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had been established here, and it afforded a convenient place for landing on this side.

When the landing was discussed, three points of land on the western side came into prominence as fit for the attempt. Cape Noir was immediately south of the fortress; "White point" was about 6,000 feet to the west; the coast here takes a northwesterly trend, and following the rocky line a mile and a half further "Flat point" was reached, whence there was a more rapid divergence to the north; a short two miles from Flat point there was a small cove, around which the rocks rose to such a height that it was thought that landing was here impossible: it was called by the French "La Cormorandière."

It was to the character of this shore rather than to the strength of the fortress that the French trusted to their defence, for it had little power of resistance against heavy artillery and a strong attacking force. The security of the garrison lay in the prevention of any landing; there was no great risk from any sea attack. There were present the battalions of Artois, Bourgogne, and Cambis, of the regular French force, excellent troops, with a battalion of " Volontaires Étrangers," from which several desertions took place during the siege, and which did not command confidence. Two companies of artillery were present to work the guns. There were twenty-four companies of the Canadian marine force, regularly disciplined. The male residents had organized themselves into companies. The total strength may be set down at 3,800 men. In the harbour were five ships of the line and seven frigates, carrying 544 guns manned by 3,000 men. Late in the siege a force of Canadians and Indians arrived, under de Boishébert, with the object of harassing the besiegers. The service performed by them was unimportant. They remained in the woods to the north of the town, whence they issued in their attacks.

Two thousand men were kept in position along the shore to oppose any attempt at landing, and in no way to relax in watchfulness. They were placed in force at the three locali

ties de St. Julien at "la Cormorandière," the extreme west, with 985 men; Marain at " Flat point" with 620 men; and Danthonnay at "White point" with 250 men. Pickets were thrown out to keep the posts in communication, and a force was held in reserve to be directed against the point attacked. The commandant was the chevalier de Drucour, who had been in Louisbourg since the 15th of August, 1754. In a memoir sent to France* he describes the fortifications as being in ruins, nothing having been done to place them in repair since the place was given over to France by the treaty of Aixla-Chapelle. In 1755, orders had been sent to make the fortress defensible, and the work had been carried on under Franquet.

Drucour, in his letter written in England,† describes himself as threatened with famine once a month. From that contingency he had been relieved by the arrival of the ships from France. Although sir Charles Hardy had been cruising in front of the harbour, he had been unable to prevent a single ship entering the port.

The British fleet sailed from Saint Helen's on the 19th of February, 1758, and arrived at Halifax on the 8th of May. Owing to the absence of Amherst, Boscawen remained in command; feeling the danger of further delay, he resolved to put to sea. As the ships were sailing out, the expedition was met by the commander-in-chief, Amherst. There were one hundred and fifty-seven sail composing this formidable armada, carrying a land force of 12,260 men. The ships kept well together until the 30th. On the 1st of June the admiral's ship met captain Rous in the "Sutherland," who had been cruising

+ Andover, 1st October, Ann. Reg. 1758, p. 179.

The naval force was composed of 23 ships of the line, 18 frigates, and 116 other vessels and transports, making a total of 157 ships of all descriptions. The land force consisted of

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in front of Louisbourg. It was then known that two ships had entered the harbour the preceding day, and it was believed that there were thirteen vessels to aid in the defence. That night the admiral's ship reached Gabarus bay. The second of June was foggy; about twelve the weather cleared, when a view was obtained of the fortress. During the day about a third of the troop-ships arrived and anchored; in the same afternoon Amherst, accompanied by brigadiers Lawrence and Wolfe, reconnoitred the shore as closely as they could approach. While they remarked the points practicable for landing, they observed that the line of coast was strongly fortified, while the surf was beating upon the shore, as if to give warning that no boat could even approach within reach of landing. So much was said throughout the fleet, of this danger in the presence of a disciplined force provided with cannon, that the admiral, to strengthen his own judgment, invited the captains, one after the other, on board his ship to discuss the hazard of the attempt. Had a council been called, most probably it would have resulted in an adverse decision. Among those summoned was captain Ferguson, of the "Prince

The Royal Artillery train included 17 officers, 53 non-commissioned officers, 63 gunners, 163 matrosses. The guns were : Brass-26 4-prs., 18 12-prs., 6 6-prs., 2 13-in. mortars, 2 10-in., 7 8-in., 10 52-in., 30 45-in. Iron-8 32-prs., 25 24-prs., 4 6-prs., I 13-in. mortar. There were 2 8-in. and 4 51⁄2-in. howitzers. Over 43,000 round shot, 2,380 case, 41,762 shell, besides a few grape and carcasses and 4,888 barrels of powder.

