1757] FEARS OF INVASION. 103 his character. It may be recollected that the duke had been the principal cause of Pitt's removal from the ministry early in the year. When George II. was exclaiming against his son that he had no authority to make such a treaty, Pitt, in opposition to the king, pointed out that full power had been granted to the duke, which in this respect must be considered his justification. Pitt's nature was not one to be dismayed by reverses, however painful, and although the season was late he took steps to equip a fleet, the destination of which was kept secret. There was, at this period, in England an extraordinary dread of invasion from France.* There will ever be found a class of alarmists who can see only the dark side of life; the antecedent events of 1745 were so recent that they furnished an argument with men of gloomy natures for the probability of their recurrence. The dread of this movement had been the cause of the limit imposed to Byng's fleet. Pitt's nature was not one to be impressed by the feeling, especially when he held the power by which the danger could be met. He must have seen these fears to be illusory and groundless, and that his first imperative duty was to re-establish public confi Frequent allusion to this probability may be found in the letters of the time. On the 24th of October, 1755, Wolfe wrote to his mother: "in case of an invasion I imagine my father will think it his duty to be at the head of his regiment." In November he writes from Canterbury: "General Hawley is expected in a few days to keep us all in order. If there is an invasion they could not make use of a more unfit person, for the troops dread his severity, hate the man and hold his military knowledge in contempt." In February, 1756, "I believe the French would be pleased to invade us if they knew how to get over;" and in July: "What makes me laugh, is our extravagant fears of an invasion, at a time when it is absolutely absurd and almost impossible." [Wright, pp. 329: 333-4: 341.] Mrs. Delaney relates in her autobiography [III., 401] alluding to this panic, owing to a wedding procession passing rapidly through some villages, the inhabitants rushed to their houses, barricaded them, armed themselves with pitchforks and exclaimed that the invasion had come. In his letters to sir Horace Mann, Horace Walpole laughs at these fears. In March, 1755, he wrote [III. p. 140] the French "shall be in Southwark before I pack up a single miniature." In February, 1756, he wrote [III., p. 176], “The reigning fashion is expectation of an invasion; I can't say I am fashionable; nor do I expect the earthquake though they say it is landed at Dover." dence. The country had lost its ancient self-reliance; the future seemed dark with additional disaster. The debt was increasing, amid the common feeling that no counterbalancing advantage was obtained. Faith in the public spirit had fled. Incapacity, irresolution, with the care for private and family interest, were apparent on all sides. The nation had no longer any confidence in its good fortune, and while the highest hope was an avoidance of serious failure, the common belief had arisen that national ruin and disgrace impended over the land. An expedition had been suggested by the probability of its success, the design being to destroy the vessels of war in the harbours on the eastern coast of France. The seaboard had been stripped of its defenders to send troops to Germany, and there was the expectation that the possibility of attack would lead to the withdrawal of a large force from the army operating against Frederick of Prussia. The expedition was ready to sail in September; the period taken for its organization was remarkably short, two months only having elapsed from the day when Pitt assumed office. Sixteen ships of the line and several frigates and transports sailed from Spithead, the fleet being under the command of sir Edward Hawke. Sir John Mordaunt was the senior general: a man well known in society, with an assured position as the nephew of the earl of Peterborough, he was personally most estimable. He had thirty-seven years service, having entered the army in 1721, and was now lieutenant-general. He had commanded a brigade at Culloden, and was present in Lauffeld in 1747. The command was, in the first instance, offered to lord George Sackville, better known as lord George Germaine, but it was declined. The second in command was Conway, whose name appears in the imperial history for the succeeding quarter of a century. Cornwallis was the third superior officer. His fame rests on his conduct in the foundation of Halifax, where he shewed uncommon ability and judgment. The expedition is of importance in the history of Canada, inasmuch as it is the occasion when Wolfe's name first appears in prominence. Although Wolfe had attracted atten 1757] ROCHEFORT. 