpose to confiscate liquors lawfully owned at the time the Amendment should become effective and which the owner intended to use in a lawful manner.

Section 33 of the act is the only one which deals specifically with liquors lawfully acquired before it should take effect, and it is therefore of first importance in the consideration of the case before us. That section declares:

"It shall not be unlawful to possess liquors in one's private dwelling while the same is occupied and used by him as his dwelling only and such liquor need not be reported, provided such liquors are for use only for the personal consumption of the owner thereof and his family residing in such dwelling and of his bona fide guests when entertained by him therein."

The admissions of fact under which this case is considered bring the liquors here involved precisely within these immunity provisions of § 33, except that they are stored in a public warehouse instead of in a private dwelling. They were lawfully acquired and were intended for a lawful use, and thus the question is narrowed to whether such custody by the warehouse company as is shown by the admissions was forbidden by the act.

Coming now to the sections relied upon as rendering the custody or possession of the liquors by the warehouse company unlawful:

Section 25 declares that "It shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor intended for use in violating this title.

But since § 33 declares that the uses to which it is admitted the plaintiff intends to devote his liquors are not unlawful, obviously this section does not apply to the case,