Admiral Boscawen not only detached the marines to aid in working the artillery, he likewise sent 4 32-prs, with part of his own ship's company for a battery. [History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, by major Francis Duncan, R.A., pp. 198-200.]

I have to acknowledge my obligation to colonel Irwin, R.A., Inspector of Canadian Artillery, for directing my attention to major Duncan's valuable volume, likewise for many pertinent suggestions with regard to the military events I have endeavoured to describe.

of Orange" 60. He had seen much service, and was distinguished by his courage and conduct: his presence in the fleet had, indeed, been specially asked for by Boscawen. Ferguson would in no way recognize that the impracticability of an enterprise was to be assumed on account of the danger attending it. In his view, no argument which dwelt upon the peril of an attempt should be listened to. He counselled the admiral, for his own honour and for the glory of the country, to assert the power which he possessed by virtue of his rank, and not to appeal to any council of war. The appeal went direct to the bold nature of Boscawen: his spirit rose with the emergency. His instructions were to land the troops on the island of cape Breton, and he resolved to place them on shore, be the risk what it might; and if the general "thought proper" to re-embark them, to cover their retreat.

The determination of Boscawen removed all doubt and irresolution; the ancient courage of the race arose when it was known that the attempt was to be made. Boscawen assembled his lieutenants, and called upon them to exercise the greatest diligence, and to aid the military in every way in their power. On the 3rd the "Kennington" frigate was brought close to the westernmost defences. It was the spot where the New England troops had landed in 1745; by them it was known as "Freshwater creek." The French gave it the name of "la Cormorandière." From this attack of the frigate, in the annals of the siege the spot is known as "Kennington cove."

On the 3rd everything was prepared, but the threatening surf suggested the danger to be incurred. During the examination of the coast the opinion had been formed that less risk would be incurred at Kennington cove than elsewhere, and it was determined that the disembarkation should take place at this spot. On the 4th the snow "Halifax" was ordered to join the "Kennington" in the attack. To distract the enemy, the "Sutherland" and "Squirrel" cannonaded Flat point, and the "Diana" and "Shannon" were brought to bear on the defences of White point. But the weather continued

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so rough that it was not practicable to land. The formidable coast defences could not be attacked in a rough sea. On the 6th there was a change of weather. Preparations were made for landing, and many of the men embarked, when the fog again came on, while the swell increased. The admiral pronounced the landing inadvisable, and the men were ordered to their ships. Amherst is careful to explain that the "reason for so doing" was made known to them.

The weather on the following morning was bad; as it improved in the afternoon, it was hoped that at daybreak the landing could be made. In the afternoon some sloops were sent to Laurentbec, the small cove to the east of Louisbourg. They were despatched to attract the attention of the fortress, to convey the belief that the landing would be made there. The French did not allow themselves to be deceived and lulled into security. During the preceding six days they had strengthened their position, and reinforced the batteries to the No force was detached to Laurentbec, and the vessels sailed to the east without interference.

west.

It was resolved that the landing should be attempted on the 8th. At sunrise the frigates approached the shore and commenced a furious cannonade. The signal was given for embarkation at two in the morning at daybreak the troops detailed for the attempt had been assembled in three divisions. Six regiments, under brigadier Whitmore, rowed to the right, as if to attempt a landing at White point. The centre, under Lawrence, made a show of landing at Flat point. Thus the whole force of the enemy was kept employed, and no one post could be weakened. The left division, under Wolfe, consisted of four companies of grenadiers, the light infantry, the rangers, the Highland regiment, and eight companies of grenadiers in support. As the boats rowed towards the shore, the cannonade from the frigates ceased.

The French did not throw away a shot, but waited until the near approach of the boats to the shore. It was then that they directed their whole fire upon them. The surf was high and strong, and it seemed impossible to find a landing place.