105 tion in the service by his ability and conduct, he was otherwise unknown. With the commanders of regiments he had obtained reputation from the excellent condition to which he had brought the men under him, and the "intelligence of the discipline he enforced." He was appointed quartermastergeneral to the expedition. There was no delay in the departure of the fleet: it left St. Helen's on the 8th of September. After being a week at sea, the information was made known that the objective point was Rochefort, on the right bank of the Charente. The fleet arrived on the 21st of September, but owing to the high wind no attempt was made to land until the 23rd, when the Ile d'Aix was taken by captain, afterwards lord, Howe. During the inaction of the preceding days, Wolfe applied for permission to make a reconnaissance, when he saw that a fort on a sandy promontory had first to be silenced before Rochefort could be attacked. He formed the opinion that a single manof-war could approach sufficiently near for the place to be cannonaded, and that under protection of the fire, troops could be landed for an attack on the reverse side. The pilot considered that there was water sufficient. The admiral ordered a careful reconnaissance to be made, upon which the opinion was formed that the landing might be effected. At the council of war the discussion turned upon the possibility of re-embarking the troops. The general was desirous of receiving a positive assurance from the admiral that he would undertake at any time to embark the troops. Hawke replied that the operation must depend on the wind and weather. The council was not of opinion that the attempt should be made. Two days' deliberation ensued, when the opinion was reversed, and the men were put on board the ships' boats. After lying on the water for three hours, the troops were ordered to return on shipboard. Again there was a misconception between the general and admiral. On the 29th, Hawke by letter informed Mordaunt that if no further military operations were to be proposed, the fleet must return to England. Mordaunt accordingly called a third council, at which the admiral refused to attend, as seamen were not judges of the operations of troops on land. During this hesitation, Wolfe offered, if 500 men were given him and three ships of war, he would make the attempt on Rochefort. The offer was refused. On a third council of war, it was resolved to demolish the fortifications of Aix and to return to England. The national disappointment on this failure was generally and strongly felt. A court of inquiry was held upon the conduct of Mordaunt ; the report, though equivocal, amounted to censure of his conduct. Consequently Mordaunt was tried by court-martial. The verdict in this case was that of acquittal. Few ministers entering upon office during a war, carried on with activity and determination by a powerful enemy, have had to encounter the influence of such depressing reverses. An ordinary mind would have been dismayed and have cowed before the future. The gloomy news from the continent and from America were only re-echoed by the failure of the efforts he had himself originated. With nations, when true self-reliant courage is the basis of the popular character, as with individuals who, with great qualities, have suffered wrong and adversity, misfortune brings forth the nobler, higher and better instincts which circumstances have caused to lie dormant. The immediate consequence is the exercise of the spirit of determination, by which the best results are achieved. How many private histories, if they were written, could trace to what at the time appeared an overwhelming disaster, the awakening of that mental discipline and labour which opened the path to distinction and fortune. Mere complacent satisfaction in the happier chronicles of a nation is a widely different sentiment to that re-awakened patriotism, called into life by the sense of the peril in which the country is placed, to teach us, that on all sides individual effort is demanded, to restore peace and happiness to the nation, when threatened by danger and disaster. As Pitt looked around him in the higher ranks of the services, the sign most predominant was indolent and selfish caution, antagonistic to all display of vigour. 1757] PITT'S INFLUENCE. 107 There was little fondness for the duties of military life; its attraction consisted in the distinction it conferred and the means of livelihood it furnished. As Pitt cast his eyes over the list of general officers, not one name suggested itself as a fit commander of an important enterprise. On all sides there was the same indifference to duty. Army contractors and purveyors were intent on gain; unenterprising and ignorant, their greatest knowledge was that of falsifying accounts. Pitt sought out and detected many such abuses; further, he remedied them. He brought to the discharge of his own obligations, attention, care and devotion. His unceasing labour, his punctual observance of every minor detail, his indefatigable examination of all that came under his notice, awoke a spirit through public life to recall the glorious days of Marlborough. No man met Pitt and received his instructions, but was carried away by the extraordinary influence he could impart. Thoughts which men had not known to be theirs, came upon natures capable of entertaining them, as they heard his plainly-given orders, and listened to his elevated views. He imparted, as it were, that sense of determination and courage, that chivalrous disregard of self, the true prompting spirit of great and noble actions. He brought England back to her true nature, and the re-establishment of the national spirit may be traced to his inspiration. The line of policy, which Pitt determined vigorously to carry out, was the attempt to drive the French from America, and to establish over the whole continent undisputed British rule. The operations to effect this result could be narrowed to three objective points: the fortress of Louisbourg; the city of Quebec; in each case to be attacked by a united naval and land expedition; third, by an advance of a land force by lake Champlain, to attack the French posts on the lake, and to advance upon Montreal. Quebec and Montreal wrested from the French, the outer posts of Frontenac, Niagara, and Detroit, with the forts on the Ohio, including fort Duquesne, would be cut off from all assistance, and from want of supplies would have no alternative but to surrender. |